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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1992 election season, pro-life candidates for federal
elective office have aired graphic television advertisements depict-
ing abortion or aborted fetuses. Indiana Republican congressional
candidate Michael Bailey, a self-styled "Christian media specialist,"
inaugurated the graphic ads in 1992.1 One of his spots showed
tweezers picking through a petri dish containing the crushed head,
arms, and legs of an aborted fetus as a woman's voice intoned,
"[i]t's a woman's choice."2 Bailey's advertisement was not an iso-
1. Michael E. Bailey, Censorship by Media Elites Will Ultimately Threaten the Repub-
lic, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 159, 160 (1994); William Booth, Antiabortion TV Ads Catch
On in Campaigns, WASH. POST, July 20, 1992, at Al; David Jackson, TV Ads on Abor-
tion Raise Speech, Obscenity Issues; Senate Hopeful May Air Spots with Dead Fetuses, DAL-
LAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 14, 1993, at A39; Christopher Stern, Antiabortion Ads
Resurface at FCC, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Apr. 18, 1994, at 36 [hereinafter Stern,
Antiabortion Ads].
On Bailey's activities as a Christian media specialist, see Bailey Plans More
Graphic Anti-Abortion Ads for TV, COURIERJ. (Louisville), July 2, 1993, at B7 [herein-
after Bailey Plans]; Jon Lafayette, Candidate's Ads Raising TV Fears, ELECTRONIC ME-
DiA, Apr. 27, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter Lafayette, Candidate's Ads] (noting that Bailey
ran his own promotion company until he founded Christian Media Ministries in
1991).
2. Booth, supra note 1; David Kelly, Challenging the Right to Air, HOLLYWOOD
REP., Aug. 11, 1992; Kate Maddox, Graphic Ads Take Political Center Stage, ELEC-
TRONIC MEDIA, Aug. 17, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter Maddox, Graphic Ads].
[Vol. III: p. 85
ANTI-ABORTION POLITICAL ADVERTISING
lated phenomenon, in part because he lent some of his abortion
footage to other pro-life candidates for similar political campaign
ads elsewhere.3 Some of the commercials even used the same nar-
rative lines: "When something is so horrifying that we can't stand
to look at it, then why are we tolerating it? Pro-choice is a lie.
These babies would never have chosen to die."4 In Georgia, Repub-
lican congressional candidates Daniel Becker, Jimmy Fisher, and
Mark Myers each ran an advertisement showing "Choice A," a smil-
ing baby, and "Choice B," a fully developed fetus assertedly aborted
in the last weeks of pregnancy.5 Some ads purported to show a
3. Booth, supra note 1; Maddox, Graphic Ads, supra note 2, at 1. See alsoJack-
son, supra note 1, at A39 (stating that Bailey "supplied footage to like-minded can-
didates in 18 states, including California, New York and Illinois"); Jeff Kunerth,
Candidates Turn to Graphic TVAds to Spread Anti-abortion Message, ORLANDO SENTINEL
TRm., July 12, 1992, at A5 (reporting on "copycat candidates" and Bailey's provi-
sion of videotape to others); Lafayette, Candidate's Ads, supra note 1, at 1 (noting
calls received from potential candidates in Texas and Montana).
On the use of graphic anti-abortion advertisements generally since 1992, see
Hille von Rosenvinge Sheppard, Comment, The Federal Communications Act and the
Broadcast of Aborted Fetus Advertisements, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 393, 393 (1993) (stat-
ing that such advertisements aired in 17 states); Michael deCourcy Hids, Senator
Who Wouldn't Run Has Won, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1992, § 1, at 26 (reporting that anti-
abortion candidates in 14 Congressional and Senate races used aborted fetuses in
ads in 1992); Jackson, supra note 1.
4. Booth, supra note 1 (advertisement for Georgia congressional candidate
Jimmy Fisher); Crier & Company, (CNN television broadcast, July 24, 1992); Cross-
fire, (CNN television broadcast, July 24, 1992) (advertisement for Georgia Republi-
can congressional candidate Daniel Becker); Colorado Christian Pro-Life Party
Congressional Candidate Matt Noah Advertisement (on file with author). Some of
the Becker and Bailey advertisements apparently include footage from "The Hard
Truth," an anti-abortion documentary purportedly showing fetuses from third tri-
mester abortions. Charles Walston, 4 GOP Candidates Support Graphic Anti-abortion
Ad, ATLANTAJ. & CONsT.,July 1, 1992, at C5;Jackson, supra note 1. Becker claimed
that the fetuses were taken from garbage dumpsters outside abortion clinics. Wal-
ston, supra.
5. Booth, supra note 1; Sheppard, supra note 3, at 393. Similarly, one of
Daniel Becker's advertisements featured a shot of the candidate holding an infant
and saying: "I'm Daniel Becker. I'd like you to meet five day old Lydia. Six days
ago under current law, she could have been aborted." Gillett Communications of
Atlanta, Inc. Petition for Declaratory Ruling, In re Applicability of Section
312(a) (7) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and Section 73.1944
of the Rules of the Commission to Certain Political Advertisements, at 2 n.1 (filed
July 28, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Gillett Petition for Declaratory Rul-
ing]. The rest of the advertisement was described as follows by the station that
aired it:
Right before the word "aborted" the image cuts to the first of six shots of
aborted fetuses, some held in a human hand. All are badly discolored in
whole or in part, and some appear covered with a wet, dark, shiny sub-
stance. While these six clips are being shown, a female announcer recites
statistics purporting to show the prevalence of third trimester abortions.
The spot closes with the candidate claiming that he has placed before the
viewer both life and death in requesting their vote.
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gloved human hand holding fetal arms that had allegedly been
ripped from the fetus. 6 Other graphic abortion imagery featured
intercutting shots of concentration camp horrors, swastikas, Ameri-
can flags and aborted fetuses, characterizing abortion as the Ameri-
can Holocaust.7 In Iowa, a minor party presidential candidate aired
a number of similarly graphic ads that also provided names and
addresses of two physicians associated with Planned Parenthood, so
that viewers could "contact these baby killers and urge them to
mend their ways."8
Some of these candidates were not satisfied with the traditional
thirty or sixty second political spot. They also sought program-
length time to air "infomercials" on the asserted horrors of abor-
tion. Daniel Becker, for example, tried to air a thirty minute pro-
gram containing footage of a third trimester abortion actually
being performed. The lengthy advertisement featured spurting
blood, pieces of fetal tissue being removed from a woman's vagina
by forceps, and a clinical voiceover by a physician describing the
technique of dilation and evacuation abortion, during which the
fetus' head is crushed prior to removal. 9
6. Videotape of 1992 Stephen Hopkins anti-abortion commercial program
(on file with author).
7. Lisa S. Mangan, Aborting the Indecency Standard in Political Programming, 1
COMMLAw CONSPECrUs 73, 73 (1993); Bailey Ads Will Target Gambling, COURIERJ.
(Louisville), Sept. 10, 1993, at B1 [hereinafter Bailey Ads]; Booth, supra note 1, at
Al; Ben MacIntyre, USA: Evangelicals Rally to Beat the 'Sinful, 'THE TIMES, (London),
Oct. 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Times File; Maddox, Graphic Ads,
supra note 2; R.G. Ratcliffe, GOP Candidate Files for Senate Election, Hous. CHRON.,
Jan. 26, 1993, at A24 (quoting Stephen Hopkins' claim that "[d]ivine providence
has decreed that America look upon the images of her holocaust"). The appropri-
ation of the Holocaust for anti-abortion arguments can be found throughout the
literature of the graphic ads movement. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 1, at 162.
8. Comments of Planned Parenthood at 3-5, MM Docket No. 92-254, filed in
response to Request for Comments, In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concern-
ing Section 312(a) (7) of the Communications Act, 7 F.C.C.R. 7297 (1992) [herein-
after Comments of Planned Parenthood]; Marcia Cranberg & Louise Arnheim,
When "Reasonable Access" Is Used Unreasonably, 11 COMM. LAw. 1, 20 (Fall 1993). See
also infra note 322.
9. See Gillett Communications, Inc. v. Becker, 807 F. Supp. 757, 763 (N.D. Ga.
1992), appeal dismissed, 5 F.3d 1500 (11th Cir. 1993). A tape of the Becker adver-
tisement was provided to the author by the FCC. The FCC tapes also included a
Stephen Hopkins "infomercial," purporting to show a third trimester abortion, in
connection with his 1992 candidacy for U.S. Senate from Texas. Jackson, supra
note 1. See also Anne Rochell, Elections '92 TV Stations Split on Airing Graphic Anti-
Abortion Ad, ATLANAJ. & CONST., Nov. 1, 1992, at C8 (discussing a graphic ad from
Becker's 1992 campaign).
Subsequent elections gave witness to similar anti-abortion ads, with candidates
claiming that the graphic ads continued to be critical to their campaign strategies.
Stem, Antiabortion Ads, supra note 1; Mary Dieter, Leising Old-Fashioned Campaign
Beat Bailey's Offering Tactics, COURIERJ. (Louisville), May 5, 1994, at B4 (reporting
Bailey's use of anti-abortion ads in 1994 elections). Michael Bailey also produced
[Vol. III: p. 85
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These advertisements unsurprisingly generated controversy. 10
The candidates were hardly unaware that their images would hor-
rify. 1 Viewer reaction to these commercials was indeed as outraged
spots for other anti-abortion candidates (such as Joe Slovenec, an independent
candidate for U.S. Senate from Ohio). Steven W. Colford, FCC Ruling Imminent on
Anti-Abortion Ads, ADVERTISING AGE, July 25, 1994, available in WESTLAW,
ALLNEWS File [hereinafter Colford, FCC Ruling]. Michael Bailey's own 1994 cam-
paign considered scheduling a December ad depicting a traditional Christmas
scene with an aborted fetus substituting for the Christ child and an announcer
asking: "What would have happened if Mary would have aborted Jesus Christ?"
Bailey Plans, supra note 1, at B7.
10. See, e.g., Booth, supra note 1; Crossfire, supra note 4; Jackson, supra note 1.
Indeed, the ads became the subject of many news stories and talk shows. See, e.g.,
Brian Cabell, TBS Says Hands Are Tied on Abortion-Baseball Ads, CNN News, Tran-
script No. 112-7, July 6, 1992; Nightline: Graphic Political Anti-Abortion Ads, (ABC
News broadcast Aug. 31, 1992) [hereinafter Nightline] ("The commercials became
a hot story. Within weeks, Bailey went from obscurity to celebrity .... ").
11. See, e.g., Booth, supra note 1; Stern, Antiabortion Ads, supra note 1, at 36.
For example, Daniel Becker acknowledged that "[c l learly the nature of these ads is
offensive to most," but called it "a necessary offense." Walston. supra note 4.
Becker stated:
I would like to express my grief over the necessity of using such a graphic
portrayal of the violence done to children through abortions. I have cho-
sen to air these ads through sports, news and other related programming
which reaches a predominantly male audience, with the express purpose
of appealing to fathers to turn their hearts once again to their little ones.
This ad was not designed to overcome our ignorance about abortion. It
was designed to overcome our denial.
Kathy Scruggs, Candidate Won't Pull Graphic Abortion Ads, Spots to Air During Today's
Braves Game, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 5, 1992, at Al.
Michael Bailey "freely admits" that his commercials are meant to disturb view-
ers, including children: "I think kids should see them because we don't want them
to think abortion is socially acceptable." Stem, Antiabortion Ads, supra note 1, at 36.
In his view, the ads forced viewers "to walk through the 'death camps.' It is sick. It
ought to horrify people." Nightline, supra note 10. Furthermore, he described the
commercials as containing "ripped apart arms and legs and torsos, absolutely dis-
gusting .... It's just sick, it's just sick. That's our point." Booth, supra note 1.
Early on, Mr. Bailey stated his view that "[ijf people would see the dead babies that
we're killing through abortion, they would think it was so horrifying they would
stop .... " Lafayette, Candidate's Ads, supra note 1, at 1 (quoting Bailey in April
1992). Bailey also said: "I decided to air the graphic footage because I believe that
the American people have the right and obligation to make an informed decision
as to whether abortion is murder." John Harmon, Anti-Abortion Ad Rattles TV Sta-
tion, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Oct. 29, 1992, at E4. According to Bailey, "[w] hat we've
done is, we've cut through all the rhetoric and taken it directly to the people."
Nightline, supra note 10. After having continued to use the graphic formats in his
1994 campaign, Bailey conceded that his "message and [his] methods are offensive
.... Even people in the church aren't yet quite comfortable with this." Dieter,
supra note 9. Yet Bailey also said: "I have no apologies for the ads and our overtly
Christian stance .... We believe Christians need to invade politics and bring
Christian principles back into the body politic." Bob Lewis, Hamilton Coasts, Three
Vie in Tight GOP Primary, AP POL. SERVICE, May 3, 1994, available in WESTLAW,
ALLNEWS File.
Republican Senate candidateJohn Knox stated that "[t]he ads are designed to
show that it's a life or death issue .... If it takes this graphic depiction of what is
going on, I think the American people deserve that .. " Walston, supra note 4.
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as it was swift, at least judging from the outpouring of distressed
phone calls to stations, complaints to the FCC and threats of litiga-
tion evoked by the advertisements. Many of the commercials aired
in the early afternoon and prime time. 12 Letters of complaint and
phone calls poured into the television stations running the ads.13
One station received bomb threats after it aired graphic anti-abor-
tion ads for Republican U.S. Senatorial candidate Stephen Hopkins
in 1993.14 A number of viewers sued the television stations that
Knox's bottom line: "[i]t's gut-check time in America. People have to quit strad-
dling the fence." Id.
David Shedlock, of the Des Moines office of Operation Rescue, purchased
time to air Virginia independent presidential candidate Howard Phillips' graphic
anti-abortion ads during an ABC "After School Special" in 1992. Graphic Anti-Abor-
tion Ads to Run During Children's Program, UPI, Sept. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File [hereinafter Graphic Ads During Children's Program]. His
rationale: "children need to know what can happen." Id.
In explaining his placement of ads during periods when children will be
watching television, Pro-Life Senate candidate Donald Larson stated that "they will
question their parents and make them uncomfortable enough to begin working
against abortion." North Dakota Senate: New Pro-Life Ads Target Conrad, THE HOT-
LINE, Nov. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Hotline File [hereinafter
North Dakota Senate].
12. See, e.g., Milagros Rivera-Sanchez & Paul H. Gates, Jr., Abortion on the Air:
Broadcasters and Indecent Political Advertising, 46 FED. COMM. LJ. 267, 268 (1994);
Booth, supra note 1 (noting that Becker ads appeared during Atlanta Braves games
and that Republican Jimmy Fisher ads ran frequently - up to 200 times per week
- on cable channels); Graphic Ads During Children's Program, supra note 11 (noting
that Howard Phillips' ads were scheduled to be aired during ABC's "After School
Special"); Christopher Stern, Viewers Protest Antiabortion Ads, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Feb. 21, 1994, at 64 [hereinafter Stern, Viewers Protest] (noting that Hop-
kins' 1994 ads aired in early mornings and evenings, when children were likely to
be in audience, and that he purchased spots during those times "to use his adver-
tising dollars most efficiently"); Walston, supra note 4 (reporting that Becker ads
were scheduled to appear during Atlanta Braves broadcasts). See also Bailey, supra
note 1, at 160-61.
13. See, e.g., Abortion 0, Braves 1, THE HOTLINE, July 7, 1992, at TV Monitor,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Hotline File; Lafayette, Candidate's Ads, supra
note 1; Jon Lafayette, Chicago Station Airs Graphic Ad Against Abortion, ELEcTRONIC
MEDIA, July 27, 1992, at 2 [hereinafter Lafayette, Chicago Stations]; Limit Sought on
Fetus Display, ATLANTA REc., Sept. 7, 1992, at B6; Nightline, supra note 10; Philip P.
Pan, Abortion Ads Anger Braves Viewers, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 4, 1992, at Al;
Rochell, supra note 9, at C8; Scruggs, supra note 11, at Al; Stern, Viewers Protest,
supra note 12, at 64. See also Comments of Gillett Communications of Atlanta at 4,
MM Docket No. 92-254, filed in response to Request of Comments, In re Petition
for Declaratory Ruling Concerning Section 312(a) (7) of the Communications Act,
7 F.C.C.R. 7297 (1992) [hereinafter Comments of Gillett]. Broadcasters found that
irate viewers blamed the station managements for their decisions to air the ads, not
understanding the statutory mandates pursuant to which the broadcasters felt
compelled to air them. Affidavit of Jack Sander at 5, Comments of Gillett, supra at 5.
14. Texas Senate 1993: Last Ditch Ads, ABORTION REP., Apr. 27, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library. KTFX-TV, the NBC affiliate in Midland, Texas, received six
bomb threats after airing Hopkins' ad. Broadcast TV, ELEcrONIC MEDIA, Mar. 22,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library. Hopkins ran in 1993 for the seat vacated
when Lloyd Bentsen became Secretary of the Treasury.
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aired the graphic ads, claiming intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 15 Additionally, many viewers contacted the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC or Commission): In 1992 alone,
the FCC received over 1200 telephone calls and about 1000 letters
about the anti-abortion ads, the majority of which complained of
their graphic nature. 16
Given this reaction, broadcasters might have been expected to
reject such advertisements or schedule them in the midnight hours.
Some broadcasters, however, felt compelled by law to air them. 17
15. See, e.g., Bailey Ads, supra note 7, at BI (reporting woman's intention to sue
WAVE-TV in Louisville "for traumatizing [her] child"); Limit Sought on Fetus Display,
THE ATLANTA REc., Sept. 7, 1992, at B6 (noting lawsuits against Denver and Boul-
der stations); Joe Flint, Graphic Political Spots Bedevil Stations, FCC, BROADCASTING,
Aug. 31, 1992, at 6 (reporting on suit seeking restraining order against Denver
Station KUSA-TV's airing of graphic ads); David Goetz, Jeffersonville Mom Sues to
Stop Bailey's Anti-Abortion Ads, COURIERJ. (Indiana), Sept. 15, 1992, at BI (reporting
pro-life viewer's suit to enjoin Louisville stations from airing graphic anti-abortion
ads on ground that "her two sons could suffer permanent 'psychological and emo-
tional injuries' from graphic anti-abortion ads.. . ."); Lewis, supra note 11 ("It]he
ads prompted lawsuits from viewers who found them offensive"); Limits Sought on
Fetus Display, supra (stating that irate parents sued TV stations in Denver and Boul-
der for "intentional damage" inflicted on their children); Maclntyre, supra note 7
(reporting that ads comparing abortions to Holocaust "prompted a lawsuit by an
Indiana housewife who opposed abortion but called tactics 'vile, disgusting and
atrocious' "); Maddox, Graphic Ads, supra note 2, at 1 (discussing two Colorado
families' lawsuits to block Christian Pro-Life anti-abortion ads); New Albany, USA
TODAY, Oct. 16, 1992, at 7A (describing refiling of federal suit as state court nui-
sance claim in order to enjoin Bailey ads); Nightline, supra note 10 (discussing how
certain children experienced trauma and became hysterical when graphic anti-
abortion ads aired); North Dakota Senate: New Pro-Life Ads Target Conrad, THE HOT-
LINE, Nov. 23, 1992; Leslie Scanlon, Woman Again Tries to Block Abortion Ads Candi-
date, COURIERJ. (Indiana), Apr. 25, 1992, at A9 (discussing pro se federal complaint
and request for temporary restraining order to block Bailey ads). See also infra note
315 and accompanying text.
16. Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling
Concerning Section 312(a) (7) of the Communications Act, 9 F.C.C.R. 7638, 7642
(1994) (stating that FCC "received approximately 1,000 letters concerning the air-
ing of political advertisements containing graphic abortion imagery") [hereinafter
November Ruling]; Mangan, supra note 7, at 73; Colford, FCC Ruling, supra note 9
(stating that FCC reported complaints concerning airing of graphic anti-abortion
ads); Stern, Viewers Protest, supra note 12 (claiming that FCC logged more than
3000 complaints).
Indeed, outraged viewers were counseled, in print, to call the FCC and com-
plain about Michael Bailey's 1994 campaign of graphic abortion imagery. Steve
Hall, TV Stations Should Reject Bailey's Ad, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 13, 1994, at B7.
The then-current spots featured "images of dead fetuses" and children in a ceme-
tery, singing a song about "how long we will allow abortion to continue." Id. Some
stations apparently refused to air the spots in the news, leading Bailey to charge
them with hypocrisy for covering stories with dead bodies while rejecting his ads.
Bailey, supra note 1, at 161; Cary B. Willis, Bailey Files Complaint Over Station Limiting
Ad, COURIERJ. (Louisville), Apr. 7, 1994, at BI.
17. See, e.g., Booth, supra note 1 (reporting that TBS executives did not want
to air the ads, but thought FCC regulation required them to do so); Steven W.
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Section 312(a) (7) of the Federal Communications Act of 1934
(Communications Act) guarantees federal political candidates "rea-
sonable access" to the broadcast airwaves for their political adver-
tisements, and puts licensees at risk of license revocation for any
willful or repeated violation of the access privilege.1 8 Section 315 of
the Communications Act requires broadcasters to provide equal op-
portunities to all legally qualified candidates for a political office if
any one of them is allowed to "use" the station, and explicitly for-
bids any censorship of political advertisements aired pursuant to
the equal opportunities rule. 19
A number of stations sought to avoid this dilemma by appeal-
ing to the FCC in July 1992,20 in marked contrast to the traditional
broadcaster posture of resisting governmental intervention. 21
Colford, Candidate's Antiabortion Spots Test Federal Limits, ADVERTISING AGE, Apr. 27,
1992, at 3 [hereinafter Colford, Candidate's Antiabortion Spots] (reporting that FCC
"told station attorneys they were required by law" to air ads);Jackson, supra note 1,
at A39 (quoting general manager of Dallas' KDFW-TV as saying "[if] we had a
choice, we probably would not have ran the spots"); Lafayette, Candidate's Ads,
supra note 1.
18. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), amended by 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1995). Section
312(a) (7) states:
The Commission may revoke any station license or construction permit
... for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to per-
mit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting
station by a legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office on be-
half of his candidacy.
47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1995).
19. Section 315 provides, in pertinent part, that:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate
for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal
opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of
such broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall have no
power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of
this section.
47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1995).
20. In July 1992, two Petitions for Declaratory Ruling were filed with the FCC
- one by Gillett Communications of Atlanta, Inc., former licensee of Atlanta tele-
vision station WAGA-TV (a CBS affiliate that had previously aired a Daniel Becker
commercial) and the other by the law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays &
Handler apparently on behalf of more than 300 broadcast clients. See November
Ruling, 9 F.C.C.R. at 7638 n.1. See also Kelly, supra note 2 (stating that the Kaye,
Scholer firm represented more than 400 television stations). None of the firm's
filings specify the number of clients on whose behalf the declaratory judgment
petition was brought. Id.
21. Broadcaster attempts to establish editorial autonomy have ranged from
opposition to the fairness doctrine to challenges to the enforcement of the FCC's
indecency rules. See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987), aff'd,
867 F.2d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990) (repealing the
fairness doctrine). The history (not to mention the lengthy party list) of the vari-
ous Action For Children's Television cases challenging the constitutionality of the
Commission's indecency rules is good evidence of strong broadcaster opposition
to the Commission's decision in 1987 to embark on a stringent enforcement pro-
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These broadcasters asked the FCC to allow the commercials to be
channeled to hours of the broadcast day when children would be
less likely to be in the audience, despite the constraints of the polit-
ical advertising provisions of the Communications Act, because the
advertisements were indecent or otherwise unsuitable for chil-
dren.22 The candidates claimed that the broadcasters' reluctance
to broadcast these advertisements was politically motivated:
gram against the broadcast of indecency broadly defined. See Action for Chil-
dren's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1334-35 (D.C. Cir. 1988) [hereinafter ACT
I]; Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert
denied, 503 U.S. 914 (1992) [hereinafter ACT II]; Action for Children's Television
v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) [hereinafter ACT I1], cert.
denied, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 36 (Jan. 8, 1996).
It should be noted that not all broadcasters aligned thefiselves with the sub-
stantive arguments of the petitioning parties. In fact, the National Association of
Broadcasters and the same coalition of broadcasters and public interest groups
that joined in the ACT cases to challenge the post-1987 expansion of the FCC's
enforcement of indecency standards took the position that the agency should not
expand its definition of actionable indecency to include graphic anti-abortion ads.
See, e.g., Joint Comments of Action for Children's Television at 3, MM Docket No.
92-254, filed in response to Request for Comments, In re Petition for Declaratory
Ruling Concerning Section 312(a) (7) of the Communications Act, 7 F.C.C.R 7297
(1992) [hereinafter Joint Comments]; Colford, FCC Ruling, supra note 9; Harry A.
Jessell, Broadcasters Oppose Widening Indecency Net to Include Political Anti-Abortion Ad-
vertisements, BROADCASTING, Feb. 1, 1993 at 54. The coalition's position, however,
was consistent with the position permitting broadcaster discretion to make reason-
able good faith judgments about when to broadcast these ads. Id.
22. The petitions took the position that the graphic depictions of abortions
and fetuses were indecent and, as such, subject to the Commission's requirement
that they be channeled to late night hours. See Letter to Vincent A. Pepper, Esq.,
and Irving Gastfreund, Esq., 7 F.C.C.R. 5599 (1992) [hereinafter Letter to Pepper
and Gastfreund]; November Ruling, 9 F.C.C.R. at 7639. The Gillett petition re-
quested that the Commission issue a declaratory ruling that "political uses, which
the licensee determines in good faith to be indecent or otherwise unsuitable for
children, may be channeled to day parts in which children do not constitute a
significant audience." Gillett Petition for Declaratory Ruling, supra note 5, at 10. Since
channeling would be mandatory if the FCC were to find an advertisement inde-
cent, the permissive wording of Gillett's petition suggests that Gillett was asking the
FCC to declare that mandatory channeling should rest not on a Commission find-
ing of indecency, but on a broadcaster's good faith belief. The result of such a
standard would be minimal independent FCC review of the channeling decision.
Similarly, the Kaye, Scholer petition requested a declaratory ruling that broadcast-
ers could decline to broadcast "uses" during hours when there is a reasonable risk
that children may be in the audience where such uses present graphic depictions
of fetuses and where the licensee reasonably concludes, in good faith, that the
graphic depictions are indecent under § 1464. Comments of Kaye, Scholer
Fierman Hays & Handler at 2, MM Docket No. 92-254, filed in response to Request
for Comments, In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning section 312(a) (7)
of the Communications Act, 7 F.C.C.R. 7297 (1992) [hereinafter Comments of Kaye,
Scholer] (describing Kaye, Scholer petition). See also Action for Children's Televi-
sion v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding constitutional statute re-
quiring broadcasters to channel indecent material and remanding to FCC for
establishment of ten o'clock p.m. to six o'clock a.m. "safe harbor" for broadcast of
indecency), cert. denied, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 36 (Jan. 8, 1996).
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Michael Bailey consistently charged "blatant censorship by the left-
ist liberal pro-abortion broadcast media that is arrogantly defying
the law."23
Ultimately, in its 1994 "November Ruling," the FCC decided
that political ads with graphic abortion imagery were not indecent,
but could nevertheless be channeled to times of the day when chil-
dren were less likely to be in the audience if broadcasters, in the
good faith exercise of their discretion, believed that the commer-
cials would be harmful to children. 2 4 Both Daniel Becker and the
Washington Area Citizens Coalition Interested in Viewers' Constitu-
tional Rights (hereinafter WACCI-VCR) have appealed the FCC's
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.25
23. Stern, Antiabortion Ads, supra note 1. See also Maddox, Graphic Ads, supra
note 2, at 1 (quoting Bailey's view that "[this is the liberal, leftist media trying to
tell conservative, Christian congressional candidates what they can and cannot
air").
24. November Ruling, 9 F.C.C.R. at 7645-49.
25. Petition for Review, Becker v. FCC, No. 95-1048 (D.C. Cir. filed Jan. 19,
1995); Petition for Review, Washington Area Citizens Coalition Interested in
Viewer's Constitutional Rights (WACCI-VCR) v. FCC, No. 95-1056 (D.C. Cir. filed
Jan. 23, 1995). The two cases have now been consolidated, with the Becker case as
the lead docket. Becker v. FCC, Consolidation Order, No. 95-1048 (D.C. Cir. filed
Feb. 2, 1995). WACCI-VCR is described in its court papers as a non-profit mem-
bership organization whose members are listeners and viewers of the electronic
media who reside in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. Joint Provisional
Certificate of Counsel at 2, Becker v. FCC, No. 95-1048 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 3,
1995). The organization "seeks, inter alia, to represent its members' interests in
protecting their right to be informed on issues of importance, and to hear the
views of all legally qualified candidates for public office. In the past, at least one
member of WACCI-VCR was a candidate for political office." Id. The National
Association of Broadcasters (NAB), the Louisiana Television Broadcasting Corpo-
ration, and WAGA License, Inc. have all intervened in the proceedings. WAGA
License, Inc. Motion to Intervene, filed Feb. 22, 1995; Louisiana Television Broad-
casting Corp. Motion for Leave to Intervene, filed Feb. 17, 1995; NAB Motion for
Leave to Intervene, filed Feb. 15, 1995; Order for leave to intervene filed May 5, 1995.
(WAGA License, Inc. is the successor in interest to Gillett Communications as the
licensee of station WAGA-TV. See WAGA License, Inc. Motion for Leave to Inter-
vene, supra, at 5.) Oral argument is scheduled for January 23, 1996.
Daniel Becker's Statement of Issues to be Raised reads as follows:
Becker will raise the following issues: (1) whether the Commission
acted properly in allowing a broadcaster to channel political speech
which, while not indecent, is deemed by the broadcaster otherwise harm-
ful to children, to later hours; (2) whether the FCC's determination to
allow broadcasters to exercise discretion in channeling political speech to
later hours of the broadcast day transgresses the prohibition against cen-
sorship of political advertising in contravention of Section 315 of the
Communications Act; (3) whether the Commission erred in failing to
take action against WAGA-TV for its failure to air as requested political
advertisements by Daniel Becker, a candidate for federal office; (4)
whether the channeling authorized by the FCC is contrary to the "reason-
able access" requirement of 47 U.S.C. Section 312(a) (7); (5) whether the
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The FCC's decision in the abortion imagery area has far-reach-
ing implications for establishing broadcaster freedom to move a
broad range of political speech to "safe harbor" hours if a broad-
caster, in good faith, finds it to be harmful to children. The princi-
ple, though first established with graphic abortion footage, could
expand to encompass other examples of the political deployment
of graphic imagery. This is particularly at a time when MTV,
Hollywood and television product advertisements have shown us
that short and powerful juxtapositions of graphic images in a rapid-
edit montage style have become the video esthetic of choice. Other
subjects that could easily lend themselves to shocking and graphic
visual treatment include the death penalty, gun control, rape, eu-
thanasia and animal rights.26
The Commission accomplished this significant affirmation of
broadcaster control over shocking political advertisements in a fash-
ion likely to pass both constitutional and statutory muster under
traditional doctrinal analysis. Had the agency found the graphic
imagery indecent, its prior rules would have required that commer-
cials containing such imagery be channeled to late night hours: the
FCC would have had to mandate channeling. This, in turn, would
have triggered a stringent and potentially deadly First Amendment
review. Instead, the agency limited its definition of indecency to
the directly sexual and excretory, conclusorily opining that graphic
anti-abortion imagery did not fit the definition.
Having done so, the Commission then adopted a rather nar-
row interpretation of the scope of access and equal opportunity
rights granted by the Communications Act to politicians. Because it
simply permitted the exercise of good faith broadcaster discretion in
channeling graphic anti-abortion imagery deemed harmful to chil-
dren, the FCC's decision probably successfully avoided triggering
sufficient state action tojustify constitutional review under the First
Amendment in the current doctrinal landscape. It is unlikely that a
court would find a First Amendment violation in the Commission's
channeling authorized in the MO & 0 is arbitrary and capricious, violates
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, and/or violates
the Communications Act.
Daniel Becker's Statement of Issues to Be Raised, Becker v. FCC, No. 95-1048 at 1-2
(D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 3, 1995). WACCI-VCR's Statement (authored by its counsel,
Media Access Project) contends that "the Commission's conclusion is arbitrary and
capricious and in excess of statutory authority in that it contradicts the plain lan-
guage and legislative history of Section 312(a) (7) and Section 315 of the Commu-
nications Act, 47 U.S.C. Sections 312(a) (7) and 315." WACCI-VCR Statement of
Issues at 2, Becker v. FCC, No. 95-1048 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 3, 1995).
26. Lafayette, Candidate's Ads, supra note 1, at 1.
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decision to leave the channeling choice to the discretion of broad-
casters accountable to the FCC.
The Commission's statutory interpretation of the Communica-
tions Act's political advertising provisions would also likely survive
judicial review under administrative law principles. It would do so
virtually automatically if (as is probable) a court were to apply the
now-current deferential standard of review of agency interpreta-
tions of ambiguous enabling statutes. Even if a more searching
standard of review were used, the Commission's policy judgment
would receive respectful consideration. The combination of tradi-
tional tools of statutory construction and judicial assessments of pol-
icy could rationally support the November Ruling despite some
equivocal signals in legislative and judicial precedent.
Graphic political advertisements raise more than simply doctri-
nal issues about the status of the November Ruling under current
law, however. They also prompt an extended discussion of policy
- one in which people from otherwise diametrically opposed ideo-
logical camps can make both institutional and substantive argu-
ments about the asserted benefits of channeling such political
advertisements. The policy arguments range from institutional pae-
ans to government neutrality and broadcaster autonomy to substan-
tive arguments about the need for a deliberative and measured
political discourse and the desire to protect children from trauma.
Although the results of the Commission's abortion advertise-
ment decision are likely to be acceptable under current law, and
although I argue in this Article that the Commission's reliance on
broadcaster discretion to displace certain types of political adver-
tisements to late night hours is probably good policy, the agency's
approach is admittedly dangerous on two levels. One level con-
cerns the relationship between broadcasters and the democratic
polity. At this level, the Commission's approach is dangerous be-
cause in light of the commercial incentives for broadcasters to mini-
mize the airing of controversial material, radio and television
stations may well find virtually all non-traditional and shocking
political material to be harmful to children. This result would be
disturbing, given both the powerful arguments that can be made in
support of a serious commitment to untrammeled political speech
over the airwaves, and the understandable concerns about the po-
tential overinclusiveness of risk-averse broadcasters faced with un-
popular political messages and the power to shunt them off to late
night hours.
[Vol. III: p. 85
ANTI-ABORTION POLITICAL ADVERTISING
Yet the likelihood of harm to children from at least some of
the political advertisements featuring graphic abortion imagery (as
well as the institutional benefits of reducing the discrepancy be-
tween the autonomy of the print and broadcast press) makes it at
least worth experimenting with a less absolutist approach to the
broadcast of political advertisements than that insisted upon by the
candidates themselves. Although the FCC's "reasonable good faith
judgment"27 standard is not self-defining, the Commission's ap-
proach promotes broadcaster editorial discretion with a mandate
for a tailored assessment of the possibility of harm - one that de-
pends on the advertisement, the community, and the viewing audi-
ence. With the broadcaster accountable to the FCC for any
channeling decisions based on harm to children, and the material
still available to the adult audience in the evenings, the FCC's ap-
proach appears best to provide some equilibrium among the vari-
ous important interests implicated by this type of advertising. That
is particularly so if the FCC keeps in mind the hidden dangers of
broadcaster discretion when the agency is faced with concrete com-
plaints. Admittedly, broadcaster accountability for editorial deci-
sions is itself troubling, both because of concerns of press
independence and because any standards for such accountability -
including the reasonable expectation of harm standard proposed
here - are necessarily indeterminate and manipulable. Their pri-
mary benefit, however, is to keep broadcaster decisions in the lime-
light and foster democratic discourse about the underlying issues.
The Commission's approach can also be analyzed at a second
level: the relationship between the Commission itself and the dem-
ocratic polity. At this level, too, there is an institutional concern.
The Commission's legal arguments in the November Ruling, when
explored fully and in depth, turn out to be open-ended and partial.
They conveniently allow the agency to hide behind bodies of prece-
dent as it fashions contingent yet stable solutions to hard social
problems. The particular solution the Commission chose here was
one which largely insulated it from judicial challenge. By classic
theories of democratic accountability, that can hardly be consid-
ered desirable. Yet even here, there are benefits to the result. A
different FCC choice would have demonstrated institutional candor
but carried costs of its own. The agency here extricated itself from
making a substantive choice about a controversial political issue, al-
lowing an institutional actor accountable not only to the FCC but
also to its various other constituencies to exercise a tailored and
27. November Ruling, 9 F.C.C.R. at 7647.
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reviewable discretion. Yet just as the FCC must be vigilant against
the dangers of abuse of its November Ruling by broadcasters, we
too must be vigilant about the institutional consequences of prag-
matic solutions grounded on strategic arguments.
Part I of this Article addresses the scope of the Commission's
interpretation of indecency in light of the petitioning broadcasters'
claim of a conflict between the statutory mandates of the political
broadcasting rules and the prohibition in the federal criminal law
against the broadcast of indecency. It challenges the FCC's articu-
lated rationales for its indecency ruling, identifies the open texture
of the FCC's definition of indecency, and points out the constitu-
tional issues avoided by the Commission's approach.
Part II considers whether the FCC may allow broadcasters to
channel graphic anti-abortion advertisements - and presumably
other advertisements that a licensee might find harmful to children
- to late night hours despite the political broadcasting safeguards
in the Communications Act of 1934. Specifically, Part II addresses
the text and legislative history of sections 312 (a) (7) and 315 of the
Communications Act, the level of deference to be accorded to this
agency action, and the constitutional implications of the FCC's ap-
proach. I conclude, in Part II, that the Commission's statutory in-
terpretation is reasonable and not likely to be found illegitimate
under current doctrine even though the legislative history and
prior judicial and administrative precedent regarding the political
advertising rules, and particularly section 315, could be read to sup-
port a broad reading of the relevant provisions. Furthermore, I ar-
gue that neither the permissiveness of the FCC's ruling nor any
broadcaster actions permitted by the agency's decision implicate
state action clearly enough under current doctrine to be subject to
scrutiny under the First Amendment. I conclude in Part II that the
FCC's decision is not likely to be subject to successful constitutional
attack.
Finally, Part III looks at the policy issues implicated by the
graphic abortion advertisements and concludes that the FCC's ap-
proach of allowing broadcaster discretion in this sort of case, while
dangerous, is for the moment the wisest balancing of interests in
political speech and child welfare. In so concluding, Part III first
addresses broadcaster discretion and government neutrality as insti-
tutional arguments in support of the November Ruling. It then
deals with substantive arguments about deliberative politics and the
protection of children. I argue that, although broadcaster auton-
omy and administrative neutrality are in principle desirable, broad-
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caster economic incentives and FCC legal strategy must be
recognized. I also argue that, although substantive arguments
about politics are seductive, the most persuasive and least danger-
ous claim in support of the November Ruling is the protection of
children. Recognizing the pitfalls of untrammeled broadcaster dis-
cretion, however, Part III also suggests some parameters for FCC
review of broadcaster decisions pursuant to the November Ruling.
It does so not as solutions to the foreseeable problems of broad-
caster discretion, but as means of assuring public scrutiny of broad-
caster decisions and continuing democratic debate about them
against a backdrop of broadcaster autonomy.
I. THE SCOPE OF INDECENCY
Section 1464 of the U.S. Criminal Code prohibits the broadcast
of obscene, profane or indecent material. 28 The Communications
Act authorizes the FCC to impose sanctions on broadcasters for vio-
lation of section 1464.29 Since 1987, the FCC has strictly enforced
the statutory prohibition on the broadcast of obscene, indecent, or
profane language.30 The Commission has defined "indecent" mate-
rial as: "language or material that, in context, depicts or describes,
in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary commu-
nity standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activi-
ties or organs." 3 The issue of graphic anti-abortion advertising by
federal political candidates presented the FCC with an opportunity
to articulate and even expand its initiative in regulating indecency.
A. The Broadcasters' Claimed Dilemma:
The crux of the petitioning broadcasters' argument in support
of their requests for a Commission directive that they be permitted
to channel graphic anti-abortion ads was that without Commission
guidance, they were stuck on the horns of a dilemma, forced to
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994). Section 1464 states: "[w]hoever utters any ob-
scene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." Id.
29. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1) (D) (1995). Section 503(b) (1) (D) states: "[a]ny
person who is determined by the Commission ... to have violated any provision of
section . . .1464 of Title 18, shall be liable to the United States for forfeiture
penalty. A forfeiture penalty under this subsection shall be in addition to any
other penalty provided for by this Chapter ...." Id.
30. See In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18
U.S.C. § 1464, 8 F.C.C.R. 704 (1993).
31. I. at 705 n.10.
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obey conflicting statutory mandates.3 2 The Kaye, Scholer petition
argued that it should be permissible for broadcasters to channel
political advertising featuring "graphic depictions of dead or
aborted and bloodied fetuses or fetal tissue" because airing such
material would constitute a violation of section 1464. 33 Complying
with that statute's prohibition of the broadcast of such material,
however, would put the well-intentioned broadcaster in the position
of violating sections 312(a) (7) and 315, the Communications Act's
political broadcasting rules. The broadcasters contended that both
concern about the welfare of children in the audience and concern
about the effect on licensees of conflicting statutory and regulatory
demands counseled FCC recognition of broadcaster discretion to
air these ads only during the indecency safe harbor.3 4
The Commission staff denied the petitions in a letter ruling.3 5
First, the Mass Media Bureau (Bureau) declined to provide a gen-
eral ruling that "a class of program material - that is, any depic-
tion of dead fetuses or fetal tissue - is indecent," opining that
such a ruling would be inconsistent with the FCC's case-by-case,
contextual interpretations of indecency.3 6 Second, the Bureau re-
fused to accept the petitioners' suggestion that they "be permitted
to classify political use material as indecent so that they may restrict
the time at which it airs even where it does not meet the Commis-
sion's indecency definition."37 Third, the Bureau concluded that a
specific advertisement supporting Daniel Becker - a Congres-
sional candidate from Georgia - containing "six shots of aborted
fetuses" covered with "a wet, dark, shiny substance" could not be
32. Gillett Communications, licensee of WAGA-TV Atlanta, and the law firm
of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, representing "numerous" unnamed
television and radio stations, appealed to the Commission for declaratory rulings
that channeling "federal candidate anti-abortion political advertisements featuring
dead fetuses and fetal tissue" would be consistent with the political advertising
rules of the Communications Act. Letter to Pepper and Gastfreund, supra note 22.
33. November Ruling, 9 F.C.C.R. at 7638 n.2 (quoting Kaye, Scholer Applica-
tion for Review).
34. Both petitioners offered several arguments: first, that the § 312(a) (7) rea-
sonable access requirements were not absolute; second, on a nuisance rationale,
that these images were outside community standards for television broadcast times
accessible to children; third, that the use of the graphic aborted fetuses constituted
indecent programming; and finally, despite previous interpretations, that channel-
ing these images to times when the risk of children in the audience would be
minimal was consistent with § 315. See Gillett Petition for Declaratory Ruling, supra
note 5, at 4-10; Mangan, supra note 7, at 81-82; Comments ofKaye, Scholer, supra note
22, at 2-3, 9-15. The indecency safe harbor is currently ten o'clock p.m. to six
o'clock a.m.
35. Letter to Pepper and Gastfreund, supra note 22.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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deemed indecent as constituting a depiction of excretory activity.38
The letter reasoned that "neither the expulsion of fetal tissue nor
fetuses themselves constitutes 'excrement' as defined by
Webster's."39
By contrast, when faced later in the campaign with Daniel
Becker's attempt to compel an Atlanta television station to broad-
cast a thirty minute political program entitled "Abortion in
America: The Real Story," the Bureau concluded that "it would not
be unreasonable for the licensee to . . . conclude that section
312(a) (7) does not require it to air, outside the safe harbor, mate-
rial that it reasonably and in good faith believes is indecent."40
In so deciding, the FCC staff relied in part on an informal
statement in 1984 from then-FCC Chairman Mark Fowler to Con-
gressman Thomas Luken ("Luken Letter"). 41 The Luken Letter
opined that the "no censorship" language of section 315 was not
intended to override the statutory prohibition against obscene or
indecent materials: "Because Section 315's purpose of fostering
political debate is untainted by subjecting broadcasters to the
prohibitions in Section 1464 against obscenity and indecency
(which by definition lack serious political value), it is concluded
that it would be unreasonable to exempt broadcasters from Section
1464's criminal prohibitions."42
38. Id. at 5600. As a result of the Mass Media Bureau's ruling, the affected
station - WAGA-TV in Atlanta - aired this advertisement in support of the can-
didacy of Daniel Becker.
39. Letter to Pepper and Gastfreund, supra note 22. By way of relief to broad-
casters, the Commission proposed that stations precede the abortion ads with the
viewer advisory that "[t] he following political advertisement contains scenes which
may be disturbing to children. Viewer discretion is advised." Id.
40. Letter to Daniel Becker, 7 F.C.C.R. 7282 (1992) [hereinafter Letter to
Daniel Becker]. The Mass Media Bureau declined to determine whether the spe-
cific program at issue was indecent in advance of broadcast, lest it impose a prior
restraint on protected speech. Id. This ruling by the Mass Media Bureau resulted
from Becker's filing of a complaint against WAGA-TV for violation of §§ 315 and
312 (a) (7).
41. Letter from FCC Chairman Mark S. Fowler to Honorable Thomas A.
Luken, dated Jan. 19, 1984, cited in Letter to Daniel Becker, 7 F.C.C.R. 7282 (1992)
[hereinafter Luken Letter] (on file with author). The attachment to the Luken Letter
is a January 6, 1984 memorandum prepared by the Commission staff in response
to Congressman Luken's letter of October 28, 1983, and hereinafter referred to as
Luken Staff Memorandum. The Luken Letter and Luken Staff Memorandum are also an
exhibit to the Comments of Gillett Communications in the public comment pro-
ceeding subsequently initiated by the FCC. Comments of Gillett, supra note 13. See
Request For Comments, In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning Section
312(a) (7) of the Communications Act, 7 F.C.C.R. 7297 (1992).
42. Luken Letter, supra note 41. See also discussion infra notes 97-104 and ac-
companying text. The issue had arisen because Larry Flynt, the publisher of Hus-
tler magazine, had announced his candidacy for the Republican nomination for
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Both the petitioning broadcasters and Daniel Becker sought
full Commission review of the Mass Media Bureau's decisions. 43
Recognizing the complex nature of the issue - not to mention the
tension between the Staff's prior decisions - the full Commission
did not simply rule on the petitioning broadcasters' appeal from
the Mass Media Bureau's decision. Instead, in October 1992, the
agency sought public comment on all issues concerning the rights
of broadcasters to channel political advertisements that they reason-
ably and in good faith believe to be indecent. 44 It also sought com-
ment on whether broadcasters have the right to channel political
advertisements that, while not indecent, may still be deemed by the
broadcaster in good faith to be harmful to children. 45
the presidency and intended to air campaign advertisements containing snippets
of X-rated material. Sydney Shaw, Flynt Plans Hard-Core Campaign Ads, UPI, Nov. 5,
1983, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. Some of the material was argua-
bly political. For example, one ad was to include footage of sex acts between gov-
ernment officials and the murdered mistress of department store owner Alfred
Bloomingdale (who was a close adviser of President Reagan). Id. Flynt had in-
sisted that his plan was not "just for the sake of shocking people," and that his
platform included "absolute freedom of expression." Id. Flynt characterized him-
self as broadcasters' "worst nightmare come true - a fabulously wealthy
pornographer willing to spend his last dime on free speech." Id.
Although the FCC was able to avoid formally addressing the issue at that time
by deciding that Flynt was not in fact a legally qualified candidate, and because he
subsequently dropped out of the presidential race, Flynt's planned antics did lead
to the informal opinion which Fowler passed on to Congress in 1984. See In re
Complaint of Larry Flynt, 1984 F.C.C. LEXIS 2675 (F.C.C. May 21, 1984); AngelaJ.
Campbell, Political Campaigning in the Information Age: A Proposal for Protecting Polit-
ical Candidates' Use of On-Line Computer Services, 38 VILL. L. REv. 517, 546-47 (1993);
Jerry Adler and Martin Kasindorf, A Smut Peddler Who Cares?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 14,
1983, at 58; Clearing the Air, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1984, at A10; Flynt Causes X-Rated
Worry, BROADCASTING, Nov. 21, 1983, at 59; Michael Isikoff, The FCC, WASH. POST,
Jan. 3, 1984, at Al5; Howard Kurtz, A Fiery Flynt Grabs Attention for His Mix of Porn
and Politics, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1983, at A2; Martin Scram and James R. Dicken-
son, Ad Nauseam, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1983, at A3; Shaw, supra.
43. Kaye, Scholer had filed an Application for Review seeking full Commis-
sion review of the Bureau Ruling. Kaye, Scholer Application for Review at 1, filed
Sept. 1, 1992, (citing Letter to Pepper and Gastfreund, 7 F.C.C.R. 5599 (1992)).
Daniel Becker filed a separate Application for Review seeking Commission review
of the Mass Media Bureau's decision in Letter to Daniel Becker, 7 F.C.C.R. 7282.
Application for Review, filed Dec. 3, 1992 (on file with author).
44. Request for Comments, In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning
Section 312(a) (7) of the Communications Act, 7 F.C.C.R. 7297 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter Request for Comments]. With this public notice, the Commission commenced
MM Docket No. 92-254 to solicit public comment on the issues raised by the Letter
to Pepper and Gastfreund, Kaye, Scholer's Application for Review, and the Bu-
reau's Letter to Daniel Becker. Id. Gillett, although it had not filed an application
for review of the Bureau Ruling, did file comments in the MM docket No. 92-254
public comment proceedings. Comments of Gillett, supra note 13.
45. Request for Comments, supra note 44, at 7297.
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In the meantime, also in October 1992, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ruled, in Gillett
Communications, Inc. v. Becker, that Daniel Becker's political adver-
tisement program "Abortion in America: The Real Story" was inde-
cent and therefore could properly be channeled to a safe harbor
period between midnight and six o'clock a.m.46
After receiving numerous letters and comments in response to
its request for public comment, the Commission issued a ruling in
late November 1994 that the advertisements at issue in the proceed-
ing (and presumably other graphic and shocking advertisements
purporting to portray abortions) were not indecent in light of the
definition of indecency used by the agency.4 7 Specifically, the Com-
mission decided that the images of abortions and fetuses were not
depictions of "excrement," and, in any event, that the political con-
text of the depictions would further support the conclusion that the
material would not be deemed indecent.48 Explicitly taking the
view that the Gillett court erroneously applied the indecency stan-
dard,49 the Commission's November Ruling affirmed a limited
reading of indecency: "Material may be shocking or outrageous,
but it is not indecent within our definition unless it depicts or de-
scribes 'sexual or excretory activity or organs.' However disturbing,
aborted fetuses or fetal tissue, alone, cannot be considered 'excre-
tory by-products' within the meaning of the indecency
definition." 50
Nevertheless, the Commission held that broadcasters may
reschedule or channel political advertisements containing graphic
abortion imagery to time periods when children are less likely to be
in the audience if they decide that such ads would be harmful to
children. 51 The opinion
46. Gillett Communications, Inc. v. Becker, 807 F. Supp. 757, 764 (N.D. Ga.
1992). The Gillett court specifically granted WAGA-TV's request for declaratory
relief and enjoined Daniel Becker from requiring WAGA-TV to air his anti-abor-
tion videotape at any time other than the safe harbor hours. Id. at 765. See also
Kate Maddox, TV Stations Sorting Through Court's Ruling on Fetus Ads, ELECTRONIC
MEDIA, Nov. 9, 1992, at 10 [hereinafter Maddox, TV Stations] (noting Justice
Anthony Kennedy's refusal to lift district court's order); Rebecca Perl, On TV:
High Court Lets TV Block Abortion Ad But Candidate Can Seek Late-Night Airtime, AT-
LANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 2, 1992, at B2.
47. November Ruling, 9 F.C.C.R. 7638, 7642-45. For extended discussion of the
indecency prong of the November Ruling, see infra notes 59-107 and accompanying
text.
48. Id. at 7643-44.
49. Id. at 7644 n.12.
50. Id. at 7643.
51. Id. at 7645-47.
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emphasize [d] that we [the FCC] do not require - nor do
we encourage - licensees to channel political advertise-
ments containing graphic abortion imagery. Rather, we
leave that decision to the reasonable, good faith judgment
of broadcasters. We conclude only that licensees may con-
sider any such advertisement's impact on children in mak-
ing access decisions under Section 312(a) (7) .5 2
The claim by the petitioning broadcasters that they were
placed in a dilemma in trying to satisfy the apparently inconsistent
requirements of the political advertising rules and the indecency
policy does not, upon close examination, provide a fully adequate
explanation of the counter-intuitive position of the petitioning
broadcasters. After all, one is stuck between Scylla and Charibdys
only if one reasonably perceives substantial threats from both. The
reality in the indecency context is that despite its stepped-up en-
forcement efforts after 1987, the FCC has not imposed forfeitures
on news-related indecency undertaken in a serious vein.53 Indeed,
the Commission's primary target for indecency enforcement ap-
pears recently to have been Howard Stern-type "shock radio" mate-
rial.54 Moreover, although the agency has imposed high fines on
52. November Ruling, 9 F.C.C.R. at 7647. The agency cautioned that a licensee
may not channel political ads of this kind out of disagreement with the candidate's
political position. Id. Additionally, "a broadcaster's decision to channel an adver-
tisement may not be included as [a] pretext [ ] for denying access." Id. (quoting
CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 387 (1981) (alteration in original). The licensee's deci-
sion to channel must be made in good faith and must relate to "the nature of the
graphic imagery in question and not to any political position the candidate es-
pouses." Id. at 7647-48. According to the Commission, any licensee who chooses
to "channel such political advertisements containing graphic abortion imagery"
that it believes are "harmful to children" must air those advertisements in time
periods that are otherwise consistent with the candidate's right of reasonable ac-
cess. Id. at 7648. For further discussion of the meaning and effectiveness of these
limitations on licensee discretion, see infra notes 380-89 and accompanying text.
53. In Letter to Peter Branton, 6 F.C.C.R. 610 (1991) [hereinafter Letter to
Peter Branton], for example, the Commission staff and subsequently the full Com-
mission held not indecent National Public Radio's broadcast of a tape of a tele-
phone conversation involving John Gotti and consisting of numerous expletives
clearly within the definition of indecency. Id.
54. See, e.g., Seth T. Goldsamt, "Crucified by the FCC?" Howard Stern, the FCC,
and Selective Prosecution, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 203, 236-50 (1995) (sug-
gesting that FCC's focus on Stern has been tantamount to selective prosecution);
Steven Nudelman, Comment, A Chilly Wait in Radioland: The FCC Forces "Indecent"
Radio Broadcasters to Censor Themselves or Face the Music, 2 J.L. & POL'Y 115, 119
(1994) (noting that Stern show targeted by FCC and arguing for uniform and
speedy enforcement of indecency rules in order to deter self-censorship). Pending
Notices of Apparent Liability based on Howard Stern material (including Sagitta-
rius Broadcasting Co., 8 F.C.C.R. 2688 (1992); Letter to Infinity Broadcasting Co.,
9 F.C.C.R. 6442 (1994); Letter to Infinity Broadcasting Co., 9 F.C.C.R. 1746
(1994); Letter to Infinity Broadcasting Co., 8 F.C.C.R. 6740 (1993); Letter to Infin-
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licensees who have aired indecent material by Howard Stern, it has
nevertheless resisted the opportunity to cause license renewal
problems even for those stations.55 Further, the Gillett court's find-
ing of indecency arose in the context of rejecting a candidate's mo-
tion to compel a broadcaster to air material during the day or early
evening. Therefore, the likelihood that the Commission would im-
pose severe sanctions even for the broadcast of indecent political
advertisements for federal candidates was in fact slim. 56 Similarly,
the likelihood of successful lawsuits on other grounds was low. 57
Perhaps it would be better to say that the threat, while there in
principle, was more hypothetical than real.
ity Broadcasting Co., 8 F.C.C.R. 2688 (1992)), have been terminated by a recent
settlement agreement, pursuant to which the broadcaster paid the FCC
$1,715,000. Order, In re Sagittarius Broadcasting Corp., 1995 FCC LEXIS 5924, 78
Rad. Reg. 2d 1512 (Sept. 5, 1995).
55. See, e.g., Eagle Radio, 9 F.C.C.R. 1294 (1994) (renewing license "without
prejudice to whatever action, if any, may be appropriate with respect to the alleged
indecent programming"). Indeed, the Commission even passed up opportunities
to deny the parent company of the Howard Stern broadcasters its request to
purchase another radio station. See In re KLUV (FM), 10 F.C.C.R. 4517 (1995);
Mass Media Action, FCC Grants Applications to Assign Three FM Stations from
Cook Inlet Radio Partnership to Infinity Broadcasting, 1992 FCC LEXIS 6905
(1992); In re Application of Cook Inlet Radio License Partnership, 8 F.C.C.R. 2714
(1992). Cf Jonathan Weinberg, Vagueness and Indecency, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. LJ.
252-256 (1996) (describing dearth of indecency-based refusals to renew broadcast
licenses). Moreover, the agency has not yet imposed even a forfeiture on any tele-
vision broadcasters. (It should be noted, however, that the agency is currently in-
vestigating, intra alia, the issuance of fines against KYW-TV for material on a Jane
Wallace program on couch dancing. See, e.g., FCC Investigating; Group W Says Inde-
cency Finding Against KYW-TV Philadelphia Would Be Censorship, COMMUNICATIONS
DAILY, Apr. 26, 1993, at 3.)
56. Admittedly, there already has been a shift in FCC enforcement policy re-
garding indecency. Assuming a dynamic rather than static view of FCC responsive-
ness to citizen indecency complaints, there is no guarantee that the FCC would in
the future limit its enforcement activity to Howard Stern. However, the FCC does
not ordinarily undertake significant policy changes without notice and explana-
tion. Even in the indecency context, the Commission imposed warnings rather
than sanctions on the first stations affected by its change in enforcement strategy.
Accordingly, the notion that broadcasters would be sandbagged by FCC sanctions
in a situation of first impression like this one is not persuasive. Moreover, I do not
claim that the broadcasters' articulated concerns are wholly unreal. Rather, I sug-
gest that the fear of sanctions, on the FCC's enforcement record as of the time the
petitions were filed, does not provide a complete explanation for the strong and
unusual reaction on the part of the petitioning broadcasters.
57. Admittedly, lawsuits against broadcast material would involve litigation
costs. However, because it is unlikely that such suits would ultimately be successful
on the merits, the threat they pose to broadcasters airing even indecent political
ads would appear to be minimal. All the pending lawsuits relating to anti-abortion
ads have apparently failed. See Goetz, supra note 15, at BI; Bailey Plans, supra note
1; Maddox, Graphic Ads, supra note 2, at 1. See also discussion supra note 15, infra
text accompanying note 316.
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In any event, the broadcasters could have asked the FCC to
declare that the material at issue was not indecent instead of seeking
the discretion to channel the broadcasts to late night hours in or-
der to avoid harm to children. This posture would not have raised
the kinds of prior restraint concerns that the Mass Media Bureau
articulated as its reasons for not ruling on whether broadcasters
could properly channel the ads.5 8 Since this could have resolved
the conflict that the broadcasters perceived between their two du-
ties under the law, we might conclude that the petitioning broad-
casters simply did not wish to air the ads and wanted a ruling from
the agency that said they would not be forced to do so. Although
they ultimately succeeded in securing that ruling, it was not
grounded in their claimed statutory conflict between indecency
and the political advertising rules.
B. The Open Texture of the FCC's Indecency Definition:
In the first part of its November Ruling, the Commission took
the position that "excretory functions" should be equated with scat-
ological references.5 9 In the agency's view, both language and con-
text led to the conclusion that the current definition of indecency
did not cover the graphic images of abortion in anti-choice political
ads. The Commission also rejected any invitation to expand its def-
inition of indecency.60
While I believe that the Commission's result is prudentially
wise and properly respectful of First Amendment interests, the
agency's articulated reasons for its position are not entirely persua-
sive. The agency has picked a particular interpretation of its inde-
cency language out of a number of available options. Had the FCC
wished to find these graphic anti-abortion advertisements indecent,
it could have argued that they were so - whether under a different
literal interpretation of the language of its current regulations, or
under a contextual interpretation of the language, or pursuant to
an expanded definition of indecency encompassing offensiveness
in general. Neither the words of the indecency standard alone nor
contextual interpretations of them have singular and self-defining
meanings. Thus, the Commission's choice of meaning for the
terms of its definition implicates a particular normative vision of
the proper scope of regulation under the aegis of section 1464. Yet
58. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
59. November Ruling, 9 F.C.C.R. at 7644.
60. Id.
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the FCC's articulated justifications in the November Ruling do not
address the issue at that underlying level.
1. The FCC's Options on a Literal Reading:
The FCC's definition of indecency is not self-defining. A lit-
eral, textual reading of the FCC's definition is not nearly as con-
strained as the Commission contends. Of the available literal
definitions of indecency, at least some could include fetal tissue and
abortions within the ambit of excrement or sexuality. For example,
as some petitioners had proposed, the Commission could have di-
rected its attention not to a dictionary definition of "excrement,"
but to the definition of "excretory activities" which includes the dis-
charge of material from the body.61 Similarly, with regard to the
component of the FCC's traditional definition of indecency that fo-
cuses on sexual organs or activities, the Commission could have ar-
gued that abortion is, in a sense, about sex - not only because it
involves the consequences of sex, but also because many people's
reactions to abortion implicate their views about sex and sexuality.
The Commission responded to claims like these essentially by
invoking the slippery slope. The notion of discharge of material
from the body is broad enough to encompass bleeding, sweating,
and even spitting, suggested the Commission.62 The Commission
feared that extending the definition of excretory activity to include
the secretion of any bodily fluid would "deprive the definition of
any meaningful limit."63 And with respect to the argument that
"abortions and fetuses are related to sex and reproduction," the
Commission dismissed it in a footnote with the response that "[t] his
would suggest that any byproduct of sex - arguably all of life - is
indecent."64
These Commission responses are not particularly persuasive.
For example, with respect to the issue of bodily fluids, the defini-
tion certainly could be limited to bodily fluids emanating from the
61. This is the position taken by the Kaye, Scholer comments in this proceed-
ing. Comments of Kaye, Scholer, supra note 22, at 11-13. The availability of multiple
dictionary definitions of the term suggests the flexibility even of a "literal" or "tex-
tual" reading of the FCC's definition of indecency. See infra note 121 for a discus-
sion of the role of dictionary definitions in the interpretation of statutes.
62. Moreover, as was argued in the Joint Comments, "[a]bortion is a medical
procedure, not a "sexual or excretory activity." Joint Comments, supra note 21, at 5.
Nor do depictions or descriptions of the abortion process "necessarily include sex-
ual or excretory ... organs." Id.
63. November Ruling, 9 F.C.C.R. at 7644.
64. Id. at 7644 n.13 (dismissing argument proposed in Mangan, supra note 7,
at 83).
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anal and genital areas. Even if this limitation were not deemed sat-
isfactory, the Commission has consistently stated that indecency is
determined in context and requires a showing of patent offensive-
ness. Those requirements should surely serve as a check on the
slippery slope.
With regard to the argument regarding the relation between
sexuality and abortion, the Commission addressed an underarticu-
lated claim that abortion material should be included in the realm
of indecency because abortions and fetuses are simply "related to"
sex and reproduction. While it is easy to dismiss this kind of nexus
as overdrawn - after all, many things can be said to be "related to"
sex and reproduction and should not reasonably be swept into the
ambit of indecency - there is something to be said for the argu-
ment in the context of the precise issue presented. The claim in
this context could be that the immediate by-products of sex and
reproduction are sufficiently closely related to the core concept of
indecency that they could be considered in the potential ambit of
the term.
The textual approach discussed here is not unfamiliar to the
FCC. The Commission itself has radically shifted and expanded its
application of the prohibition on indecency since Pacifica65 without
significantly changing the words of the definition. Although the
broad definition of indecency the Commission has been enforcing
since 1987 harkens back to language used by the FCC in Pacifica,
that generic definition was in fact interpreted during the decade
following the Supreme Court's decision in FCC v. Pacifica as only
covering repetitive uses of the "seven dirty words" featured in the
now-famous George Carlin monologue at issue in the case. 66 It is
only since 1987 that the indecency standard has been transformed
into a disciplinary regime potentially enveloping all broadcast refer-
ences to sexuality that the Commission finds patently offensive.
The shift in application under the same definition is evidence of
the contingent character of the definition's meaning. 67 Thus, abor-
tion imagery cannot simply be excluded from the ambit of regula-
tion by unelaborated reference to the definition of indecency.
65. In re (a Citizens Complaint Against) Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM),
56 F.C.C.2d 94, aff'd sub nom. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
66. See In re Application of WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, 1254-55
(1978) (describing scope of enforcement).
67. Indeed, the kind of prurient and sexualized understanding of indecency
that the Commission's November Ruling seems to suggest was not, on its facts, a part
of the Pacifica case. After all, the Carlin monologue was neither prurient nor
erotic; it was simply a litany of "dirty" words invoked to ridicule conventional con-
ceptions of appropriate language.
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Moreover, the FCC has attributed its expansion of the indecency
interpretation to a desire for intellectual consistency - a decision
to eliminate the arbitrary exclusion of whole categories of offensive
speech by the post-Pacifica limitation of enforcement to the seven
dirty words.68 Yet the Commission's decision to stop its expansion
of indecency at the sexual boundary is not dictated by that
rationale.
2. Context as the Determinant:
A more contextual inquiry led the court in Gillett Communica-
tions of Atlanta, Inc. v. Becket69 to arrive at a conclusion different
from, and criticized by, the FCC's November Ruling. The Gillett
court found that Daniel Becker's "Abortion in America: The Real
Story" was indecent because the videotape purported to depict "the
actual surgical procedure for an abortion[,]" and contained four
minutes of "graphic depictions and descriptions of female genitalia,
the uterus, excreted uterine fluid, dismembered fetal body parts,
and aborted fetuses."70 Taking into account the fact that the broad-
cast images were "readily understandable to children,"71 and keep-
ing in mind the Commission's position that "'[t]he linchpin of
indecency enforcement is the protection of children from inappro-
priate broadcast material[,]' 72 the court held that the videotape
depicted the abortion materials "in a manner which is patently of-
fensive according to contemporary community standards."73 The
court also found significant to its indecency decision the expert tes-
timony of two psychiatrists who opined on the negative impact of
the advertisement on children. 74 The meaning of patently offen-
68. See, e.g., In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (KCBS-FM), 2 F.C.C.R. 2703,
2703 (1987). For a description of the change in FCC indecency enforcement, see,
e.g., Lili Levi, The Hard Case of Broadcast Indecency, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
49 (1992-93).
69. 807 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ga. 1992), appeal dismissed mem. 5 F.3d 1500 (11th
Cir. 1993).
70. Id. at 763.
The Commission Staff had not rendered an indecency ruling about this adver-
tisement because of its concern about prior restraints. Letter to Daniel Becker,
supra note 40, at 7282. However, the Commission had taken the position that "it
would not be unreasonable" for the licensee to conclude that it is not required to
air "material that it reasonably and in good faith believes is indecent" outside of
safe harbor hours. Id.
71. Gillett Communications, 807 F. Supp. at 762-63.
72. Id. at 762 (quoting In re Liability of Sagittarius Broadcasting Corp., 7
F.C.C.R. 6873 (1992)).
73. Id. at 763.
74. Id. The court concluded, after referring to the psychiatric evidence, "that
upon viewing the evidence in its entirety, there is ample support for the conclusion
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sive sexual and excretory material in the indecency definition was
interpreted by reference to harm to children.
The FCC also has insisted since 1987 that its definition of inde-
cency must be applied contextually. 75 The FCC's interpretation of
context in excluding graphic abortion imagery from indecency is
different from the court's in Gillett Communications, however. Just as
the Gillett court focused on the context of the ads as including the
interests of children, the only meaning of context articulated by the
Commission was the fact that the images were part of a political
campaign and concerned an issue of importance in American poli-
tics. The court and the agency simply focused on two different as-
pects of the context in defining whether graphic anti-abortion
footage constituted actionable indecency.
3. The Underlying Vision of Indecency:
The FCC cannot automatically justify the exclusion of abortion
imagery from indecency by mere reference to dictionary definitions
or an assertedly neutral reliance on context. The meaning of the
definition is determined by an underlying substantive, normative
vision. The Commission's decision that the anti-abortion material
is not indecent is just that: not a mechanical necessity, but a choice
based on an underlying vision of the appropriate regulatory foot-
print. That underlying conception is not clearly articulated in the
November Ruling, however.
The history of the FCC's treatment of indecency evidences the
separation of sexuality from other elements of potential offensive-
ness. The Commission's finding in the November Ruling is wholly
consistent with the pattern of the FCC's indecency enforcement
since its stepped-up enforcement policy commenced in 1987.76
that the videotape contains indecent materials, the broadcasting of which is pro-
scribed by 18 U.S.C. § 1464." ld.
75. See, e.g., New Indecency Standards to be Applied to All Broadcast and Am-
ateur Radio Licensees, 2 F.C.C.R. 2726, 2726 (1987) (FCC Public Notice); Infinity
Broadcasting Corp. of Pa. (WYSP (FM)), 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 932 (1988) (Reconsidera-
tion Order).
76. A July 1995 Westlaw search of all references to indecency in FCC cases
after January 1, 1987 turned up 127 cites. This figure represents only the pub-
lished actions - which would include Commission letters of inquiry and notices of
apparent liability - issued to station licensees. It would not include the investiga-
tions and dismissals undertaken without the issuance of such formal documents. A
printout made by the FCC of post-1987 "non-routine" indecency actions provides a
total of 432 references in the broadcast service. (FCC-provided list on file with
author). In addition, there are a number of pending indecency actions which
would not have been included in the Westlaw search. Naturally, the number of
actual forfeitures assessed for violations of the indecency policy is much smaller
than the number of investigations. Suffice it to say, however, that the total amount
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While much can be said about the range of material covered by the
agency's enforcement actions, the one clear theme is that it covers
the spectrum from the explicitly sexual to the more coded forms of
smutty double entendre.77 Historically, the FCC has not found inde-
cency outside the realm of pandering, vulgar, or titillating depic-
tions - narrowly interpreted - of sexual or excretory activities or
organs.78
On a number of occasions prior to the adoption of the generic
indecency definition, the FCC has been confronted with - and
rejected - claims that highly inflammatory and offensive language
should be taken off the air as indecent. Even after the Supreme
Court's decision in Pacifica, the Commission declined an invitation
to extend section 1464 to explicitly racist and inflammatory state-
ments during J. B. Stoner's gubernatorial bid in Georgia in the
1970s,79 and permitted a station's license to be renewed despite
anti-Semitic slurs in its "public affairs" programming in the 1960s.80
Even when faced with claims that offensive speech on the air should
be regulated under section 1464 because it might present the
threat of imminent violence, the Commission has enforced a strin-
gently narrow interpretation of the degree of danger of violence
that should trigger governmental involvement.81 The Commission
in fines assessed - particularly in connection with Howard Stem programming -
is in the six figures. See Tim Jones, Stern Issue for FCC: How Much License?, CHI.
TRiB., Mar. 27, 1994, at C1 (noting $1.6 million in fines against Infinity Broadcast-
ing Corp. as of that date); supra note 54 (describing $1,715,000 in settlement fee
paid by Infinity Broadcasting to terminate pending Howard Stem proceedings).
77. See, e.g., Pacifica Found., Inc. (KPFK-FM), 2 F.C.C.R 2698 (1987) (regard-
ing reading of explicit scenes from Jerker, a critically acclaimed play about post-
AIDS gay phone sex); New Indecency Standards to Be Applied to All Broadcast
and Amateur Radio Licensees, 2 F.C.C.R. 2726, 2727 (1987) (concerning action-
ability of double entendre).
78. The Commission has stated that the topic of sex is not off limits to broad-
casters. Even instances of explicit language have passed Commission muster when
they are presented in a serious news context. See, e.g., Letter to Peter Branton,
supra note 53, at 610-11 (permitting expletives in news broadcast of John Gotti
wiretap). See also Rivera-Sanchez & Gates, supra note 12, at 282.
79. Letter from Commissioner Robert E. Lee to Lonnie King, Atlanta NAACP,
36 F.C.C.2d 635 (1972) [hereinafter Letter to Lonnie King] (refusing to declare
that Stoner's racist advertisements during his senatorial race could be rejected on
the ground that they would foster violence). See also Letter from Wallace E. John-
son, Chief Broadcast Bureau, to Julian Bond, Atlanta NAACP, 69 F.C.C.2d 943
(1978) [hereinafter Letter to Julian Bond]; see discussion infra notes 99, 238 and
accompanying text.
80. Complaint of Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'rith, 4 F.C.C.2d 190
(1966) (renewing, on ground of public interest in free expression, license of
broadcaster who aired anti-Semitic material), 6 F.C.C.2d 385 (1967), aff'd, 403
F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 930 (1969).
81. Letter to Lonnie King, supra note 79, at 637.
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has never construed section 1464 as covering offensive speech of a
non-sexual nature.
Yet the question of graphic anti-abortion advertisements brings
two intellectual problems into sharp relief. first, the problem of
articulating a basis for distinguishing between broadly sex-related
expression and sexual speech more closely akin to the prurience
and titillation of the obscene; and, second, the broader problem of
confining the notion of indecency to sexuality only.
One option is suggested by Pacifica, referenced in the Novem-
ber Ruling.82 Although the Pacifica Court made clear the "emphati-
cally narrow" character of its holding,8 3 the Pacifica opinion
contains some expansive language and broad regulatory rationales.
Justice Stevens characterizes indecency as "nonconformance with
accepted standards of morality. ' 84 In keeping with that reading of
Pacifica, an FCC that wished to promote the welfare of children
could expand the notion of indecency to include patently offensive,
disturbing, shocking and outrageous material even if it did not di-
rectly relate to sex or other bodily functions.8 5 After all, section
82. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In dismissing the argument
that excretory conduct could include expulsion of all bodily matter, the Commis-
sion opined that "[s]uch an expanded definition arguably would encompass tele-
vised scenes of a character sweating, blowing his nose, or dressing a wound, and
would be far afield from the Commission's or the Court's concerns in Pacifica." November
Ruling, 9 F.C.C.R. 7638, 7644 (1994) (emphasis added).
83. Pacifica was a plurality opinion that emphasized the narrowness of its
holding. 438 U.S. at 750. See also Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,
127 (1989) (characterizing Pacifica holding as "emphatically narrow").
84. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740 (1978). Justice Stevens' plural-
ity opinion contains potentially expansive rhetoric and seems to rest in part on the
lower social value of the kind of speech at issue. Rejecting Pacifica's argument that
the definition of indecency should require an element of prurient appeal, the Ste-
vens opinion quotes Webster's Dictionary for a definition of indecency as "noncon-
formance with accepted standards of morality." Id. at 740 n.14 (quoting WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1966)). Stevens also takes the position that
channeling "will have its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of
serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed
by the use of less offensive language." Id. at 743 n.18. Stevens does not deem this
problematic because of his view that non-obscene sexual expression is low in the
hierarchy of First Amendment values, not being an essential part of any exposition
of ideas. Id. at 746. (This last element could serve to distinguish a very broad
definition of offensiveness, however). For a reading of Pacifica that minimizes the
centrality to the opinion of the lesser value of indecent speech, see C. Edwin
Baker, The Evening Hours During Pacifica Standard Time, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.,
45, 50-52 (1996).
85. November Ruling, 9 F.C.C.R. 7638 (1994). These are the adjectives used by
the Commission in distinguishing the anti-abortion ads from the core material the
agency considers actionably indecent. Id.
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1464 does not define the appropriate scope of indecency.8 6 Such
an approach would not entangle the FCC in a battle of dictionaries
and would also give the agency more regulatory flexibility to ad-
dress in the future different kinds of shocking political program-
ming not so closely tied to sex and other bodily functions as is
abortion.
Presumably attempting to keep within the existing boundaries
of First Amendment doctrine and a narrow reading of the statutory
mandate of section 1464, however, the FCC has exercised its regula-
tory power in this area of content in a limited way. Naturally, the
Commission has been concerned about the danger of censorship if
the notion of patent offensiveness is not clearly anchored, presuma-
bly in something analogous to obscenity boundaries. However, by
refusing to address the question at this level, the Commission has
passed up an opportunity to explore the potential viability of any
such anchors.8 7
86. Nor does the history of the provision provide any meaningful parameters.
See Milagros Rivera-Sanchez, The Origins of the Ban on "Obscene, Indecent, or Profane"
Language of the Radio Act of 1927, 149 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. MONOGRAPHS 1
(Feb. 1995) (reviewing sparse history of ban). See also Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 740
(distinguishing statutory term "indecent" from term "obscene"). Although Profes-
sor Rivera-Sanchez ultimately concludes in her monograph that the Pacifica Court
may have erred in distinguishing between obscenity and indecency in the statute, a
number of the historical facts she describes suggest that the measure may have
been passed to deal with vulgar and offensive language that could be considered
"morally objectionable" - an expansive principle significantly broader than ob-
scenity (and even, perhaps, than of sexuality). Rivera-Sanchez, supra at 23.
87. David Cole, among others, has persuasively argued that the interest in
avoiding offense to others does not work well as ajustification for separating sexual
expression from other offensive expressive material. David Cole, Playing by Pornog-
raphy's Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 111, 154-56
(1994). Based on this ground, arguments have been made in support of broadly
defining regulable indecency or offensiveness. For an argument in favor of chan-
neling violence as an aspect of obscenity, on the ground that obscenity should not
be deemed strictly limited to sexual or erotic material, see, e.g., Kevin Saunders,
Media Violence and the Obscenity Exception to the First Amendment, 3 WM. & MARY BILL
RTs. J. 107 (1994).
The desirability and constitutional status of any such extension of the inde-
cency principle is beyond the scope of this paper, except to the extent discussed
infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text. It should be noted, however, that argu-
ments can be made to explain the "special" treatment of sexual as opposed to
otherwise offensive expression. For example, the maintenance of a distinction be-
tween public and private may provide a better explanatory model for some of the
Supreme Court's cases dealing with sexual expression than the broad notion of
offensiveness. Cole, supra, at 114-16 (ultimately arguing, however, that such a dis-
tinction inverts First Amendment principles and that regulating sexual expression
reinforces the pornographic character of American sexuality by fetishizing it).
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C. The Problems of Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation
Avoided by the FCC's Approach:
The FCC's decision not to interpret indecency to include
graphic anti-abortion ads has the consequence of avoiding new First
Amendment and statutory muddles. Its choice can be recognized
as particularly strategic when an overview of the November Ruling
discloses a structure that minimizes the likelihood of a challenger's
success on either constitutional or statutory grounds, while permit-
ting nearly the same result on the merits as might have flowed from
a finding of indecency.88
One might argue that expanding the definition of indecency
to include graphic anti-abortion images would create an unconstitu-
tionally vague and overbroad category.8 9 Even without such expan-
88. For discussions regarding the strategic character of the second prong of
the November Ruling, see infra notes 293-305, 319-21 and accompanying text.
89. I do not suggest that, for constitutional purposes, the vagueness doctrine
is a mechanical way of defining abstract degrees of linguistic clarity in any given
statute. See Anthony Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960) (on vagueness doctrine's surrogacy for merits consid-
erations). The vagueness rhetoric is used by courts to strike down statutory lan-
guage for different reasons. In the traditional understanding, vague statutes are
struck down because they do not define conduct "with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Law-
son, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). (With regard to citizen behavior, a statute that does
not display that level of definiteness would lead, at the very least, to a predictable
chill on the expression of fully protected speech. With regard to official behavior,
a "vague" statute is one that potentially hides official arbitrariness and discrimina-
tion in application.) I have previously proposed a version of the vagueness argu-
ment in the indecency context that focuses on the necessarily contradictory and
ambivalent character of sexual speech. Levi, supra note 68, at 170-74. For an inter-
esting argument about the use of vagueness doctrine to resolve substantive issues
of constitutional law, see Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules
and Social Orders, 82 CAL. L. REv. 491 (1994) (explaining that some statutes are
struck down on vagueness grounds because they permit official judgments impos-
ing community norms and middle class mores across the board, allowing official
intrusions on individual liberty in the course of pursuing community goals). Were
the indecency definition expanded beyond its current scope to include material
that would be generally shocking to community mores, various versions of the
vagueness challenge could be mounted.
The category "graphic anti-abortion ads" might be considered sufficiently pre-
cise, if added to the definition of indecency, to satisfy the traditional vagueness
doctrine threshold, particularly if the FCC experimented with some obscenity-like
anchors for its application of the indecency definition. On the other hand,
graphic anti-abortion ads arguably could be used by analogy to justify additional
expansion of the definition of indecency, to encompass other shocking and
graphic images. Moreover, the addition of this material to the definition might
cause the generic definition of indecency to be subjected to more searching scru-
tiny as to vagueness than has thus far been the case (as pointed out in text). Third,
even though the category of graphic anti-abortion ads has received some content
and parameters from the specific instances in which abortion imagery has been
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sion, the FCC's definition of indecency thus far has not been
subjected to searching vagueness and overbreadth analysis under
the First Amendment. The D.C. Circuit grounded its rejection of
the vagueness argument in the context of the indecency rules sim-
ply on the assumption that the Supreme Court's Pacifica decision
had implicitly approved the definition.90
The First Amendment problem would be particularly acute if
the Commission had expanded indecency effectively to include any
images that would be shocking or harmful to children, without any
further guidelines to constrain discretion. Particularly since what is
objectionable about the anti-abortion ads is that they purport to
depict real blood, pain and death rather than merely that they do
so by depicting sexual or excretory organs, it is difficult to identify a
justifiable distinction between them and the many other deeply dis-
turbing graphic and bloody depictions that could also be swept into
such a definition. 91 Much more pressing First Amendment vague-
ness and overbreadth problems are posed by a definition of inde-
cency significantly broader than that specifically referring to sexual
or excretory organs. While some of the rhetoric and rationale of
Pacifica could serve to justify a capacious category of regulable of-
fensive material, the case is more comfortably read narrowly, as the
opinion itself instructs. 92
In addition to the by-now classic arguments based on unconsti-
tutional vagueness and overbreadth, the expansion of indecency to
include anti-abortion material could raise a de facto viewpoint dis-
crimination argument. Even with regard to indecent speech, R.A. V
v. City of St. Paul makes clear that viewpoint discrimination is forbid-
aired, it would still presumably be possible that the inclusion of this additional
category would allow for discriminatory and arbitrary application of law by the FCC
and other official actors. For further discussion of the argument regarding admin-
istrative discretion, see infra notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
90. ACTI, 852 F.2d 1332, 1340 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Most recently, the court
again rejected the void for vagueness argument as applied to the definition of
indecency in the Public Telecommunications Act of 1992. ACT III, 58 F.3d 654
(D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 36 (Jan. 8, 1996).
91. See Joint Comments, supra note 21, at 6 (noting increased uncertainty about
what would be subject to indecency review, including possible inclusion of assassi-
nation footage, war film and videotape relating to medical issues).
92. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 438 U.S. 726, 734-35, 742, 757 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring). See also Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Marjorie L. Esterow, Censoring
Indecent Cable Programs: The New Morality Meets the New Media, 51 FoRDrHAm L. REv.
606, 627-30 (1983) (discussing narrowness of Pacifica decision); Levi, supra note
68, at 139 (same). Despite sweeping language that could be used to justify exten-
sive regulation of broadcast speech inconsistent with reigning morality, the Pacifica
decision clearly states that the Court was simply interpreting the FCC's definition
as applied to the Carlin broadcast. Baker, supra note 84, at 46.
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den by the First Amendment.93 If it is still in fact the case, as I
suspect, that only virulently anti-abortion candidates have employed
graphic abortion footage in their advertisements thus far, then at-
tempts to channel such material could be deemed, in practice, to
run afoul of RA.V's call for value neutrality. After all, these anti-
abortion advertisements would be singled out as a result of their
particular content. Moreover, while "time zoning"94 may not always
be constitutionally suspect, it is surely so when it effectively targets
one category of speakers for their ideas. 95
Although the constitutional arguments against the FCC would
not necessarily have been successful if the agency had held that the
advertisements at issue in the November Ruling could be consid-
ered indecent, it is important to note that by structuring its decision
as it did, the Commission probably avoided litigation on that First
Amendment question, while still in the end permitting channeling.
Apart from the constitutional issues, a finding of indecency in
this proceeding would have led to a question of statutory interpreta-
tion as well. Even if the FCC had defined the speech here as inde-
cent, there still would have remained the question of whether the
images could properly be channeled due to conflicts with the polit-
ical advertising rules: is there a section 1464 exemption to sections
312(a) (7) and 315, or a sections 312(a) (7) and 315 exception to
section 1464?
Although there is little authority directly on point, and the ar-
guments of the existing authority are not overly persuasive, their
93. RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
94. Baker, supra note 84, at 49 (coining the phrase in describing the channel-
ing at issue in Pacifica).
95. Whether this sort of argument is ultimately persuasive is questionable.
We can distinguish between viewpoint and manner of presentation for purposes of
analyzing whether a governmental burden on speech is tantamount to viewpoint-
based discrimination. However, as the Court pointed out in Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971), among other cases, the meaning of speech is often inextricably
intertwined with its manner of presentation. Id. Compare Franklyn S. Haiman,
Speech v. Privacy: Is There A Right Not To Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U. L. REv. 153, 188-
90 (1972) with Geoffrey Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189, 243-44 (1983). In Madsen, the Supreme Court upheld against
constitutional challenge a permanent injunction imposed by a state court to ex-
clude anti-abortion demonstrators from a buffer zone around abortion clinics.
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994). Despite the protesters'
argument that their viewpoint had been singled out for prohibition, the Court
held that there was no evidence that the state would not have enjoined similar
demonstrations by others with different content and viewpoints. Id. at 2523-24.
Following Madsen, one could argue that broadcasters are just as likely to channel
graphic and shocking pro-abortion images as anti-abortion ads, even though the
current vehicle prompting examination of the rules happened to involve an anti-
abortion campaign.
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result is statutorily supportable.96 As noted above, the January 19,
1984 transmittal letter from then-Chairman Mark Fowler to Con-
gressman Thomas Luken, and the accompanying staff memoran-
dum, suggest that there would be a section 1464 exemption from
the "no censorship" dictates of section 315. 97 The federal court in
Gillett relied on the Luken Letter and the Luken Staff Memoran-
dum's references to traditional norms of statutory construction to
conclude that the graphic anti-abortion ads, as indecent material,
could be channeled to late night hours despite section 315's
prohibitions on censorship. 98
On the other hand, the FCC's Broadcast Bureau in Julian Bond,
in the context of rejecting the NAACP's argument that the use of
the word "nigger" in a political advertisement should be deemed
indecent, stated that "even if the Commission were to find the word
'nigger' to be 'obscene' or 'indecent,' in light of Section 315 we
may not prevent a candidate from utilizing that word during his
'use' of a licensee's broadcast facilities."99
96. See infra section II. A.
97. Luken Letter, supra note 41. The Luken Letter and Luken Staff Memorandum
are appendices to the Comments of Gillett in the Commission's MM 92-254
proceeding.
98. Gillett Communications, Inc. v. Becker, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 757, 762 (N.D.
Ga. 1992). With no further explanation, some scholars addressing the issue have
opined that "[tihe Bureau's dictum suggesting that section 315 would prevent the
censorship of obscene or indecent language is doubtful." Martin Kassman, The
Defamation You Can't Refuse: Section 315's Prohibition on Censoring Political Broadcasts,
13 HASTINGS COMM. & ETr. LJ. 1, 11 (1990). See also Sheppard, supra note 3, at
398-402; Richard G. Singer, The FCC and Equal Time: Never-Neverland Revisited, 27
MD. L. Ruv. 221, 238 n.87 (1967).
99. Letter to Julian Bond, supra note 79, at 944. For strict readings of § 315's
"no censorship" provision in contexts outside indecency, see Ken Bauder, 38
R.R2d 31, 33 (1976); Honorable William H. Lamb, 37 R.R.2d 115, 117 (1976). In
William H. Lamb, the Commission suggested, in dictum, that "any state require-
ment which would have the effect of inhibiting the broadcast of such [political]
'uses' would frustrate the underlying purposes for which section 315 was enacted,
or, at the very least, would impose unreasonable burdens on the parties governed
by that section of the Communications Act." Lamb, 37 R.R.2d at 117. And in Ken
Bauder, the FCC declared (in response to a station's inquiry whether the Smith Act
prohibited the sale of political advertising time to the Communist Party's Presiden-
tial and Vice Presidential candidates), that
[a]s long as a station abides by the directives of Section 312(a) (7) and
Section 315 of the Communications Act, we do not believe that it need
concern itself with the provisions of the Smith Act with regard to the sale
of political broadcast time to legally qualified candidates associated with
the Communist Party.
Bauder, 38 R.R.2d at 33. Although the FCC sought to harmonize the political pro-
gramming rules and the Smith Act by noting that the Act prohibited speech advo-
cating the overthrow of the government rather than necessarily targeting all
members of the Communist Party per se, its citations to the immunity holdings of
Port Huron Broadcasting Co., 12 F.C.C. 1069 (1949) and Farmers Educ. & Coop.
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Moreover, the FCC Luken Letter Staff Memorandum has been
argued to rest on shaky substantive ground.100 The basic rationale
of the Luken Staff Memorandum, as Chairman Fowler summarized
it, is as follows:
Because Section 315's purpose of fostering political de-
bate is untainted by subjecting broadcasters to the prohibi-
tions in Section 1464 against obscenity and indecency
(which by definition lack serious political value), it is con-
cluded that it would be unreasonable to exempt broad-
casters from Section 1464's criminal prohibitions.
Applying the canon of statutory construction under which a
statute should not be interpreted to yield an unreasonable result,
the Luken Staff Memorandum concluded that exempting political
uses from section 1464 would be unreasonable. The bottom line of
the staff's approach in the Luken Staff Memorandum was that it
would be unreasonable to read section 315 as requiring the broad-
cast of low value political speech that would be considered illegal
under section 1464.
In its comments in the Commission's proceeding on the anti-
abortion ad issue, Media Access Project (MAP) argued that the
Luken Staff Memorandum does not distinguish between obscene
and indecent speech from a constitutional standpoint. Even apart
from the abstract question of statutory conflict and the role of ca-
nons of construction, section 1464 cannot be read constitutionally
to place a flat ban on broadcast indecency (as its language purports
to do). 101 Since section 1464 requires a limiting construction to
Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959) clearly suggest the agency's assumption
that § 315 foreclosed licensee censorship even of political speech violative of the
Smith Act. See Bauder, 38 R.R.2d at 32.
100. Procedurally, neither the Fowler transmittal letter (referred to in note
41) nor the accompanying FCC staff memorandum are of any precedential value.
Reply Comments of Media Access Project at 7, MM Docket No. 92-254, filed in response
to Request for Comments, In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning Sec-
tion 312(a) (7) of the Communications Act, 7 F.C.C.R. 7297 (1992) (hereinafter
MAP Reply Comments]; discussion infra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
Neither Chairman Fowler's transmittal letter nor the staff memo had the full Com-
mission's explicit backing and support, as noted in the Fowler transmittal letter
itself. Luken Letter, supra note 41. In addition, on the reduced level of deference
that should be accorded to such informal expressions of administrative agency
views about statutes they administer, see, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme
Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Adminis-
trative State, 95 COLUM. L. Rv. 749, 749-50 (1995) [hereinafter Pierce,
Hypertextualism].
101. See, e.g., Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); ACTII,
932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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preserve its constitutionality, MAP argued that it is not, in principle,
in conflict with sections 312(a) (7) and 315.102 In addition, the
Luken Staff Memorandum's assumption that indecency is not pro-
tected speech is "the fatal flaw in the staff's analysis." 103 More fun-
damentally, both the Luken Staff Memorandum and the Gillett
opinion's uncritical reliance on canons of construction raise the de-
bate on the meaning and determinacy of the canons. 10 4
Although these criticisms of the analytic structure of the Luken
Staff Memorandum may be well-founded, they do not resolve the
question of whether the Commission had the statutory authority to
channel political advertising it found to be indecent. First, just be-
cause section 1464 cannot constitutionally justify a complete ban
does not mean that it cannot constitutionally justify a channeling
regime. Second, that the canon of construction used in the Luken
Staff Memorandum is manipulable means simply that it is not con-
clusive; it does not mean that the memo's conclusion is unsupport-
able as a matter of statutory interpretation. Third, the structure of
the original Radio Act of 1927 supports the conclusion of the
Luken Staff Memorandum, even if it does not support the memo's
reasoning. Section 1464 was originally part of the Communications
Act, and, indeed, was included in the very section that prohibited
censorship by the Commission itself.105 Thus, at the time of enact-
102. See MAP Reply Comments, supra note 100, at 6.
103. Id. at 7.
104. See, e.g., Henry Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes,
in FELIX FRANKFuRTER: THE JUDGE 30 (Wallace Mendelsohn ed., 1964); KARL LLEW-
ELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 521-35 (1960); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public
Values in Statutoy Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1007, 1073 (1989) [hereinafter
Eskridge, Public Values]; Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision
and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395,
401-06 (1950); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - In the Classroom and In
the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800 (1983). It is, of course, true that the Gillett
Communication court's reference to the canons is not atypical; judges habitually
articulate their decisions on the ground of some canon of statutory construction,
despite critiques of the canons from the academy. See generally Symposium, A Re-
evaluation of the Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REv. 529 (1992). For
an account more charitable to the canons of construction than Llewellyn's, see
David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv.
921 (1992).
105. Initially, § 1464's prohibition against indecent speech was enacted as
part of § 29 of the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1172-73 (1927). Section 29 was
transferred verbatim as § 326 of the Communications Act of 1934. Section 326
read:
[niothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the Com-
mission the power of censorship over the radio communications or sig-
nals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall
be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with
the right of free speech by means of radio communication. No person
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ment, it could be said that the original drafters did not see any fun-
damental conflict between simultaneously prohibiting both
indecency and FCC censorship of any kind. This then might well
lead to the conclusion that if the material were indecent, Congres-
sional will would not be thwarted if the material were shunted off to
broadcast times when children would be less likely to be in the audi-
ence. 106 Finally, if, as is argued below, the statutory scheme of sec-
tions 312(a) (7) and 315 do not preclude channeling for purposes
of protecting children, afortiori channeling would be applicable in
the context of a finding of indecency.
In sum, the graphic anti-abortion advertisements provided the
FCC with the opportunity to engage in a searching analysis of its
proper role in regulating offensive expression. The Commission
declined the invitation, presumably because it saw such an inquiry
as entailing potentially high constitutional and statutory risks un-
necessary to the resolution of the issue. Ironically, however, the in-
decency prong of the November Ruling is significant for its possible
analytic effects in the traditional regulatory domain of sexual ex-
pression, even if its analysis is not significant in expanding the
scope of that regulation. Simply put, the Commission's arguments
in the November Ruling may signal the possibility of a salutary re-
laxation of enforcement standards in the ordinary indecency
context. 1
07
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall utter any obscene, inde-
cent, or profane language by means of radio communication.
Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1934).
106. In FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 735, 737-38 (1978), Justice Ste-
vens concluded that the prohibition on censorship by the FCC was not intended to
limit the Commission's power to regulate obscene and indecent speech because
[a] single section of the 1927 Act is the source of both the anticensorship
provision and the Commission's authority to impose sanctions for the
broadcast of indecent or obscene language. Quite plainly, Congress in-
tended to give meaning to both provisions. Respect for that intent re-
quires that the censorship language be read as inapplicable to the
prohibition on broadcasting obscene, indecent, or profane language.
Id. at 737-38.
107. As noted above, the Commission argued in its November Ruling that even
if the graphic anti-abortion imagery could be considered to fit into the category of
sexual or excretory expression subject to indecency review, it would still not be
considered indecent because of its use in the context of a political campaign. No-
vember Ruling, 9 F.C.C.R. at 7644. Having reiterated the Commission's by-now
traditional characterization of the indecency inquiry as being primarily contextual,
and having clarified that the Commission's analysis of context "has always encom-
passed more than just the four corners of the material being reviewed [,]" the Com-
mission focused only on the facts that the material aired was part of a political
campaign and that "the issue of abortion is an important question in American
politics." Id.
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II. THE SCOPE OF CANDIDATE POLITICAL ADVERTISING RIGHTS
Although the FCC's decision that the challenged material is
not indecent eliminates the petitioning parties' argument of statu-
tory conflict between section 1464 and the political advertising
rules, its conclusion that harmful but not indecent material can
permissibly be channeled raises questions both of statutory and of
constitutional interpretation. First, did the FCC correctly interpret
sections 312(a)(7) and 315 in allowing broadcaster decisions to
channel graphic anti-abortion political ads? Second, does the No-
vember Ruling's recognition of discretion in broadcasters violate
the rights of political advertisers under the First Amendment?
A. The Statutory Dimension:
This Part concludes that, particularly in light of the policies
articulated by the Commission in support of its statutory readings
- namely, the constitutionally recognized interests in the protec-
tion of children, editorial autonomy, and consistency with prior ad-
ministrative practice - deference by a reviewing court to FCC
interpretation is likely. Whether a court applied the extremely def-
erential approach to review of agency statutory interpretations
adopted by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council,10 8 however, or only the "special" or "respectful"
The Commission's post-1987 enforcement approach to indecency has been
criticized elsewhere as inconsistent. Although prior enforcement actions have tra-
ditionally paid lip service to the value of merit as one of the factors to be addressed
in the contextual indecency analysis, the decisions have not been consistent in
defining the merit factor or addressing the weight to be accorded to merit. For
example, some programming containing offensive material but otherwise satisfy-
ing the public interest has avoided indecency sanctions. See, e.g., Letter to Peter
Branton, supra note 53 (not finding indecent broadcast by National Public Radio
of an expletive-laden tape of telephone conversation involving John Gotti). On
the other hand, the Commission has imposed indecency forfeitures on broadcast-
ers who have addressed important social issues in ways that have fallen into the
indecency net. See, e.g., Letter from RoyJ. Stewart, Chief, Mass Media Bureau, to
Merrell Hansen, (KSD-FM), 6 F.C.C.R. 3689 (1990) (imposing forfeiture on radio
station for reading of Playboy interview about Jessica Hahn's claim of rape against
televangelist Jim Bakker).
In its attempt to distinguish the anti-abortion ads from indecent material, the
FCC could be read to have articulated a commitment to a more restrictive inter-
pretation of indecency and a broader sweep for merit than it had used in at least
some post-1987 indecency cases. While that is not necessarily the case and the
Commission could well distinguish its treatment of anti-abortion ads from the ordi-
nary indecency enforcement context, the rationale of the decision here provides a
new window of opportunity into the traditional indecency area.
108. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984). Even before Cheron, although there was no consistent statement of
doctrine on the standard of review for agency interpretations of statutes, the Court
in Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) expressed the
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consideration accorded under traditional administrative law princi-
ples, the November Ruling would in all likelihood pass muster.
As noted above, section 312(a) (7) requires broadcast licensees
to provide legally qualified federal political candidates reasonable
access to the air, and section 315 assures that licensees have no
power of censorship over political advertisements aired pursuant to
the section's equal opportunities provisions. 10 9
With regard to section 312(a) (7), the FCC was clearly dele-
gated power by Congress to interpret the meaning of the statutory
right of reasonable access, and nothing in the language or legisla-
tive history of the section suggests constraints on the FCC's inter-
pretive power. The prior judicial and administrative interpretations
of section 312(a) (7), however, are more equivocal. Nevertheless,
even the existence of some prior administrative language emphasiz-
ing the needs of federal candidates in the application of section
312(a) (7) is counterbalanced by consistent administrative refer-
ence to broadcaster discretion in other cases.
With regard to the "no censorship" provision of section 315,
the statute does not define the term "censorship." The legislative
history is silent on the question whether channeling political adver-
tising to late night hours would be considered censorship. It is
even ambiguous on the question of whether the drafters of the
1927 Radio Act intended the "no censorship" provision to be truly
absolute. Although prior administrative and judicial interpreta-
tions of section 315 contain some absolutist language, no precedent
is dispositive. Under these circumstances, although a contrary re-
sult is supportable, it is likely that a court would find the November
Ruling to be a reasonable accommodation of conflicting statutory
policies in a context where Congress expressed no specific
intent. 110
rhetoric of deference in the context of broadcasting: "The construction of a stat-
ute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are com-
pelling indications that it is wrong, especially when Congress has refused to alter
the administrative consttuction." Id. at 381.
109. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
110. The relationship between § 312(a) (7) and § 315 is as follows: Federal
candidates - and federal candidates only - have affirmative rights of access to
the broadcast media under § 312(a) (7). Section 315 provides only a contingent
right of access, and is triggered for any candidate only when a station has granted
airtime to the requesting candidates's opponent. That section assures equal op-
portunities both to federal candidates and to state and local candidates whose op-
ponents have been provided airtime by a station. Of the two, only § 315 contains
an explicit proviso that broadcasters do not have the power of censorship over
material aired pursuant to equal opportunities requests. However, the argument
that § 312(a)(7) permits broadcaster censorship because it does not specifically
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1. Section 312(a)(7)11 and the Meaning of Reasonable Access:
In light of the fact that the affirmative right of access under
section 312(a) (7) is statutorily limited to "reasonable" access, the
fundamental question is whether FCC permission for broadcasters
to channel these ads by federal candidates can properly be consid-
ered "reasonable."' 12 There is support, both in the legislative his-
tory and in the subsequent judicial and administrative
interpretations of the statutory right of access, for arguments that
the FCC's decision in the anti-abortion ad context is not an unantic-
ipated departure from prior interpretations of "reasonableness."
In its November Ruling, the Commission took the position that
allowing broadcasters to channel images deemed by a broadcaster
to be harmful to children would not violate section 312(a) (7). Be-
cause the Commission had never interpreted 312(a) (7) to "entitle a
federal candidate 'to a particular placement of his or her political
announcement on a station's broadcast schedule,' "113 the agency
did not see its decision in the abortion ad context as inconsistent
with its prior treatment of the reasonable access provision.11 4 The
Commission rested its conclusion on three arguments. First, it read
its precedents to have paved the way for its November Ruling: "We
already have concluded that Section 312(a) (7) does not preclude
licensees from considering the potential impact of political adver-
tisements on their audience in making access decisions." 115 Sec-
ond, the Commission took the view that nothing in section
312(a) (7) eliminated broadcasters' discretion to protect chil-
dren.116 Third, the Commission argued for its conclusion by em-
phasizing its limits: to cabin the expansiveness of its ruling, the
prohibit it - particularly in light of the § 315 "no censorship" proviso - is
unpersuasive.
111. Campaign Communications Reform Act, Title I of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 312(a)(7) (1994)).
112. Section 312(a)(7), as originally reported in the Senate, would have ap-
plied to any legally qualified candidate and not simply to federal office-seekers.
The Conference Committee expressly limited the provision. S. CONF. REP. No.
580, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1971); CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 380 (1981).
113. November Ruling, 9 F.C.C.R. at 7645 (quoting Commission Policy in En-
forcing Section 312(a) (7) of the Communications Act, 68 F.C.C.2d 1079, 1091
(1978) (Report and Order)).
114. Id. The Commission staff had taken a dramatically contrary position on
this issue, holding that even content-neutral channeling of federal candidates to
late night hours in order to protect children would violate § 312(a)(7). Letter to
Pepper and Gastfreund, 7 F.C.C.R. 5599 (1992).
115. November Ruling, 9 F.C.C.R. at 7645.
116. Id. at 7646.
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FCC reminded licensees that they had to give individualized atten-
tion to access requests by anti-abortion candidates; 1 7 that those
broadcasters who chose to channel any of this material must make
available to the candidate "access to times with as broad an audi-
ence potential as is consistent with the federal candidate's right to
reasonable access;" 118 and that licensees not channel this material
"out of disagreement with the candidate's political position." 1 9
a. The Text and Legislative History of Section 312(a) (7):
In addition to the "plain" language of the statute, traditional
statutory construction calls for a look at legislative history, legisla-
tive purpose, and the structure of the statute.120 The plain lan-
117. Id. at 7646-47.
118. Id. at 7647.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Deci-
sionmaking in Rviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, TEX. L. REv. 83, 112 (1994).
The rationale for this approach is grounded on a notion of legislative supremacy
and a legitimating theory of politics that limits the judicial role in interpreting
statutes to that of discovering an already-existing legislative design. See, e.g.,Jane S.
Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 108 HARv. L. REV. 593, 594-99 (1995) (describing this traditional approach as
form of "institutional essentialism" in the course of cataloguing an emergent new
strand of "democratic legitimacy" in statutory interpretation).
The use of legislative history as a tool of statutory interpretation has been
severely criticized recently, both by scholars and by courts (with Justice Scalia as
one of the more outspoken textualist critics). Indeed, there has been an apparent
change in the Supreme Court's approach to statutory construction, with the Court
decreasing its reliance on intentionalist or purposive statutory analysis (grounded
on legislative history and purpose) and increasing its textualist bent. For discus-
sions and analyses of the change, see, e.g., WiuLiAM N. ESKRIDGE,JR., DYNAMIc STATU-
TORY INTERPRETATION 207-29 (1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism,
37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 656-66 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, New Textualism];
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 980-85
(1992) [hereinafter Merrill, Executive Precedent]; Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and
the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 355-63 (1994) [hereinafter
Merrill, The Chevron Doctrine]; Pierce, Hypertextualism, supra note 100; Fred Schauer,
Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SuP. CT.
REv. 231; Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Con-
struing Statutes in the 1988-1989 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L.
REv. 277 (1990) [hereinafter Wald, Sizzling Sleeper]; Looking It Up: Dictionaries and
Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1437, 1438-40 (1994) [hereinafter Note,
Looking It Up].
It is by now an old saw to repeat Judge Harold Leventhal's description of
legislative history-based statutory interpretation as "akin to looking over a crowd
and picking out your friends." Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of
Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L. REv. 195, 214 (1983)
[hereinafter Wald, Use of Legislative History] (quoting Harold Leventhal); Jonathan
Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1101, 1158 n.264 (1993); see also
Pierce, Hypertextualism, supra note 100, at 751 (repeating turn of phrase and con-
cluding, about intentionalist statutory interpretation in 1970s and 1980s, that
"j ] udges frequently relied on carefully selected nonauthoritative statements in the
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often voluminous and internally inconsistent legislative history of statutes to attri-
bute to Congress the judges' preferred resolutions of policy disputes that Congress
did not resolve."). Legislative history has been criticized on the ground, inter alia,
that the purposive or intentionalist statutory interpretation it aids is indeterminate
and even incoherent. ESKRIDGE, supra, at 13-47. After all, an examination of the
legislative history all too often leads to "a plethora of purposes, cross-cutting pur-
poses, and purposes set at such a general level that they could support several
different interpretations." William N. Eskridge,Jr., The Case of the Speluncean Explor-
ers: Twentieth-Century Statutory Interpretation in a Nutshell, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
1744-45 (1993) [hereinafter Eskridge, Speluncean Explorers]. For discussions of vari-
ous criticisms of the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation, see, e.g.,
ESKRIDGE, supra, at 210-25; James J. Brudney, Congresswnal Commentary on Judicial
Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MicH. L. REv. 1, 41-60
(1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv.
1479, 1507 (1987) [hereinafter Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation]; Richard
J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government,
64 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1239, 1255-58 (1989) [hereinafter Pierce, Agency Theory of Govern-
ment]; Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 863, 870 (1930), cited in
Schacter, supra, at n.22; Seidenfeld, supra, at 114-19. Even more pointedly, critics
have charged that the process of legislative enactment - involving, as it does,
coalition building and compromise, not to mention deceit - necessarily fails to
provide a single coherent and cohesive legislative intent that can pass for a public
purpose. See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra, at 630-40. When strategic motives
are factored in for particular congressional stances (including the purposive deci-
sion to enact vague statutes in certain political circumstances), the inquiry into
legislative intent becomes murkier still, and perhaps, as some have thought, intrac-
table. See Schacter, supra, at 604 & n.49.
Nevertheless, the acuity of these criticisms does not necessarily support dis-
pensing with legislative history entirely. A look at the legislative history and pur-
poses is useful, so long as it is not proposed as dispositive or unchallengeable.
Simply put, legislative history provides a range of purposive possibilities within
which to operate. See Seidenfeld, supra, at 130 (noting some benefits of legislative
history); Brudney, supra, at 3. Thus, it narrows the field and provides the outside
parameters for a purposive analysis. See also ESKRIDGE, supra, at 238 (illustrating
factors in which pragmatic statutory interpreter should be interested). The antipa-
thy of "new textualists" like Justice Scalia to legislative intent and history, while
understandable given the limits of legislative history, effectively forecloses a useful
avenue of inquiry in statutory interpretation. The criticisms of legislative history
need not be insuperable if legislative history is looked at self-consciously, with an
understanding of what it can do and no illusions as to its determinacy, objectivity
or seamless character. Indeed, a look at the available legislative history and articu-
lated purposes, as well as an understanding of the political context of the congres-
sional enactment, can help guide the otherwise overly abstract reliance on
dictionary definitions of the text of a statute. Textualism, while a useful reminder
that purposive statutory analysis can go too far, is itself unsatisfying if it is not cou-
pled with the more traditional approach to statutory construction (including a
look at legislative history). For critiques of the Court's textualism, see, e.g., Es-
KRIDGE, supra, at 230-34; Pierce, Hypertextualism, supra note 100; Seidenfeld, supra,
at 120-21; Wald, Sizzling Sleeper, supra, at 300-09. For a persuasive argument that
the better interpretive approach begins with the language of the relevant statute,
but also adds strong evidence from context, statutory goals, and legislative history,
see Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL.
L. Rav. 845 (1992). (Whether textualist or grounded in legislative intent, the
traditional approaches to statutory interpretation are based on an assumption of
legislative supremacy, with the judiciary simply serving as the amanuensis of the
legislative will. See Wald, Sizzling Sleeper, supra, at 301-03. For an account that iden-
tifies and analyzes a different trend in statutory interpretation - one that meas-
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guage of section 312 requires reasonable access but does not define
"reasonableness." Dictionary definitions do not resolve the issue. 121
The legislative history, while instructive, is silent on the specific
question of this kind of advertising.
Section 312(a) (7) was passed as part of the Campaign Commu-
nications Reform Act, Title I of the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971.122 One of the central purposes of this reform legislation
was "to give candidates for public office greater access to the media
so that they may better explain their stand on the issues, and
thereby more fully and completely inform the voters."123 In consid-
ering campaign reform in 1971, Congress addressed bills "intended
to increase a candidate's accessibility to the media and to reduce
the level of spending for its use." 124 The Federal Election Cam-
paign Act was motivated primarily by congressional concern over
the expense of modern political campaigning, particularly over tel-
evision. 125 The legislative evidence suggests a congressional hope
that a combination of the political potential of television with elec-
ures democratic legitimacy not by the elimination of judicial discretion in the
interpretation of statutes, but by the interpretive rules that shape that discretion to
produce democratizing effects, see Schacter, supra.)
121. It is hardly revolutionary to assert that statutory meaning is usually any-
thing but "plain," that courts can vary on the "plain" meaning of the very same
statute, and that an over-reliance on dictionary definitions is both misleading and
dangerous. On the prevalence of meaning skepticism, see Schacter, supra note
120, at 601-03. For cogent critiques of reliance on dictionary definitions as value
neutral, or as the basis of wide consensus, or as avoiding inconsistency in results,
see, e.g., Clark D. Cunningham, et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE LJ.
1561, 1563, 1614-16 (1994) (reviewing LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF
JUDGES (1993)); Pierce, Hypertextualism, supra note 100, at 752, 765; A. Raymond
Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning and Context in Statutory Interpretation. 17
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71 (1994); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the
Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA.
L. REV. 1295, 1320-21 (1990); Note, Looking It Up, supra note 120.
122. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1994).
Title I of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 contained the reasonable
access requirement now in § 312(a) (7), the lowest unit charge requirement now in
§ 315(b) (1), and a since-repealed spending limitation for federal candidates. Ken-
nedy for President Comm'n v. FCC, 636 F.2d 432, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See also
CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 377, 379-82 (1981) (describing legislative history of
§ 312(a) (7)).
123. S. REP. No. 96, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1774; CBS v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting S. REP.
No. 96), aff'd, 453 U.S. 367 (1981). See also S. RE. No. 229, 92d Cong., lst Sess. 56
(1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.CA.N. 1822; 117 CONG. REc. 28792 (1971) (state-
ment of Sen. Pastore).
124. CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. at 379, (quoting Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971. Hearings on S. 1, S. 382, and S. 956 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971) [hereinafter Hearings on S.
1, S. 382 and S. 956] (opening statement of Sen. Pastore)).
125. Kennedy, 636 F.2d at 439.
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tion reform legislation reducing the cost of campaigning could lead
to a more informed electorate and improved political discourse. 126
The Report of the Senate Commerce Committee that consid-
ered the 1971 legislation provided neither an explicit interpreta-
tion of what came to be section 312(a) (7) nor a discussion of its
impact.1 27 The Report simply stated that broadcasters' duty to per-
mit candidate access "is inherent in the requirement that licensees
serve the needs and interests" of their communities of license. 128
Section 312(a) (7) was derived from a Senate bill that included
a provision designed "to insure that all licensees make available to
legally qualified candidates for public office reasonable amounts of
time for use of broadcasting stations .... ,"129 The objective of the
section which ultimately passed as 312(a) (7) was described on the
House floor as "requir[ing] broadcasters to permit any legally quali-
fied candidate to purchase a 'reasonable amount of time' for his
campaign advertising."130
Other than opining that the legislation would improve federal
candidates' access to the air, what did Congress intend by its dictate
126. Senator Gravel, the sponsor of one of the reform bills in 1971, delivered
an encomium to television as potentially the new public forum. 117 CONG. REC.
272 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Gravel). See also Kennedy, 636 F.2d at 439-40 (quoting
Sen. Gravel). Yet the dangers posed for such a vision by spiraling electronic cam-
paign costs were clear in the members' minds. Id. at 440.
Rather than attempting to limit the role of television in political campaigns,
however, Congress' goal in 1971 was "to make the medium more responsive to
civic needs, and to provide better and more complete information to the American
public." Id. at 441. The Kennedy court concluded that the amendments of the
Campaign Communications Reform Act were inspired by congressional concern
that insufficient time (at excessive rates) was being made available to candidates by
broadcast media. Id. at 442.
127. CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. at 381.
128. S. REP. No. 96, supra note 123, at 34, cited in CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. at 379.
129. Kennedy, 636 F.2d at 444 (quoting Hearings on S. 1, S. 382 and S. 956,
supra note 124, at 132-33). The congressional desire for reform in election com-
munications led to a number of bills before Congress, the most significant of
which were three Senate bills - S. 1, S. 382 and S. 956. Ultimately, the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 was derived largely from S. 382, but § 312(a) (7)
owes its origin to an access provision in S. 956. Id. See also CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. at
379 (explaining origin of § 312(a)(7)). The concept of reasonable access appar-
endy stemmed from a campaign reform bill in 1970 - S. 3637 - which was ve-
toed for other reasons by President Nixon. Henry Geller & Jane H. Yurow, The
Reasonable Access Provision (312(a)(7)) of the Communications Act: Once More Down the
Slippery Slope, 34 FED. COMM. L.J. 389, 391 & n.5 (1982). The bill had repealed the
equal opportunities requirement for presidential and vice-presidential contests; re-
quired stations to sell time to candidates at the lowest unit charge available to
commercial advertisers on the station on a given day for the same length and class
of time; and had been amended on the Senate floor to provide specifically for
reasonable access for federal candidates during prime time. Id.
130. 118 CONG. REc. 326 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Keith), cited in Kennedy, 636
F.2d at 445 & n.112.
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that federal candidates be afforded "reasonable" access? Section
312(a) (7) does not define the term. Broadcasters complained that
the provision that reasonable amounts of time be made available to
candidates was "sufficiently ambiguous to create difficulty and un-
certainty" and asked for its elimination from the final legislation. 131
Nevertheless, the lack of definition is unsurprising. In introducing
the bill whose access provision was the precursor of section
312(a) (7), for example, its proponent, Senator Scott, stated that
"[t] he term 'reasonable,' of course, is open to interpretation; but it
can, I believe, be given a quick test run through the FCC when a
complaint is filed."1 32 This suggests a congressional understanding
of FCC discretion. Perhaps Congress believed that it should not
concertize, in the abstract, the degree of access required to be "rea-
sonable." Yet, perhaps to constrain FCC discretion, Senator Scott
also asserted that "it is absolutely essential that candidates be al-
lowed as much access to television and radio as they wish, and as
they can afford. To impose ceilings [on broadcast expenditures]
without offsetting them with guarantees [of broadcast time], ig-
nores the real problem which is access to the media and access to
the electorate."13 3
131. Hearings on S. 1, S. 382 and S. 956, supra note 124, at 418 (testimony of
Leonard Goldenson, President of American Broadcasting Co.). Even Dean Burch,
the FCC Chairman, made it clear that the FCC was not enamored of this bit of
legislation:
[I]t is better to consider the licensee's performance in this area as one
part.., of his entire programming service to the public. We believe the
amount of time afforded and the campaigns to which time is devoted are
matters best left to the licensee's reasonable, good faith judgment based
on his knowledge of his community's particular needs .... I would per-
sonally hesitate to go this far [as to grant reasonable access to all legally
qualified candidates] in the absence of some definite showing that the
inability to buy broadcast time is of serious proportions.
Id. at 189-90 (testimony of FCC Chairman Dean Burch).
132. 117 CONG. REc. 3886 (1972). As noted above, two separate pieces of
reform legislation were pending when Senator Scott and his allies introduced S.
956. S. 956, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). Section 302(c) of S. 956 was the precur-
sor of the reasonable access requirement of § 312(a) (7) that was ultimately
adopted in the Federal Election Campaign Act. See supra note 129.
133. Hearings on S. 1, S. 382 and S. 956, supra note 124, at 341 (comments of
Senator Scott). See also id. at 347-49 (containing Senator Scott's and Senator Ma-
thias' official statement in connection with S. 956).
Commentators suggest that the section 312(a) (7) access provision was a direct
result of congressional adoption of the lowest unit rate requirement for political
advertisers. One commentator stated: "Having driven the price of political adver-
tising time to its lowest levels, Congress logically became concerned about the pos-
sibility that some broadcasters might decide not to sell any political advertising
time at all." DONALD M. GLLMOR, et al., MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW, CASES AND
COMMErrr 780 (5th ed. 1990); Geller & Yurow, supra note 129, at 392. Similarly, it
should be noted that the central provisions of S. 382 were spending limits and the
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Although the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the reasonable access requirement under section 312(a) (7) in CBS
v. FCC,13 it did not speak directly to the legislative view of the spe-
cific definition of reasonableness. It read the legislative history of
section 312(a) (7) as establishing a new, affirmative and personal
right of access for each federal candidate, rather than simply reaf-
firming the FCC's prior practice of interpreting the public interest
to require that licensees provide some air time for political candi-
dates generally.
The bottom line with regard to the legislative history of section
312(a) (7) is that Congress chose not to define its notion of reason-
able access. It delegated the task of elaborating that notion to the
FCC. 135 Substantively, the 1971 Congress simply did not address
the particular question involved here: it was not faced at the time
with candidates who wished to air the kind of shocking and offen-
sive advertising that characterizes the graphic anti-abortion
material. 136
suspension of § 315 for Presidential and Vice Presidential races. The access right
was added in committee. S. REP. No. 96, supra note 123, at 34. This might suggest
that the candidate access rule was inserted in the legislation to ensure that with
§ 315 eliminated for some races, broadcasters would not fail to provide access to
candidates.
134. CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981). In CBS v. FCC, the Carter-Mondale
Committee had sought to buy 30 minutes of prime time in December 1979, in
conjunction with President Carter's formal announcement of his candidacy for the
next election. Id. at 371-72. All three networks rejected the request. Id.
135. The Commission's authority to interpret § 312(a) (7) derives from
§ 303(r) of the Communications Act, which provides that the Commission shall
"[m] ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions,
not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
Act." 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1994), cited in Commission Policy in Enforcing Section
312(a) (7) of the Communications Act, 68 F.C.C.2d 1079, 1087 & n.8 (1978) (Re-
port and Order).
136. Much of congressional commentary justifying the access right relies on
the notion that candidates should be able to inform the voters to promote well
informed and intelligent voting. See Kennedy for President Comm'n v. FCC, 636
F.2d 417, 439-40 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting Sen. Gravel's statement that "we have
in the technology of television the potential renaissance of the Athenian forum
where the public gathers, political contenders debate the issues and enlightened
citizen decisions are formed."). See also Licensee Responsibility as to Political
Broadcasts, 15 F.C.C.2d 94, 94 (1968) (noting, with regard to § 315, that "presenta-
tion of political broadcasts . .. is an important facet [of service to the public],
deserving the licensee's closest attention, because of the contribution broadcasting
can thus make to an informed electorate - in turn so vital to the proper function-
ing of our Republic"); Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525, 534
(1959) (recognizing that "the thrust of section 315 is to facilitate political debate
over radio and television").
Congressional opposition to spot advertising on the ground that it privileged
the telegenic over the substantive suggests also that at least some reformists at the
time had a rationalist political discourse in mind. See Kennedy, 636 F.2d at 440-41 &
1996]
130 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAwJouRNAL [Vol. III: p. 85
b. Administrative and Judicial Interpretations of Section
312(a) (7):
Neither the Commission's rhetoric nor its practice gives a sin-
gle and unambiguous response to the question whether channeling
graphic anti-abortion ads should be considered a denial of reason-
able access under section 312(a) (7).
The Commission has developed its interpretation of section
312(a) (7) largely on a case by case basis, although on a number of
occasions, it has issued general statements as part of its provision of
political broadcasting guidelines.13 7 In 1972, the Commission is-
sued a Public Notice describing the rules for political advertising in
light of the passage of section 312(a) (7).1s8 The Notice expressed
the Commission's view that reasonable access did not require that
all or most time at the end of a campaign be preempted for polit-
ical broadcasts, but did not provide any further substantive guide-
lines of what the reasonable access requirement would entail. 139
When it revisited the issue in 1978, the Commission again de-
clined to adopt formal rules to implement section 312(a) (7) on the
ground that no rules could address all possible election campaign
circumstances. 140 Instead, it took the position that it would rely on
n.67. For example, Senator Gravel - who had proposed S. 1, one of the three
central bills considered by the 1971 Congress in connection with election reform
- sought to legislate an ambitious "voter's time" plan pursuant to which each
major presidential candidate would be given broadcast time. In arguing for this
approach, Senator Gravel opined: "It is preposterous that ability to pay determines
access to television, and that the political television fare of the American public is
commercial-like campaign spots rather than rational and informative political dis-
cussion." 117 CONG. REC. 273 (1971) (statement of Sen. Gravel).
On the other hand, it would not be fair to read too much into the rhetoric of
an informed electorate. The Congress, at the time of § 312(a) (7), was not explic-
itly distinguishing between informed and rational voters and voters swayed by sen-
timent and gut reaction. Instead, it was addressing the issue of whether an
informed electorate would be prompted only by broadcaster political program-
ming, or whether some governmental intervention to allow candidates to express
their own positions would lead to a more democratic politics.
137. Geller & Yurow, supra note 129, at 399 (noting and criticizing FCC's case-
by-case approach). For example, the Commission issued comprehensive guides
for compliance with its political programming rules in 1978, 1984 and 1991. See
Codification of the Commission's Political Programming Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. 678,
680-81 (1991) (Report and Order); Political Primer, 100 F.C.C.2d 1476 (1984);
Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a) (7) of the Communications Act, 68
F.C.C.2d 1079, 1089-90.
138. Use of Broadcast and Cablecast Facilities by Candidates for Public Of-
fice, 34 F.C.C.2d 510 (1972).
139. Id. at 536.
140. Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act,
68 F.C.C.2d at 1089. See also Codification of the Commission's Political Programming
Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. at 680-81 (restating Commission's 1978 conclusion).
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the reasonable, good faith judgments of its licensees to provide rea-
sonable access.141 Having announced the test of the new section as
reasonableness, the FCC stated that it "will not substitute its judg-
ment for that of the licensee, but, rather, . . . will determine in any
case that may arise whether the licensee can be said to have acted
reasonably and in good faith in fulfilling his obligations under this
section."142
Nonetheless, the Commission provided guidelines "that would
be applied to determine whether a particular licensee's judgment
was reasonable[,]" 143 and to "ensure that the Congressional intent
in enacting Section 312(a) is fully realized."14 The Commission's
guidelines require broadcasters to consider: the individual needs
of the candidate as he or she expresses them; the amount of time
previously provided to the candidate; potential disruption of broad-
casters' regular programming; the number of other candidates
likely to request equal opportunities under section 315 if the broad-
caster grants a given candidate's section 312(a) (7) request; and the
timing of the request.14 5
The application of this litany of factors by the FCC over the
years has been ambiguous and, some have charged, inconsistent. 146
On the one hand, the Commission has always used the language of
broadcaster discretion and minimal administrative second-guessing.
As noted above, "so long as a station makes available to candidates a
wide array of day parts and programs," candidates need not be af-
141. Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act,
68 F.C.C.2d at 1089.
142. Use of Broadcast and Cablecast Facilities by Candidates for Public Of-
fice, 34 F.C.C.2d at 536. Henry Geller has interpreted this policy statement as
likening broadcasters' § 312(a) (7) obligations to those established under § 315 -
pursuant to which the licensee, rather than the Commission, would determine
how best to accommodate candidates. Geller & Yurow, supra note 129, at 404 ("In
practice, the Commission has seesawed with respect to this fundamental
declaration.").
143. Codification of the Commission's Political Programming Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. at
681.
144. Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act,
68 F.C.C.2d at 1089.
145. See CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 375 (1981).
146. See, e.g., Geller & Yurow, supra note 129, at 400-09; Thomas Blaisdell
Smith, Note, Reexamining the Reasonable Access and Equal Time Provisions of the Federal
Communications Act: Can These Provisions Stand if the Fairness Doctrine Falls ?, 74 GEO.
L.J. 1491, 1516 (1986). Geller and Yurow have taken the position that the history
of FCC interpretation of reasonable access is one of inconsistency, subjectivity and
intrusiveness with respect, inter alia, to determinations regarding the start of cam-
paigns, to limits on licensee discretion to provide spot and program time, and to
claims of a multiplicity of candidates. Geller & Yurow, supra note 129, at 400.
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forded access to specific programming of their choice1 47 or "be
given or sold any particular position on a station's schedule. 1 48
The subsequent review of the rules stated that, in negotiations with
candidates, broadcasters are "permitted to consider such factors as
the amount of time the candidate has already purchased and/or
utilized, the total number of candidates in the race, and potential
programming disruption."149
The Commission has also taken the position, since 1978, that
"there may be circumstances when a licensee might reasonably re-
fuse broadcast time to political candidates during certain parts of
the broadcast day."150 In particular, in recently reaffirming its
traditional approach that allows broadcasters to refuse to sell polit-
ical advertising during the news, the Commission rejected argu-
ments that limiting candidates' access to news programming
impermissibly curtails their access to voters since television news
programming reaches the highest concentration of those likely to
vote.151 Instead, the Commission explicitly balanced the candi-
dates' rights to access and the public interest in broadcastei
discretion:
We continue to believe that allowing the station discretion
to refuse to run political advertising within its news pro-
gramming does not unreasonably hamper the access of
147. Codification of the Commission's Political Programming Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. at
682. The Commission expressed its views in 1978 as follows:
[A]lthough a candidate for federal office is entitled under Section
312(a) (7) to varied broadcast times, such candidate is not entitled to a
particular placement of his or her political announcement on a station's
broadcast schedule. We recognize that it would be very difficult for a
licensee to afford "equal opportunities" to opposing candidates if one
candidate has his or her spot placed adjacent to a highly rated program,
which was broadcast only once or very rarely.
Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, 68 F.C.C.2d
at 1091. See also Geller & Yurow, supra note 129, at 404 & n.81 (identifying cases
demonstrating broad view of licensee discretion, though arguing that agency has
"seesawed" with respect to licensee discretion).
148. Public Notice, 43 Fed. Reg. 36,349 (1978).
149. Codification of the Commission's Political Programming Policies, 6
F.C.C.R. 5707, 5713-14 n.25 (1991) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking). See also
CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. at 387 (listing factors broadcasters may consider).
150. Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act,
68 F.C.C.2d at 1091. The 1991 Codification of the political programming rules
quotes this language from the 1978 Report in connection with its finding that news
programming could properly be exempted by broadcasters from reasonable access
time. Codification of the Commission's Political Programming Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. at 682.
151. See Codification of the Commission's Political Programming Policies, 7 F.C.C.R.
at 682 (describing arguments of media buyers against Commission policy of ac-
cepting broadcaster limitations of political time in news programming).
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federal candidates to broadcast time, but does serve the
public interest by preserving the journalistic integrity of
the licensee in this vital area of programming. 152
In the balance, the Commission seemed to weigh heavily what
it took to be congressional recognition of the "special status of news
programming in the context of licensees' political broadcasting ob-
ligations."155 So long as federal candidates were given access to a
wide array of dayparts other than news, the Commission took the
position that "the public interest is served by preserving the journal-
istic discretion of the licensee in the vital area of news program-
ming. Pursuant to this policy, licensees are permitted to refuse
political advertising in all news programming or during some news
programs or during any portion of a specific news program."1 54
Doctrinally, it can be argued that the Supreme Court, in up-
holding the federal candidate right of access, upheld nothing more
than a limited right grounded on broadcaster discretion. This
reading of CBS v. FCC would harmonize the case with the Supreme
Court's prior precedent in CBS v. Democratic National Committee,155
in which the Court held that the First Amendment does not require
a general right of access to the media. 156
On the other hand, a close look at decisions under section
312(a) (7) might suggest that, despite sweeping rhetoric about
broadcaster discretion, the level of discretion allowed broadcasters
under section 312(a) (7) is often quite limited in practice. A
number of commentators suggest that this has been increasingly
true since the Commission's Carter-Mondale decisions ultimately af-
152. Id.
153. Id. at 682 n.26 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1)-(4)).
154. Codification of the Commission's Political Programming Policies, 7
F.C.C.R. 4611, 4611 (1992) (Mem. Op. & Order) (footnote omitted).
155. 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (hereinafter CBS v. DNC).
156. Moreover, it has been argued that, despite its rhetoric, the Court's deci-
sion in CBS v. DNC was driven less by faith in broadcast journalism than by the
salutary effect of having political discourse under the control of governmentally
accountable licensees and not private partisans who might manipulate the political
process without accountability. LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 127-28
(U. Chi. Press 1991); CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 124-25. If so, it might be argued that
these manipulative advertisements by the pro-life candidates have precisely the ef-
fect the Court sought to evade in CBS v. DNC. (On these advertisements as manip-
ulative, see infra notes 322-39 and accompanying text). On this view, one might
want to argue that CBS v. FCC should not be read to undermine the fundamental
assumptions about public debate in CBS v. DNC It must be kept in mind, however,
that with regard to federal candidates, Congress expressed a preference for their
own access to the air, as opposed to broadcaster coverage of their candidacies.
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firmed in CBS v. FCC.157 The FCC has imposed both procedural
and substantive constraints on broadcaster discretion to reject ac-
cess to federal candidates.
The Commission has stressed the importance of addressing the
individual needs of the federal candidate requesting access. Opin-
ing that "[f]ederal candidates are the intended beneficiary of sec-
tion 312(a) (7) [,]" the FCC announced in its first general statement
on the subject that "a candidate's desires as to the method of con-
ducting his or her media campaign should be considered by licen-
sees in granting reasonable access"158 and, indeed, should be
honored as much as possible under the 'reasonable' limits imposed
by the licensee."1 59 In keeping with this individualized approach,
the Commission reasoned that it would be unreasonable for broad-
casters to follow a policy of flatly banning access to any class or
length of program or spot time offered to commercial advertis-
ers. 160 The FCC also suggested that one way of trying to act reason-
157. Carter-Mondale Presidential Comm., Inc., 74 F.C.C.2d 631 (1979), aff'd
sub. nom. CBS v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980), aff'd 453 U.S. 367 (1981) [here-
inafter Carter-Mondale]. Some characterize Carter-Mondale as a politically-motivated
departure from prior Commission interpretation and practice, noting the party-
line breakdown of the decisions. See CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. at 418-19 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (observing that FCC had voted along party lines in case); Smith, supra
note 146, at 1516. An account that suggests that the Commission's approach in
Carter-Mondale was unprecedented is overly simplistic and ignores the multiplicity
and complexity of Commission action in this area. A review of the Commission's
pre-Carter-Mondale reasonable access cases suggests that both candidate-friendly
and broadcaster-friendly interpretations of the reasonable access notion can be
found. One article, for example, takes the view that the policies in the FCC's 1978
Order regarding the enforcement of § 312(a) (7) "look both ways" in terms of the
balance between broadcasters and candidates. Geller & Yurow, supra note 129, at
405. See also Smith, supra note 146, at 1516 & n.182 (pointing to criticisms of Com-
mission interpretations as inconsistent).
158. Commission Policy on Enforcing Section 312(a) (7) of the Communica-
tions Act, 68 F.C.C.2d 1079, 1089 n.14 (1978) (Report and Order).
159. Id. at 1090.
160. Id. at 1090, 1094 (proscribing across-the-board bans). As one of the
FCC's subsequent Notices of Proposed Rulemaking regarding political broadcasts
described the post-1978 policy:
[S] tations are obligated to negotiate the timing and placement of polit-
ical advertising with candidates, without preexisting limitations or bans
on the number or placement of spots. Stated differently, any time that is
available to commercial advertisers must also be made available to federal
candidates. Federal candidates have the right to formulate their own
campaign media strategies, and the broadcaster must negotiate the sale
of time on an ad hoc, individualized basis.
Codification of the Commission's Political Programming Policies, 6 F.C.C.R. 5707,
5713 (1991) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking) (footnote omitted). The Commis-
sion "fe [lt] certain" that Congress wished candidates "to be at least on par with
commercial advertisers .... " Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7) of the
Communications Act, 68 F.C.C.2d at 1090. In the Commission's view, reasonable
access "does not lend itself to a specific number of hours based on complex formu-
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ably and in good faith would be for licensees to meet with
candidates prior to a campaign "in an effort to work out the prob-
lem of reasonable access."1 61
In addition to requirements of individual consideration, the
Commission's guidelines included the requirements that licensees
provide access to prime time programming, absent unusual circum-
stances, 162 and that they always make prime time spot announce-
ments available. The Commission's political broadcasting primers
have consistently made clear that broadcasters cannot simply ex-
empt certain dayparts from the periods they will make available for
sale to federal political candidates. In addition, the Commission
has consistently taken the position that stations "may not use a de-
nial of reasonable access as a means to censor or otherwise exercise
control over the content of political material, e.g., by rejecting it for
nonconformance with any of the station's suggested guidelines."16 3
Therefore, the Commission's rhetoric of broadcaster discre-
tion may stand in contrast to the extent to which rational broadcast-
ers are likely to capitulate to candidate demands.1 64 In CBS v. FCC
las. Rather, what constitutes 'reasonable access' depends on the circumstances sur-
rounding a particular candidate's request for time and the station's response to
that request." Codification of the Commission's Political Programming Policies, 7
F.C.C.R. 678, 681 (1991) (Report and Order). The Commission revised its com-
prehensive 1978 guide to the political programming rules in 1984. Political Primer
1984, 100 F.C.C.2d 1476 (1984). The Primer reiterated the Commission's aversion
to flat bans. Id. at 1524. The Commission's political broadcasting rules were subse-
quently codified again in 1991. In the new ruling, the FCC said it would continue
to rely on the reasonable good faith judgments of licensees as to what constitutes
reasonable access; that it would continue to rely on the guidelines set out in Com-
mission Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, 68 F.C.C.2d at
1089-95, and approved in CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981); and that it would
retain its policy of permitting stations to ban federal candidates from news pro-
gramming on the ground that "section 312(a) (7) was never intended to provide
candidate access to specific programming." Codification of the Commission's Political
Programming Policies, 7 F.C.C R. at 682.
161. Use of Broadcast and Cablecast Facilities by Candidates for Public Of-
fice, 34 F.C.C.2d 510, 536 (1972).
162. Codification of the Commission's Political Programming Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. at
681. The meaning of this statement is unclear. It could mean that prime time
could be precluded under certain substantive circumstances. It could also refer to
the number of contenders who would have to be provided equal opportunities
during prime time if any one candidate were provided prime time access.
163. Codification of Commission's Political Programming Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. at 681
(citing Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, 68
F.C.C.2d at 1094).
164. After all, given the death penalty of license revocation that can attach to
a single violation of § 312(a) (7), and given the broad language of the majority's
opinion in CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981), the rational broadcaster would be
quite risk-averse. See, e.g., Kenneth M. Kwartler, Note, Political Broadcasting by In-
dependent Committees: A Proposal for Eliminating the Federal Communications Commis-
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itself,165 for example, the candidate's needs prevailed, although
the networks had shown that there would have been quite substan-
tial interference with their scheduling function if they were re-
quired to accept the thirty minute spots when President Carter
wanted them aired. 166 Despite the broadcasters' showing, the
Court did not second-guess the FCC's interpretation of the breadth
of the Congressional mandate for reasonable access. Instead, the
majority found that the FCC's asserted position of accepting broad-
caster judgments, so long as they took into account the relevant
factors in good faith, assured that the intrusion on broadcaster dis-
cretion was not sufficient to create a First Amendment problem.
And, having reviewed the Commission's criteria for determining
reasonableness, the Court did not find the standards to be arbitrary
or capricious. 167 Risk-averse broadcasters acquainted with CBS v.
FCC'68 would naturally consider paramount the needs and pur-
poses of the candidates. 169
Most importantly, although broadcasters who can show individ-
ualized consideration of candidates' requests without adopting
blanket rules are rarely, if ever, found to have declined to provide
reasonable access,170 any suggestion that decisions to decline access
are content-based raise FCC concern. Indeed, FCC precedent
seems to prohibit section 312(a) (7) refusals of access for content-
related reasons. 71
sion's PACcess Doctrine, 64 B.U. L. REv. 625, 633 (1984) (predicting that CBS v. FCC
decision would result in greater broadcaster caution).
165. 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
166. See, e.g., CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. at 414-17 (White, J., dissenting); Note, The
Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARv. L. REv. 221, 229 (1981) [hereinafter Harvard
Note]; Smith, supra note 146, at 1513-16. Justice White (joined by Justices Rehn-
quist and Stevens) was particularly concerned about the Commission's ruling that
specialized attention should be given to the individual candidate's needs, because
under that kind of standard, by definition, "there will be very little deference paid
to the judgment and discretion of the broadcaster" and "[tihe demands of the
candidate will be paramount." CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. at 413 (White, J., dissenting).
167. CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. at 386-90. Some commentators have taken the
position that the FCC's emphasis on the needs of the individual candidate in the
Carter-Mondale case was in fact somewhat of a departure from the "traditional FCC
practice of according considerable weight" to the broadcasters' judgments. See
Harvard Note, supra note 166, at 229 & n.43; Smith, supra note 146, at 1513-16. See
also supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
168. 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
169. See, e.g., CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 111; Carter-Mondale Presidential
Comm., Inc., 74 F.C.C.2d 631, 644 (1979).
170. See, e.g., Citizens for LaRouche, Inc., 47 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1197 (1980)
(declining to find that station violated § 312(a) (7) by refusing to provide candi-
date with 30 minute prime time program spot on particular day).
171. See, e.g., Carter-Mondale, 74 F.C.C.2d at 669, in which CBS argued that its
interpretation of § 312(a) (7) as requiring an assessment of a candidate's purpose
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Despite the Commission's asserted concerns about broadcaster
denials of access for content-based reasons, however, it could still
be argued that the November Ruling is not an arbitrary and unrea-
sonable reading of the legislation. First, although concern about
the impact of particular speech content on the public has never
before served as an articulated justification for the exclusion of cer-
tain time slots from reasonable access, the Commission took the
position in its November Ruling that its precedent in allowing
broadcasters to close news programming to section 312(a) (7) ac-
cess was a recognition that licensees could permissibly take the pub-
lic impact of political spots into account in determining access
under section 312(a) (7). The interest that the Commission pur-
ported to protect in its news exemption decision was the broad-
caster's asserted journalistic interest in the integrity of its news
programming. 172 The November Ruling, however, provides a plau-
sible rereading of that decision. Rather than an abstract endorse-
ment of broadcaster editorial discretion, the news exemption
decision could be explained by broadcaster concerns about the pos-
sible effect on public perceptions - including assumptions of
broadcaster endorsement - of political ads in the news. In any
event, if the public has an interest in the journalistic integrity of the
broadcast licensee in the area of news programming that can out-
weigh the candidate's interest in access to news programming that
is most likely to target the candidate's desired audience, it could be
argued that a parallel kind of balance exists as between the anti-
abortion candidate's access right and the public's interest in the
protection of children from harmful material.
in seeking time would violate § 315's prohibition against censorship. The FCC
stated: "nor did we state that content would be a relevant consideration in evaluat-
ing a request for reasonable access." Id.
This is consistent with the FCC's assumption that the "no censorship" provi-
sion of § 315 is applicable to the access provided under § 312(a) (7) as well. See
supra note 110. In addition, it could be argued that reading § 312(a) (7) as permit-
ting content-based decisions would nullify § 315, whose "no censorship" mandate
could be argued to be absolute. This was one of the arguments made by the Media
Access Project in its comments in Docket 92-254. Letter from Gigi B. Sohn & An-
drew Jay Schwartzman, Counsel, Media Access Project and the Washington Area
Citizens Coalition Interested In Viewers Constitutional Rights, to Donna Searcy,
Secretary, Federal Communications Commission 1-2 (Jan. 22, 1993) (on file with
author). See also November Ruling, 9 F.C.C.R. 7638, 7641 (1994) (discussing MAP's
argument concerning "no censorship" provision of § 315). MAP will presumably
reiterate this argument in its briefs in the appeal from the November Ruling. The
discussion of § 315 can be found infra notes 178-271 and accompanying text. On
the other hand, the flexibility of § 312(a) (7) might counsel reading § 315's prohi-
bition on censorship more flexibly as well.
172. See, e.g., CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 99-100 (1973).
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Second, the broader structure of section 312 as a whole sug-
gests that an FCC decision to permit broadcasters to establish a safe
harbor for certain kinds of shocking speech is consistent with legis-
lative intent. Section 312(a) (6) authorizes the FCC to revoke a sta-
tion license for violations of section 1464's prohibition on the
broadcast of obscene or indecent speech.173 If this provision were
read as a statutory limit on the reasonable access guaranteed by sec-
tion 312(a) (7), the limitation permitted by the November Ruling is
consistent with such a structure. 174
The reasonable access provision of section 312(a) (7) was ap-
parently designed to promote the public interest in rich political
discourse through the privilege granted to federal political candi-
dates. 175 Even the FCC, which has on numerous occasions stated
that federal candidates are the beneficiaries of the reasonable ac-
cess mandate, recognizes that those candidates are awarded access
in a fiduciary capacity.' 76
This particular problem is doctrinally difficult because it pits
several aspects of the public interest against one another: the inter-
est in informed political discourse; the interest in journalistic free-
dom and editorial control; and the interest in the protection of
children and parental supervision. There is a conflict, for example,
between the public interest in untrammeled debate on issues of
momentous social import, no matter how ugly or unruly, and the
public interest in the welfare of children who might be harmed by
graphic abortion material. Given this conflict - and in light of the
constitutionally compelling interest in the protection of children
affirmed in the Ferber'77 line of cases - a court would probably find
173. See also Luken Staff Memorandum, supra note 41, at 7 n.17 (on file with
author) (concluding that this provision "must be read to carve an exception to
Section 312(a) (7)").
174. On the other hand, one could also conclude that the § 312(a) (6) provi-
sion presents not a floor, but a ceiling on the limitations statutorily envisioned for
§ 312(a) (7). This would mean that even though reasonable access might not have
to be provided for material that violates § 1464, the exclusion of material that does
not rise to that level of law violation (and that is only otherwise "harmful to chil-
dren") could not take advantage of the structural § 312(a) (6) argument.
175. See discussion supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973); Carter-Mondale Presiden-
tial Comm., Inc., 74 F.C.C.2d 631, 644 (1979), aff'd sub nom. CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S.
367 (1981).
177. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (upholding conviction of child
pornography seller and explicitly stating that state's interest in safeguarding physi-
cal and psychological well-being of minors is compelling). See also NEWTON N. Mi-
NOW & CRAIG L. LAMAY, ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND: CHILDREN, TELEVISION,
AND THE FrST AMENDMENT 119-36 (1995) (on "child's First Amendment" and spe-
cial constitutional role of the protection of children).
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permissible a reading of the textually ambiguous section 312 that
would permit the Commission's decision to allow broadcasters to
consider the interests of children as well as candidates in determin-
ing reasonable access in particular instances.
2. The Prohibition of Censorship Under Section 315:
By contrast to section 312(a) (7), which requires reasonable-
ness and thus provides for administrative interpretation, the censor-
ship prohibition of section 315 is stated in absolute terms. Having
established the principle of equal opportunities for the use of
broadcast stations by legally qualified political candidates, the statu-
tory language in section 315 cautions that "such licensee shall have
no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the pro-
visions of this section." 178 The FCC adopted an anti-discrimination
regulation addressing political broadcasting as a gloss on section
315.179 This naturally raises two questions: first, what is meant by
censorship, and second, whether the channeling of political
messages with harmful content should be considered censorship
under the statute or discrimination under the regulation interpret-
ing the statute.
While I conclude in this discussion that there are no clear an-
swers to those questions in the legislative history, and while the
weight of FCC and judicial precedent has interpreted section 315
strictly, there is sound basis for the interpretation of section 315 in
the November Ruling. Given the deference traditionally accorded
to agency interpretations of statutes, and in light of prior judicial
approval of channeling as a means of resolving constitutional con-
flicts in the indecency area, it is likely that the FCC's interpretation
of section 315 would survive judicial scrutiny.
178. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1995).
179. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1941 (e) (1994). Pursuant to this non-discrimination regu-
lation, broadcasters cannot permissibly discriminate between candidates in either
charges or service. The question then raised is whether the channeling of graphic
anti-abortion advertisements works as a discrimination against anti-choice candi-
dates. This section is the renumbered (but otherwise unchanged) § 73.1940 of the
Commission's rules. It provides, inter alia, that "[i]n making time available to can-
didates for public office, no licensee shall make any discrimination between candi-
dates in . . . practices . . . or make or give any preference to any candidate for
public office or subject any such candidate to any prejudice or disadvantage." Id.
See also infra note 272 and accompanying text. Discussion of this provision is sur-
prisingly absent from the parties' comments and the FCC decisions in the abortion
ad matter.
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a. Legislative History and the Meaning of Censorship in Section
315:
Section 315 was essentially adopted wholesale from its prede-
cessor Section 18 of the Radio Act of 1927.180 The section 315 pro-
hibition on censorship was not addressed by the Congress that
adopted the 1934 Communications Act.1 81 Nor were there prof-
fered definitions of censorship or clear discussions of the meaning
of the prohibition on broadcaster censorship in the legislative his-
tory of the Radio Act of 1927.182
The Radio Act of 1927, which was the first comprehensive fed-
eral regulation of radio, was passed against a political background
of complaints by candidates that they had been discriminatorily de-
nied access to airtime by broadcasters. 183 The discussion in Con-
180. 44 Stat. 1170 (1927); CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 105-07 (1973); HARRY P.
WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION LAW 312 (1948);John W. Dean, III, Political Broad-
casting: The Communications Act of 1934 Reviewed, 20 FED. Comm. B.J. 16, 20-21
(1966); Edward De Grazia, Equal Political Defamation For All Section 315 of the Federal
Communications Act, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 706 (1951).
181. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 532 (1959).
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1918, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 26, 49 (1934) ("Section 315 on
facilities for candidates for public office is the same as section 18 of the Radio Act.
The Senate provision, which would have modified and extended the present law, is
not included in the substitute."); WARNER, supra note 180, at 318. See also infra
notes 207-08.
182. For accounts of the legislative history of the Radio Act of 1927, see, e.g.,
ERIK BARNouw, A TOWER IN BABEL: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED
STATES, VOLUME I - TO 1933, 197-202 (1966); HUGH CARTER DONAHUE, THE BAT-
TLE TO CONTROL BROADCAST NEWS: WHO OWNS THE FIRST AMENDMENT? 1-18
(1989); JONATHAN W. EMORD, FREEDOM, TECHNOLOGY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
167-71 (1991); WARNER, supra note 180;J. Roger Wollenberg, Title II: The FCC as
Arbiter of "The Public Interest, Convenience and Necessity," in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE COMMUNICATIONS Acr OF 1934 61, 73 & n.88 (Max Paglin ed., 1989). See also
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF U.S. REGULATORY AGENCIES 2075-372 (1973) (collecting
legislative materials).
It should be noted that both § 29 of the Radio Act of 1927 and § 326 of the
Communications Act of 1934 included provisions prohibiting censorship by the
Federal Radio Commission and the Federal Communications Commission respec-
tively. Radio Act of 1927, § 29, 44 Stat. 1162 (superseded 1934); Federal Commu-
nications Act of 1934, § 326, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), amended by 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613
(1995).
183. DONAHUE, supra note 182, at 9-11; David H. Ostroff, Equal Time: Origins of
Section 18 of the Radio Act of 1927, 24J. BROAD. 367, 367-72 (1980). See also Note,
Radio: Communications Act - Section 315 - Censorship - Equal Facilities for Political
Candidates, 7 AIR L. REv. 313, 314 (1936) ("The frequent comments in the public
press would seem to indicate that discrimination and unwarranted political censor-
ship are by no means foreign to the American broadcasting system."); Seymour N.
Siegel, Censorship in Radio, 7 AIR L. REV. 1, 4-7 (1936) (discussing radio access dur-
ing Roosevelt Administration's early days). See also Hearings on H.R. 7357, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. 83 (1924). Some commentators suggested examples of discrimina-
tory practices by broadcasters even after passage of § 315 in 1934. See, e.g., De
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gress largely concerned the model of regulation to be adopted for
the still-new medium of radio. One option was the common carrier
model, promoted by progressive legislators as the system "promis-
ing the fullest access opportunities for candidates and discussion of
public affairs." 18 4 Supporters of the common carrier approach ar-
gued for it largely on grounds of discrimination by broadcasters be-
tween candidates and between people of different views on political
questions.18 5 As is noted below, the common carrier model was ul-
timately rejected for broadcasting in the Radio Act of 1927 and the
Communications Act of 1934.186 Instead, the early legislation con-
stituted a compromise between a common carrier and a traditional
editorial model - providing no affirmative rights of access to the
air to anyone, but assuring equal opportunities if access were
granted to one political candidate.' 8 7
Congressman Wallace White's bill to reform broadcasting -
one of the 1927 Act's parents - did not specifically deal with the
issue of political broadcasts.188 Nevertheless, the bill was specifically
directed at curtailing what Congressman White saw as a dangerous
monopoly in the infant industry.'89 Floor discussion of the bill
made clear that freedom of speech was a value intended to underlie
the legislation. 90 Moreover, House floor discussions raised specific
Grazia, supra note 180, at 356-58. The first attempt to invoke § 315 itself appar-
ently came in 1936 when a radio station flatly refused to broadcast a radio speech
by the Communist Party nominee. Harry R Blaine, Equality, Fairness and 315: The
Frustration of Democratic Politics, 24 MD. L. REv. 166, 169 (1964).
184. DONAHUE, supra note 182, at 3; BENNO SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
VS. PUBLIC ACCESS 141-44 (1976). See 67 CONG. REc. 5478-5504 (comments by Pro-
gressive legislators in support of a common carrier model).
.185. See, e.g., DONAHUE, supra note 182, at 5, 9-12.
186. See infra notes 196-204, 209.
187. Id.
188. 67 CONG. REc. 5480 (1926) (statement of Rep. White); Dean, supra note
180, at 21; Ostroff, supra note 183, at 372.
189. EMORD, supra note 182, at 167.
190. See, e.g., 67 CONG. REc. 5480 (1926); DONAHUE, supra note 182, at 1 &
n.1. Congressman LaGuardia sought assurance that there was a guaranty of free
seech over the radio. 67 CONG. REC. 5480 (1926) (remarks of Rep. LaGuardia).
ongressman White replied that his bill "[did] not touch that matter specifically.
Personally, I felt that we could go no further than the Federal Constitution does in
that respect. The pending bill gives the Secretary no power of interfering with
freedom of speech in any degree." Id. (remarks of Rep. White). Congressman
Blanton inquired into whether the bill dealt with slanderous political attacks of
one party or individual upon another; and Congressman Woodruff asked whether
Congress "[c]ould ... take action in regulating what a person might say over the
radio without abridging the right of free speech?" Id. (remarks of Rep. Woodruff).
Congressman White responded to Congressman Woodruff: "You get very near
censorship when you undertake to do that." Id. (remarks of Rep. White). See also
Seymour N. Siegel, Attitude of Congress on Censorship, in RADIO CENSORSHIP 58-59
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concerns about discrimination in political broadcasts. Congress-
man Davis complained about both discriminatory access and une-
qual rates granted to political candidates by broadcasters.19 1 Texas
Democrat Luther Johnson's eloquent attempt to amend the White
bill to include an equal access provision was derailed only because
of the Chair's procedural ruling that the amendment was out of
order. 192
(H.B. Summers ed., 1939). It should be noted, of course, that the censorship issue
underlying that day's Congressional colloquy appeared directly to concern censor-
ship by the government (and particularly the Secretary of Commerce - then the
powerful Herbert Hoover - to whom the White bill would have remitted full juris-
diction over radio). See, e.g., DONAHUE, supra note 182, at 6-9 (on Hoover's power
and strategic maneuvering as Commerce Secretary).
191. Representative Davis complained of broadcaster censorship of news and
politics, relying on congressional testimony by AT&T Vice President W.E. Harkness
that the company routinely rejected requests to use its toll broadcast facilities. 67
CONG. REc. 5483 (1926). Taking the position that "[wje do not censor - we
edit[,]" Mr. Harkness had likened AT&T to any other publication with the right to
reject material presented. Id. at 5484. Harkness stated the standard as follows:
"We feel if the matter is unfair or contains matter which the public would not care
to hear, we may reject it." Id. Congressman Davis reminded the House that
broadcasters
can permit one candidate to be heard through their broadcasting stations
and refuse to grant the same privilege to his opponent. They can permit
the proponents of a measure to be heard and can refuse to grant the
opposition a hearing. They can charge one man an exorbitant price and
permit another man to broadcast free or at a nominal price. There is
absolutely no restriction whatever upon the arbitrary methods that can be
employed, and witnesses have appeared before our committee and al-
ready have given instances of arbitrary and tyrannical action in this re-
spect, although the radio industry is now only in its infancy.
67 CONG. REC. 5483 (1926). See also H.R. REP. No. 464, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 18
(1926) (discussion between Rep. Davis and W.E. Harkness regarding AT&T's prac-
tice of rejecting some purchasers of airtime). Congressman Davis stated: "I am
even more opposed to private censorship over what American citizens may broad-
cast to other American citizens .... There is nothing in the present bill [the
White bill] which even pretends to prevent it or to protect the public against it."
Id.
192. 67 CONG. REC. 5558-61 (1926). Congressman Johnson proposed "[t]hat
the broadcasting stations shall be required by a mandatory provision of law to serve
the public like other public-service concerns, and in so doing shall not be permit-
ted to discriminate against anyone, either as to service or rates." Id. at 5558. Short
of that, Congressman Johnson argued for an amendment that would provide equal
facilities and rates, without discrimination, to all political parties, candidates for
office, and proponents and opponents of all political questions. Id. at 5559-60.
He made clear that fear of media power in the political arena was a central con-
cern that animated his support for a common carrier regime. He asked:
What greater monopoly could exist than where a radio company could
give the free use of its line to one candidate for office, one contender of
some economic theory, and then deny such ... to those who are on the
other side of the question? . . . If the strong arm of the law does not
prevent monopoly ownership, and make [price] discrimination by such
stations illegal, American thought and American politics will be largely at
the mercy of those who operate these stations. For publicity is the most
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On the Senate side, Senator Clarence Dill had proposed his
version of a radio regulation bill, designed to grant full authority
over the regulation of radio to an independent radio commis-
sion. 193 Senate discussions were even clearer than those in the
House in articulating legislative concern about access to the air for
political candidates and points of view on political issues. Some
members of Congress strongly objected to broadcaster discretion to
reject requests for airtime and to edit broadcast material, contend-
ing that such discretion was nothing more than "private censor-
ship." 194 Senator Heflin characterized licensee pre-broadcast
review of political speeches as "tyranny" and called for uncensored
and non-discriminatory access to Republicans and Democrats
alike. 195
In keeping with those views, the bill reported to the Senate by
the Interstate Commerce Committee prohibited discrimination in
the use of broadcasting stations for the discussion of matters of pub-
lic interest and required that broadcasters be deemed common car-
riers for the purpose of political broadcasts.' 96 The then-
powerful weapon that can be wielded in a republic, and when such a
weapon is placed in the hands of one, or a single selfish group is permit-
ted to either tacitly or otherwise acquire ownership and dominate these
broadcasting stations throughout the country, then woe be to those who
dare to differ with them. It will be impossible to compete with them in
reaching the ears of the American people.
67 CONG. REc. 5558 (1926), quoted in DONAHUE, supra note 182, at 10-11. The
Johnson amendment was nevertheless rejected by the Chair as not being germane
to the matters then under discussion. 67 CONG. REC. at 5560-61. See also Ostroff,
supra note 183, at 372-73.
193. SeeS. REP. No. 772, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-5 (1926); EMORD, supra note
182, at 168.
194. 67 CONG. REc. 5484 (1926) (remarks of Congressman Davis). See also
CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 105 (1973) and legislative history cited therein; H.R. REP.
No. 464, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-18 (1926); Wollenberg, supra note 182, at 73 &
n.88. During the hearings on S. 1 and S. 1754 before the Senate Committee on
Interstate Commerce, Senator Wheeler took the position that "this is in the nature
of a public utility. I think something must be done to permit a man to get a per-
mit. It must be done so that the people shall not be kept off the air." Hearings
Before Sen. Comm. on Interstate Commerce on S. 1 and S. 1754, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 133
(1926).
195. 67 CONG. REc. 12356 (1926) (remarks of Senator Heflin):
What business is it of one to censor a speech and say whether or not it can
be made, unless it is of such a character that it ought not to be made
anywhere because of obscene language or something of that kind ....
The conditions ought to be absolutely fair. If a Republican has a speech
he wants to broadcast, let him do it and say what he pleases, and let a
Democrat do likewise ....
Id.
196. 67 CONG. REC. 12503 (1926). The bill provided that
[i]f any licensee shall permit a broadcasting station to be used.., by a
candidate or candidates for any public office, or for the discussion of any
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established meaning of "common carrier" entailed the notion of
uncensored and non-discriminatory carriage.
Ultimately, however, Senator Dill, the floor manager of the bill
and Chair of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, pro-
posed an amendment that would eliminate the characterization of
broadcasters as common carriers, prohibit censorship by broadcast-
ers, and explicitly immunize broadcasters from civil and criminal
question affecting the public, he shall make no discrimination as to the
use of such broadcasting station, and with respect to said matters the li-
censee shall be deemed a common carrier of interstate commerce.
Id. See also CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 106; Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY,
Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 531-32 (1959) (discussing legislative history of 1927 Radio Act);
WARNER, supra note 180, at 313-14.
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liability for defamation. 197 The Dill bill was passed. 198 Even though
Senators disagreed about whether they should "consent to the
building up of a great publicity vehicle and allow it to be controlled
by a few men, and empower those few men to determine what the
public shall hear [in the first instance,]" 199 there was wide agree-
ment that licensees should be prevented from censoring political
197. 67 CONG. REc. 12358, 12501-02 (1926). See also CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at
106; Dean, supra note 180, at 20-21; Ostroff, supra note 183, at 374; Wollenberg,
supra note 182, at 73; Walter A. Goldhill, Note, Censorship of Political Broadcasts, 58
YALE L.J. 787, 789 (1949). Senator Dill also made clear in floor discussion that the
non-discrimination provision relating to political speech by candidates should be
extended to rates as well as terms of service. 67 CONG. REC. 12502 (1925). On
Dill's role in the bill, see EMORD, supra note 182, at 168. See also CBS v. DNC, 412
U.S. at 106 (describing Senator Dill as principal architect of 1927 Radio Act).
The Dill amendment read as follows:
If any licensee shall permit a broadcasting station to be used by a candi-
date or candidates for any public office, he shall afford equal opportuni-
ties to all candidates for such public office in the use of such broadcasting
station: Provided, That such licensee shall have no power to censor the
material broadcast under the provisions of this paragraph and shall not
be liable to criminal or civil action by reason of any uncensored utter-
ances thus broadcast.
67 CONG. REc. 12501.
The story of the Dill amendment appears to be a fascinating example of prag-
matic politics at work. Senator Dill was the Chair of the Interstate Commerce
Committee that referred the common carrier version of the political speech legis-
lation to the full Senate. Yet, having gotten the bill to the Senate, Senator Dill
reneged on his Committee's proposal and suggested a different amendment. He
stated during floor discussion that the common carrier provision of the bill re-
ceived the most discussion and the most objection in Committee deliberation. 67
CONG. REc. at 12358. He said that the Committee "finally agreed to it [the com-
mon carrier provision] in order.., to get the bill out of the committee. After we
got it out we realized that the 'common carrier' phrase was an unwise phrase, to
say the least, at this time." Id. Arguing that broadcasting was voluntary and unpaid
by the listener, Senator Dill believed that it would be "unwise to put the broad-
caster under the hampering control of being a common carrier and compelled to
accept anything and everything that was offered him so long as the price was paid."
Id. at 12502. Senator Dill assured the membership that he had "consulted [on his
amendment] with a number of the leading broadcasters," and that although "they
do not like any limitation they do agree that this will not be objectionable." Id. at
12358. Presumably having gotten his bill through a split committee to the Senate
by appearing to give in on a crucial point regarding free access, Senator Dill then
managed to get the Senate to agree to a legislative compromise that he had
cleared with the regulated industry. For an account of Dill as a supporter of broad-
cast interests despite his image as trust-buster in the 1920s, see ROBERT W. McCHES-
NEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND DEMOCRACY- THE BATTLE FOR THE
CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928-1935 126-27 (1993).
198. 67 CONG. REc. 12505 (1926); CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 107; DONAHUE,
supra note 182, at 15; Ostroff, supra note 183, at 374.
199. 67 CONG. REC. 12503 (1926) (statement of Senator Howell). See also
DONAHUE, supra note 182, at 12 ("Progressives criticized equal time for political
candidates as restrictive, confusing, palliative, narrow, and anemic."). These legis-
lators sought a general access right, not only for candidates, but also for other
citizens for discussion of public issues on a common carrier basis.
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speeches.200
The House-Senate Conference Committee charged with recon-
ciling the White and Dill bills included the equal opportunities pro-
vision as Section 18 of the new legislation, but limited it to
candidates, 201 eliminated the Senate version's express immunity
from liability,20 2 included the prohibition on censorship without
any explanation, 203 and clarified that the anti-discrimination princi-
ple applied to rates as well as access to airtime.20 4 Subsequent Con-
gressional discussion of the conference legislation reiterated free
speech concerns20 5 and addressed the scope of the equal opportu-
200. 67 CONG. REc. 12356, 12502-05 (1926). See also Port Huron Broadcasting
Co., 12 F.C.C. 1069, 1073 (1948). Similarly, in the context of discussing the prohi-
bition of censorship by the government itself, both Senator Dill and Senator Hef-
lin spoke vehemently in support of uncensored speech. 67 CONG. REc. 12615
(1926). Senator Heflin, for example, "took the position [throughout the discus-
sion of the radio legislation] that people ought to be at liberty to discuss anything
they want to over the radio, and that the special interests ought not to be able to
suppress free speech." Id. One commentator summarized the history as follows:
"Repeatedly, senators expressed their concern that the medium was in danger of
being controlled by a select few who could deny coverage to certain political topics
and, most particularly, could deny members of the Senate an opportunity to pres-
ent their campaign messages." EMORD, supra note 182, at 168.
201. H.R. REP. No. 1886, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 18 (1927).
202. See id. (excluding any provision for immunity from liability). Proposals
to ban all political defamation from the air had been defeated. See 67 CONG. REC.
5572-73 (1926). So was legislation designed to immunize broadcasters from liabil-
ity for defamation aired pursuant to the non-censorship provision. See H.R. 9971,
69th Cong., 1st Sess., as reported with Senate amendments (May 6, 1926), cited in
De Grazia, supra note 180, at 707 & n.8. The elimination of the immunity provi-
sion by the Conferees was not explained in the Conference Report. Goldhill, supra
note 197, at 789; Port Huron Broadcasting Co., 12 F.C.C. 1069, 1073 (1949); Farm-
ers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 532 (1959). In floor discus-
sion concerning the compromise bill in the House, Senator Blanton asked Senator
Scott why the proposal to ban political defamation from the air had been elimi-
nated from the bill in conference. 68 CONG. REC. 2567 (1927). Senator Scott's
response was that "there were a number of reasons .... When we reached confer-
ence the question presented itself as to the legality of such a provision.., where
the right of action would attach." Id.
203. H.R. REP. No. 1886, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1927). The Conference
Report simply explained § 18 as follows:
Section 18 was not embodied in the House bill. It is a modification of
one of the sections of the Senate amendment. It provides in substance
that if any licensee shall permit a legally qualified candidate for public
office to use a broadcasting station the licensee shall afford equal oppor-
tunities to all other candidates for the same office to use the station.
Id.
204. See, e.g., 68 CONG. REc. 3034 (1927) (comments of Senator Dill).
205. The House discussion of free speech and anti-censorship issues was ex-
plicit. For example, on being questioned on the non-discrimination principle in
the bill, Senator Scott stated, "you are trespassing very closely on sacred ground
when you attempt to control the right of free speech." 68 CONG. REc. 2567 (1927).
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nities notion.206
Attempts to amend the Radio Act of 1927 followed shortly on
the heels of its passage. 207 The ultimate legislative winner - the
Communications Act of 1934 - borrowed its political rules from
the 1927 Act virtually verbatim.20 8 The 1934 Act followed its prede-
206. WARNER, supra note 180, at 315-18; CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 110-11. One
commentator has summarized the rationales for the passage of the equal time no-
tion in 1927 as follows:
In 1927, Congress enacted equal time for several reasons. Politicians'
ability to mount electoral campaigns over radio, a new mass communica-
tions medium, was at stake. Incumbents especially wanted to secure ac-
cess to broadcasting. Progressive political ideals that an informed
electorate reached political decisions by voting on the basis of the fullest
information supported arguments that candidates enjoy access to radio
during political campaigns. Ideological and sectional politics came into
play. Several key Western Congressmen had made their political careers
fighting railroad and utility interests and viewed broadcasters suspiciously
as the monopolists' latest incarnation. Southern Congressmen protective
of the legacy of their region's peculiar institution and anxious about en-
croaching urbanism, were equally suspicious of Eastern-dominated radio.
Perennial Democratic standard-bearer William Jennings Bryan viewed
"impartial treatment of candidates" over radio as an effective counterbal-
ance to a Republican press in contested states. All demanded equal time
for candidates before a national system of licensing was put in place.
DONAHUE, supra note 182, at 5-6.
207. The Radio Act of 1927, as a compromise measure, had vested primary
licensing authority in the Federal Radio Commission for one year, with the idea
that it would be returned to the Secretary of Commerce thereafter, although the
Commission would play an appellate role. EMORD, supra note 182, at 171 (citingJ.
Rosenbloom, Appendix I, Authority of the Federal Communications Commission in FREE-
DOM AND RESPONSIBILrrY IN BROADCASTING 96,113 (John E. Coons ed., 1961)). De-
spite the statutory plan, however, Congress renewed the independent Federal
Radio Commission's jurisdiction three times, ultimately renewing it "until other-
wise provided by law." Id. Senator Dill supported the compromise between his
desire for an independent committee and Congressman White's desire to settle
control of communications in the executive, apparently because he foresaw that if
a commission were ever created, "we would never get rid of it." LUCAS A. PowE,JR.,
AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 62 (1987) (quoting Senator
Dill); BARNouW, supra note 182, at 199; DONAHUE, supra note 182, at 201 n.40.
President Hoover pocket vetoed the first major attempt to rewrite broadcast
regulation. See H.R. REP. No. 2106, 72nd Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 6 (1933). See also 76
CONG. REc. 3767 (1933) (remarks of Senator Dill). Hearings on this legislation
again reflected many Congressmen's distaste for broadcaster censorship of any
kind. See, e.g., Hearings on H. 7716 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce
72nd Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1932) (remarks of Senator Wheeler). The legislation -
H.R. 7716 - would have included a provision broadening the equal opportunities
requirement beyond political candidates to include presenters of views on public
questions. The legislation passed both Houses of Congress in 1933. Wollenberg,
supra note 182, at 68-69. See also De Grazia, supra note 180, at 708; WARNER, supra
note 180, at 315.
208. H.R. RP. No. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26, 47 (1934). See WARNER, supra
note 180, at 318; Wollenberg, supra note 182, at 69-70, 75. Section 315 read:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate
for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal
opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of
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cessor in explicitly exempting broadcasters from the obligations of
common carriage.2 09
The legislative history suggests that many of the legislators
feared censorship and used the rich rhetoric of absolute prohibi-
tion. However, what they meant by censorship was never defined.
Most importantly, broadcaster discretion over time scheduling of
advertisements was not addressed. The stories told in Congres-
sional colloquy focused on access refusals, editing, and rate discrim-
ination. Moreover, at least some powerful congressmen assumed
that some of what we might today call censorship would not be
completely prohibited. 210 Both members of Congress and persons
testifying on the issue of broadcaster immunity over the years after
such broadcasting station, and the Commission shall make rules and reg-
ulations to carry this provision into effect: rovided, That such licensee
shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the
provisions of this section. No obligation is hereby imposed upon any li-
censee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate.
H.R. REP. No. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934). In the words of Senator Dill,
"[t] he radio law expressly prohibits any kind of censorship by the managers of
radio stations ... [and the proposed Dill-Rayburn bill] simply writes into law...
the provisions of the radio law as they relate to radio regulation now being en-
forced by the Federal Radio Commission." 78 CONG. Rc. 4138-39 (1934).
Although there was virtually no specific discussion of the non-censorship as-
pect of section 315 during the legislative discussion of the bill that ultimately be-
came the 1934 Act, it should be noted that various encomia to free speech on the
air were made in Congress. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REc. 10991-92 (1934) (remarks of
Congressman Willford). Senator McFadden warned against the then-current cen-
sorship of politics by broadcasters, including network censorship policies, and
called for a legislative solution (particularly in light of the impending Congres-
sional elections of 1934). 78 CONG. RIc. 3543 (1934) (remarks of Senator McFad-
den regarding H.R. 7986). At one point, according to Senator Dill, claims were
made that the call for a new radio bill was an attempt to bring about censorship.
78 CONG. REc. 4138 (1934). Senator Dill vociferously denied any attempt to regu-
late freedom of the press and cited as evidence the retention of the prohibition of
censorship in the 1927 Act. Id.
209. 48 Stat. 1066 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1994). See also
CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 108-09; Wollenberg, supra note 182, at 73.
The Supreme Court pointed out in CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 108-09 & n.4, that
several additional - and ultimately unsuccessful - attempts were made to add a
limited obligation on the part of broadcasters to permit access to those wishing to
address public questions. See also Wollenberg, supra note 182, at 73 & nn.91-92.
210. Similarly, the Federal Radio Commission's formulation of programming
standards and its imposition of sanctions - including non-renewal of license -
for programming reasons were not perceived as censorship at the time. See, e.g.,
KFBK Broadcasting Assoc. v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931)
(holding that FRC's taking account of licensee's past conduct did not constitute
prohibited censorship and affirming agency's decision to deny license renewal on
grounds that station's programming did not serve public interest); Trinity Method-
ist Church v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 284 U.S. 685 (1932) (affirming FRC's denial of license renewal application on
grounds that licensee's broadcast of vituperative sermons was not in public
interest).
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the enactment of sections 18 and 315 apparently assumed that sec-
tion 315 permitted broadcasters to delete obscene and indecent
matter from political programming.2 1' Accordingly, even some
who seemed to adopt an absolutist view of the non-censorship man-
date and who would not have permitted censorship of defamation
in political broadcasts nevertheless appeared to accept the propri-
ety of censoring obscenity and indecency. This suggests that even
the so-called absolutists were not wedded to complete non-interven-
tion into the candidate's chosen speech.212
211. See, e.g., 67 CONG. REc. 12356 (1926) (remarks of Senator Heflin); Note,
Defamation - Broadcaster's Liability - § 315 of Federal Communications Act Implies
Complete Immunity, 34 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 140, 141 (1959).
212. In addition, one commentator noted that "the Commission ha[d] never
suggested that § 315 prohibit[ed] broadcasters from deleting indecent language
from election speeches." De Grazia, supra note 180, at 713 n.41(a). In this com-
mentator's view, there was "presumably no doubt but that a broadcaster must de-
lete indecent language to escape liability under § 1464." Id.
With respect to editing for defamation, I note below that the Supreme Court
ultimately held that § 315 did not permit such broadcaster intervention. See infra
notes 231-36 and accompanying text. Although in doing so the Court character-
ized the legislative history as indefinite, it should be noted that some legislators
attempted to harmonize the deletion of defamatory political language with the
prohibitions of § 315 by substantive parsing of the asserted difference between def-
amation and political speech. Much of the post-1934 legislative discussion with
regard to whether broadcasters should be deemed to have immunity from libel
suits addresses the question of what the earlier Congresses meant by the non-cen-
sorship provision. A number of legislators took the position that the prohibited
censorship related only to the content of the candidate's political message and not
to its defamatory character. See, for example, the comments of Congressman
Charles H. Elston:
If section 315 is given the interpretation which I think the Congress in-
tended and not what the Federal Communications Commission says Con-
gress intended [in Port Huron], there would not be any difficulty. In the
first place, the part of the section that refers to censorship simply means
that the licensee could not censor a person's political view.
Hearings Before the Select Comm. to Investigate the FCC, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1948).
See also Hearings on H.R 7716 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 72nd
Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1932) (position taken by Henry Bellows, Chairman of Legisla-
tive Committee of National Association of Broadcasters). This view is consistent
with the interpretation of the non-censorship proviso adopted by one of the first
state courts to address the issue of broadcaster immunity from defamation liability.
In Sorenson v. Wood, the Nebraska court stated that the § 18:
prohibition of censorship of material broadcast over the radio station of a
licensee merely prevents the licensee from censoring the words as to their
political and partisan trend but does not give a licensee any privilege to
join and assist in the publication of a libel nor grant any immunity from
the consequences of such action.
243 N.W. 82, 85 (1932), appeal dismissed sub norn. KFAB Broadcasting Co. v. Soren-
sen, 290 U.S. 599 (1933) (per curiam) (on ground that decision rested on ade-
quate non-federal ground).
These courts and legislators attempted to distinguish political speech from
defamation - which they did not consider proper political speech anyway - so
that the latter and not the former would be subject to control by the broadcaster.
Of course, the distinction between political partisanship and defamation is often
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Moreover, Congress' elimination of the language of common
carriage and immunity from liability suggests that Congress did not
envision a complete lack of broadcaster discretion either to deny
access to political candidates or, perhaps, even to censor their
broadcasts in some ways.213 Admittedly, however, it is unwise to
read too much into the legislature's decision to drop the language
of common carriage and immunity from liability. At least one plau-
sible reading of the Senate's retreat from common carriage for
broadcasters suggests that the legislative history is one of subtle
compromise. The most significant difference between the common
carrier approach and the "no censorship" provision appears to be
that under the Dill amendment, broadcasters could refuse to air
any candidate's political broadcast so long as the denial of access
were even-handed.21 4 As a common carrier, a radio station would
not have been permitted to reject any such requests for carriage.
Senator Dill, in removing the common carrier language without
eliminating the "no censorship" notion, provided broadcasters with
a two-pronged option. Broadcaster who did not wish to carry cer-
tain political programming would not be forced to do so; however,
those who chose to carry such programming would be denied the
luxury of censoring speech they did not like. This result could well
have been the most politically tenable way of getting wide agree-
ment in the Senate on the issue of equality of opportunity without
including the more controversial affirmative political access rights
that would have been guaranteed by a common carriage provision.
Finally, it could be argued that the legislature worried most, in
the early radio broadcasting context, about viewpoint discrimina-
tion by broadcasters.2 15 There is ample evidence that broadcasters
ephemeral. Indeed, defamatory statements about opponents may be the method
by which a candidate seeks to promote his candidacy.
While graphic anti-abortion advertisements are neither defamatory nor,
under recent FCC precedent, obscene or indecent, the disparity in the legislative
approach to censorship of defamation on the one hand, and indecency or obscen-
ity on the other, suggests that there might be more interpretive room in the Con-
gressional view of the coverage of the non-censorship provision than one might
think.
213. See supra notes 184-86, 196-97 & 201-02 and accompanying text.
214. See 67 CONG. REc. 12502 (1926) (colloquy between Senators Cummins
and Dill in which Senator Dill explains that licensee need not permit any candi-
date to broadcast, but must not discriminate if it does permit any candidates to do
so).
215. See supra notes 183, 190-91, 199-200 & 205 and accompanying text. See
also De Grazia, supra note 180, at 706 ("The provisions of the section [18] were
inserted to insure equality of treatment by radio stations of political parties and
candidates. An appreciation of the 'political and propaganda' potentialities of ra-
dio communications inspired Congress to a provision which would preclude sta-
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had discriminated among candidates in making airtime avail-
able. 216 Many of the Democratic legislators were concerned that
what they characterized as the conservative and increasingly mo-
nopolistic radio licensees would deal preferentially with Republican
candidates. 217 If we focused on this as the primary motive behind
the equal opportunities legislation, then we could interpret the
non-censorship proviso as a way of ensuring equal opportunities.218
In other words, allowing equal amounts of airtime to the Demo-
cratic and Republican Senatorial candidates would not comply with
the dictates of section 315 if the Democratic candidate's message
were censored and the Republican candidate's message not subject
to the same review or treatment.2 19 Attention to the Congressional
concern to assure broadcaster viewpoint neutrality may permit an
tion-owner partisanship and discrimination in political elections."); Ostroff, supra
note 183.
216. See, e.g., DONAHUE, supra note 182, at 9-12 (recounting claims by Senate
Progressives Robert LaFollette and Hiram Johnson that they had been relegated to
low-power frequencies, and by House members who claimed price discrimination
in radio use during election periods); De Grazia, supra note 180, at 719-20 & n.68;
Ostroff, supra note 183, at 367-72. Legislators and commentators who discussed
the issue argued that such discrimination by broadcasters was common. See supra
notes 183 & 190-91 and sources cited therein; DONAHUE, supra note 182, at 6 (quot-
ing William Jennings Bryan article in N.Y. TrmEs, Sept. 3, 1922).
217. Ostroff, supra note 183, at 368 ("The major effort came from Democrats,
such as Clarence Dill in the Senate, and Ewin Davis in the House. Outside of the
South the Democrats were in the political minority; since the Civil War only two
Democrats had been elected President. During the mid-1920s the Democrats
could not foresee the economic cataclysm which would make them into the major-
ity party. The threat radio would follow the press by heavily favoring the Republi-
cans might well have led some Democrats to fear for the survival of their party.").
See also DONAHUE, supra note 182, at 6, 11; supra note 205. Claims of broadcaster
censorship against Republican candidates were also reported after Roosevelt's elec-
tion. See supra note 183. On "private censorship" of non-mainstream views after
1927, see MCCHESNEY, supra note 197, at 82-84, 245.
The rhetoric of the Progressives who sought a right of access both for candi-
dates and for the public in the discussion of political issues was grounded in con-
cern that broadcasters could manipulate public opinion and undermine
democracy. See DONAHUE, supra note 182, at 15 ("The potential dangers of broad-
caster manipulation of public opinion assaulted the Progressives' identification of
good government with an informed electorate capable of making independent
political decisions after digesting news and public affairs .... ).
218. For example, one scholar took the position that the Commission
adopted the view that § 315 did not permit deletion of defamation and that § 315
would be "desecrated were broadcasters permitted to delete defamation ... [be-
cause the Commission likely] felt.., broadcasters could obscure discrimination by
defamation deletion practices." De Grazia, supra note 180, at 719-20. This type of
criticism interprets the non-censorship mandate not as an affirmative decision to
opt for unfettered political speech, but as a transaction cost-avoiding corollary to
the principle of equal treatment.
219. See, e.g., 68 CONG. REc. 3034 (1927) (colloquy between Senators Dill, Pitt-
man and Fletcher during the Senate floor discussion of the Dill-White Conference
Committee bill). Senator Pittman and Senator Fletcher were concerned to make
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interpretation of section 315's censorship prohibition that focuses
on non-censorship as a guarantor of viewpoint neutrality. This fo-
cus on the "no censorship" provision not as a prohibition in itself,
but as part of a regime designed to provide equality in the treat-
ment of political candidates by broadcasters, might lead to the con-
clusion that good faith broadcaster decisions about the public's
interest, when viewpoint neutral, would be acceptable under the
statute's "no censorship" provision.
Senator Dill - the architect of the Radio Act of 1927 - did
subsequently describe section 18 of that legislation as "a law requir-
ing equal treatment of candidates with no censorship of what they
say." 220 Admittedly, it would be awkward to read this as if "no cen-
sorship" simply restated "equal treatment."221 Additionally, the
FCC has in the past interpreted the clause as having an independ-
ent meaning.2 22 Nevertheless, the structure and purposes of the
statute do not necessarily support blanket prohibitions of a neutral
rule of censorship across the board.223
clear that the equal opportunities provision in the bill also required equality of
conditions for use (including equality of rates). Id.
220. Hearings on H.R 7716 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 72nd
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1932).
221. Dill also made clear his understanding that the legislation's "equal op-
portunities" language entailed equality of treatment in conditions of access, in-
cluding rates, and suggested that the FRC regulations would so provide should the
measure be adopted. 68 CONG. Rac. 3304 (1927). One could conclude that it
would have been unnecessary to assure the Senate that regulations assuring equal-
ity of treatment would be adopted under the equal opportunities clause if Senator
Dill thought that the "no censorship" proviso had accomplished that result in the
statute itself.
222. In Western Conn. Broadcasting Co., 43 F.C.C.2d 730 (1973), for exam-
ple, the FCC interpreted as violative of § 315's "no censorship" provision a broad-
caster's editing of Democratic mayoral candidates' scripts to eliminate material not
in "good taste" and that he thought would harm the image of the station. As the
FCC put it: "[t]he basic purpose of the absolute prohibition against censorship in
section 315(a) is to assure candidates of the opportunity to use broadcast facilities
unfettered by licensee judgments as to the manner of use." Id. at 795. In the
Initial Decision, 43 F.C.C.2d 752 (1972), the Hearing Examiner had discussed the
censorship issue under § 315. He found that the "basic purpose of the absolute
prohibition against censorship in Section 315(a) is to assure candidates of the op-
portunity to use broadcast facilities unfettered by licensee judgments as to the
manner of use." Initial Decision, 43 F.C.C.2d at 795 (citing Farmer's Educ. & Coop.
Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 527, 529 (1959)).
The FCC concluded that § 315 "requires equal treatment and prohibits cen-
sorship. Here the censorship, which itself was illegal, had the effect of favoring
one candidate, which also was illegal." Western Conn., 43 F.C.C.2d at 743 (emphasis
supplied).
223. Admittedly, the Supreme Court's decision in Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union
v. WDAY, Inc., if read broadly, does undermine this argument. Farmers Educ. &
Coop. Union, 360 U.S. at 525.
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b. Judicial and Administrative Precedent:
The most widely debated issue involving the meaning and ex-
tent of the "no censorship" provision of sections 18 and 315 con-
cerned the question whether broadcasters could delete defamatory
statements by legally qualified political candidates in light of the
broadcasters' possible exposure to liability for defamation under
state law.2 24 For the first twenty-odd years of the 1934 Act, courts
were split on the issue 22 5 and many state legislatures avoided the
pitfalls of judicial conflict by enacting immunity legislation.2 26 Un-
til the FCC's decision in Port Huron Broadcasting,227 where no state
legislative immunity existed, broadcasters typically reviewed and de-
leted defamatory material despite the "no censorship" language of
the federal statute.228 In Port Huron, the Commission stated that
the prohibition on censorship in section 315 was absolute, that
broadcasters could not excise defamatory matter from the state-
ments of political candidates, and therefore that they would be re-
lieved from all liability under state law for defamation.
22
Broadcasters were not comforted by this decision, fearing that the
Commission did not have the singlehanded authority to suspend
state law.2 3 0 Although several attempts were made to establish ex-
press Congressional immunization of broadcasters for the airing of
defamatory political speech, none prevailed.2 31
224. Id. at 529.
225. Id. at 528 & nn.2, 3 and cases cited therein.
226. See, e.g., De Grazia, supra note 180, at 724 and n.81; Note, Recent Cases:
Broadcaster's Immunity from Liability for De[amation in "Equal Time"Political Speeches, 44
MINN. L. REv. 787, 790-91 & n.26 (1960) [hereinafter Minnesota Note] (discussing
enactment of immunity provisions).
227. Port Huron Broadcasting Co., 12 F.C.C. 1069 (1948).
228. Id. See also 98 CONG. REc. 7401 (1952) (describing prior history regard-
ing defamatory political broadcasts); De Grazia, supra note 180, at 711 (describing
pre-Port Huron editing of defamation by broadcasters).
229. The FCC was "of the opinion that the prohibition of section 315 against
any censorship by licensees of political speeches by candidates for office is abso-
lute, and no exception exists in the case of material which is either libelous or
might tend to involve the station in an action for damages." Port Huron, 12 F.C.C.
at 1074.
230. Id. Indeed, the Supreme Court later characterized the FCC's pre-Port
Huron views on the matter as "not clearly articulated[.]" Farmers Educ. & Coop.
Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 528 (1959). See also Hearings on H.R 7716
Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 72nd Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1932) (testi-
mony of Henry Bellows, Chairman of the Legislative Committee of the National
Association of Broadcasters).
231. Attempts to achieve a Congressional resolution to the issue occurred
both before and after Port Huron. See, e.g., Port Huron, 12 F.C.C. at 1073 & n.2
(listing relevant congressional hearings from 1932 to 1943); Investigation of Fed-
eral Communications Commission, Hearings on H.R. 691 Before the Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the Federal Communications Commission, 80th Cong., 2d
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It was not until 1959, in Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union
v. WDAY, Inc.,232 that the Supreme Court affirmed the FCC's Port
Huron approach. The Supreme Court there held that the "no cen-
sorship" provision of section 315 prevented broadcasters from re-
moving libelous material from political uses of stations, and, as a
corollary, that section 315 granted the stations a federal immunity
from state law defamation suits for libelous material broadcast pur-
suant to that section.2 33 The Court stated that the term "censor-
Sess. (1948) [hereinafter Select Committee Hearings]; H.R. REP. No. 7062, 82nd
Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); S.' REP. No. 1333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 14(d) (1947);
WARNER, supra note 180, at 362; Goldhill, supra note 196, at 789 & nn.13, 14 and
hearings cited therein.
There are indications that despite Congress' failure to pass immunity legisla-
tion, some legislators favored an exception to the censorship proviso of § 315 for
defamation. See, e.g., Hearings on H.I 7716 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Com-
merce, 72nd Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1932) (comments of the Chairman and Senator
Fess). Some legislators themselves expressed doubts about the constitutionality of
such proposed enactments clarifying § 315. For example, Ohio Congressman Fess
expressed doubt about Congress' power to enact an immunity from defamation
liability for broadcasters. 67 CONG. REc. 12503 (1926). Commentators echoed the
theme. See, e.g., De Grazia, supra note 180, at 723. See also Goldhill, supra note 196,
at 789 & n.14 (suggesting that congressional inaction after the 1934 Act "may have
been caused by doubt as to the power of the Federal Government to provide im-
munity against state defamation law[,]" (citing Hearings on S. 814 Before Senate
Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 63-64 (1943))). See also Hearings
on H.t 7716 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 72nd Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1932).
Later refusals to act have been attributed to different congressional motives.
See, e.g., De Grazia, supra note 180, at 713-14 and accompanying notes. Initially
after Port Huron, a House Select Committee to Investigate the Federal Communica-
tions Commission addressed the broadcasters' concerns about the dilemma in
which they felt placed as a result of the decision. See Select Committee Hearings,
supra. The hearings did not ultimately lead to Congressional action, perhaps then
because of FCC Chairman Coy's assurances that "for the time being, at least until
the matter is settled, the honest and conscientious broadcaster who uses ordinary
common sense in trying to prevent obscene and slanderous statements from going
out over the air, need not fear any capricious action." De Grazia, supra note 180, at
714 & n.44 (quoting First Interim Report Pursuant to H.R. 691, H.R. REP. No.
2461, at 2 (1948) and concluding that "[tI here appears to be no question but that
the House Select Committee recommended no legislation because it felt assured
the Commission would not enforce the Port Huron decision."). Congress' failure to
enact an immunity provision expressly has also been explained as resulting from
"the inability of the legislators to agree on what the rule should be, rather than
whether there should be immunity or not." Note, Defamation - Broadcaster's Liabil-
ity - Section 315 of Federal Communications Act Implies Complete Immunity, 34 ST.
JOHN's L. REv. 140, 146 (1959). Still another explanation mentioned by commen-
tators was that such amendments to § 315 were proposed in bills that were objec-
tionable and rejected on other grounds. Goldhill, supra note 196, at 790 n.14.
232. 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
233. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union involved a speech by a Senatorial candidate
- aired as a matter of equal opportunities under § 315 - in which he accused his
opponents and the Farmers Union of "conspiring to 'establish a Communist Farm-
ers Union Soviet right here in North Dakota.'" Id. at 526-27. Two of the candi-
dates in the race had made speeches over WDAY and the station felt compelled by
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ship," as it is "commonly understood, connotes any examination of
thought or expression in order to prevent publication of objection-
able material."2 34
The Court found neither "clear expression of legislative intent,
nor any other convincing reason" to suggest that Congress meant to
give the term "censorship" in section 315 a narrower meaning than
the one attributed by the Court to common understanding. 23 5
Rather, the Court said, the legislative history "shows a deep hostility
to censorship either by the Commission or by a licensee."2 36 More-
over, as a policy matter, the Court found that permitting broadcast-
ers to censor allegedly libelous remarks "would undermine the
basic purpose for which section 315 was passed - full and un-
restricted discussion of political issues by legally qualified
candidates."23 7
The FCC's prior cases deploy restrictive language about broad-
caster discretion over political advertising. Although the FCC has
implied that the "no censorship" provision of section 315 would not
permit broadcasters to refuse to air material that presented clear
§ 315 to make the station available to the third candidate. The Farmers Union
then sued both the candidate and the station in state court for defamation.
The holding of the case, as suggested in text above, has two parts. Although
fourJustices dissented in Farners Educ. & Coop. Union, disagreeing with the major-
ity's assertion of broadcaster immunity from state defamation law, all the Justices
agreed that allegedly libelous material could not be eliminated from political
broadcasts under § 315. Id. at 535-36 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (concluding that
both language and legislative history of § 315 "call for the conclusion reached in
Part I of the Court's opinion, namely, that WDAY could not have lawfully deleted
from A.C. Townley's broadcast his defamation of petitioner").
234. Id. at 527.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 528 & n.6.
237. Id. at 529. The Court characterized the 1927 Act's predecessor of § 315
as grounded on a congressional recognition of radio's "potential importance as a
medium of communication of political ideas .. " Id. This recognition led Con-
gress to "foster [radio's] broadest possible utilization" by encouraging access to
broadcasters' facilities by political candidates "without discrimination" and by in-
suring that such candidates "were not to be hampered by censorship of the issues
they could discuss." Id. The Court saw it in line with the tradition of free expres-
sion for Congress to have forbidden both the Commission and individual licensees
any power of censorship over political broadcasts. Id. at 529-30.
Given the difficulties involved in making judgments about whether any given
statement is defamatory, and given the time limitations inherent in political cam-
paigns, the Court feared that "all remarks even faintly objectionable would be ex-
cluded out of an excess of caution" by fearful broadcasters and censorship of
assertedly defamatory matter "would almost inevitably force a candidate to avoid
controversial issues ... and hence restrict the coverage of considerations relevant
to intelligent political decision." Id. at 530-31.
19961
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and imminent danger of lawless action,2 38 the FCC historically has
employed a rhetoric that heavily favors the interests of political
advertisers.
The FCC has described section 315 as designed to "permit a
candidate to present himself to the electorate in a manner wholly
unfettered by licensee judgment as to the propriety or content of
that presentation."2 39 Even more bluntly, the FCC has attributed to
Congress an intent to "allow a candidate complete control over the
content and format of his or her media campaign." 240 The FCC has
resisted any broadcaster incursion into the content of political ad-
vertising, even when claimed necessary to avert harm. For example,
despite dicta that the danger of imminent lawless action would be
sufficient to permit "censorship" of speech protected under section
315, the FCC's broad interpretation of the section 315 prohibition
of censorship has been applied even against a credible factual claim
that language in political advertising would incite people to
violence. 241
238. See Letter to Lonnie King, 36 F.C.C.2d 635, 637 (1972) (quoting Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)). See also supra note 79 & 99, infra note
241; Luken Staff Memorandum, supra note 41, at 7. The agency staff has also infor-
mally opined that § 315 political uses would not be deemed exemptions to the
prohibitions on the broadcast of indecent and obscene speech under § 1464 of the
federal criminal code. Luken Staff Memorandum, supra note 41.
239. Gray Communications System, Inc., 19 F.C.C.2d 532, 535 (1969). In
Gray, the Commission held that the definition of "use" under § 315 was not limited
to the political candidate's appearance alone, but would extend to his appearance
in a lengthy variety show he planned. Id. at 533. The FCC also stated that where a
candidate's personal appearance is the focus of a program, that program satisfies
the requirements of being a "use" for purposes of § 315 and "the station is prohib-
ited from censoring the candidate's choice of program material." Id. at 534.
While it reiterated its commitment to a case-by-case review of § 315 use questions,
the Commission in Gray did advise licensees to be aware that "the Commission
views the noncensorship provision of § 315 as including all program material
presented as part of a candidate's use of a broadcast facility, with no right of prior
approval of format or content on the part of the licensee." Id. at 535. The Com-
mission later said that if a candidate uses a broadcast station under § 315, "the
station cannot edit his material in any way or limit what he talks about." The Law
of Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C.2d 2209, 2220 (1978).
240. In re Lane Denton v. The LBJ Co., 61 F.C.C.2d 1163 (1976) (clarifying
definition of "use" for purposes of § 315 and finding a violation of section's "no
censorship" provision in station's initial refusal to sell airtime to candidate for an
ad the station considered libelous, misleading and deceptive). The FCC admon-
ished the station that "[t] he licensee is required to respect the candidate's choices
in this area and not attempt to substitute his judgment for that of the candidate."
Id at 1166.
241. In a case involving a virulently and explicitly racist and inflammatory
political advertisement by a candidate for the Democratic nomination for Senator
from Georgia in the 1970s, the FCC refused to advise licensees that they could
decline to air the advertisement without violating § 315. Letter to Lonnie King, 36
F.C.C.2d 635, 636-37 (1972). See also supra notes 79, 99 & 238 and accompanying
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In the past, the FCC has also deemed impermissible refusals to
air candidate material that is "vulgar" or "in bad taste" or harmful
to the station's image. 242 The Commission has enforced the "no
text. The mayor of Atlanta had issued an executive order urging broadcast stations
not to accept advertising with such racist language on the ground that it was calcu-
lated to incite listeners to violence. Id. The Atlanta office of the NAACP and other
organizations petitioned the Commission to tell broadcast stations that they could
permissibly decline to air the Stoner filth.
The FCC held that:
the relief requested in your letter would amount to an advance approval
by the Commission of licensee censorship of a candidate's remarks ....
Despite your report of threats of bombing and violence, there does not
appear to be that clear and present danger of imminent violence which
might warrant interfering with speech which does not contain any direct
incitement to violence. A contrary conclusion here would permit anyone
to prevent a candidate from exercising his rights under Section 315 by
threatening a violent reaction. In view of the precise commands of Sec-
tions 315 and 326, we are constrained to deny your requests.
Id.
Interestingly, Senator Baker noted in the Senate Report on the campaign re-
form legislation that would later become the Federal Election Campaign Act that
he had offered an amendment to the bill in the Commerce Committee that would
have permitted broadcasters to refuse to air racially inflammatory political adver-
tisements. S. REP. No. 92-96, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1818-19 (additional views of Mr. Baker):
under present law . . . licensees . . . are prohibited from censoring the
material broadcast in political advertisements... even though the mate-
rial may be designed solely to arouse the most base prejudices of the com-
munity against the opposing candidate .... It seems to me that there is
no public interest in requiring licensees to broadcast racially inflam-
matory material simply because such material is contained in the political
commercials of a candidate for public office. The amendment which I
have proposed would permit a licensee to refuse to broadcast such mate-
rial subject to the safeguard that the licensee would be liable for damages
to a candidate for such refusal if it can be shown that the refusal was
prompted by considerations other than concern for public health, safety
and welfare.
Id. The proposed amendment was not accepted in Committee. Id. at 95-96.
Baker reintroduced his amendment during final Senate deliberations over one of
the contending election reform bills in 1971. Senator Pastore asked Baker to with-
draw the amendment and bring up the subject at the next scheduled meeting
between the Subcommittee on Communication and the FCC. Senator Baker com-
plied with the request to withdraw. See 117 CONcG. REc. 13295 (daily ed. Aug. 5,
1971).
242. Gloria Sage, 62 F.C.C.2d 135 (1976), rev. denied, 63 F.C.C.2d 148 (1977);
Western Conn. Broadcasting Co., 43 F.C.C.2d 730 (1973). Gloria Sage involved a com-
plaint about a five minute political program by Ellen McCormack which a viewer
attacked as " 'a vulgar airing of her anti-abortion views[.]' " 62 F.C.C.2d at 135. In
Western, the station barely avoided having its license revoked as a result of the gen-
eral manager's deletions of Democratic candidates scripts. (Despite these
problems, however, the station's license was not revoked because the overall pro-
gramming in the field of public affairs was "good enough to tip the scales against
revocation." Id. at 741. The station was fined the maximum monetary fine allowed
at the time, however. Id.) The standard the broadcaster had used for his editorial
decisions was "good taste," and, in his view, "[m]aterial was not in good taste if it
involved name-calling, a person's reputation, or an exaggeration, or seemed other-
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censorship" provision against licensee attempts "to prohibit the ex-
pression of what it considered 'objectionable' speech." 243 Also, it
has bluntly stated that a station "refus[ing] to carry [a] commercial
because it found the content 'offensive' would be subject to com-
plaint by the candidate and disciplinary action by the
Commission. 244
The FCC similarly suggested that section 315's prohibition of
broadcaster censorship, along with section 326's non-censorship
mandate to the Commission, precluded it from preventing the
broadcast of political advertisements alleged to be false and mis-
leading.2 45 Indeed, broadcasters could not even censor political
programming consisting of spliced and edited material susceptible
to distortion. 246
wise objectionable." Id. at 732. See supra note 222 (discussing Western). See also
Notice on the Law of Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C.2d 2209, 2270; 43
Fed. Reg. 36,342, 36,374 (1978) (citing and characterizing Sage and Western as ex-
amples of censorship of candidates).
243. Barry Commoner & LaDonna Harris, 87 F.C.C.2d 1, 6 (1980).
244. Id. at 6. In Barry Commoner itself, the candidate claimed that § 315 was
violated by NBC's initial refusal to accept an advertisement containing the word
"bullshit," and the network's subsequent transmission of the unedited commercial
to its affiliates with an advisory as to the offensive nature of the ad's language,
allowing affiliates to refuse to broadcast the commercial. Id. The Commission did
not find NBC to have violated the "no censorship" provision, but did advise the
network in the future to assure that its advisories clarified the obligation to broad-
cast even offensive political speech aired under § 315. Id. In dictum, the Commis-
sion also made clear that if the affiliated broadcast stations had in fact refused to
carry the commercial because of its offensive content, that would be a proper sub-
ject of disciplinary action by the Commission. Id. at 6-7.
The issue of obscene speech during a § 315 use arose in In reLarry Flynt, 1984
FCC LEXIS 2675 (1984). Flynt, the publisher of Hustler magazine who for a time
sought the Republican nomination for President, claimed that a radio station had
impermissibly censored him during an appearance covered by § 315. Id. The
Commission did not reach the issue of the claimed censorship, because it found
that Flynt was not a legally qualified candidate for public office subject to the pro-
tections of § 315. Id. at 4-5. See also supra note 42.
245. Alan S. Burstein, 43 F.C.C.2d 590, 591 (1973). See also In re Lane Denton
v. The LBJ Co., 61 F.C.C.2d 1163 (1976), supra note 240 (concluding that licensee
violated § 315 in refusing to air misleading, deceptive ad).
246. Capitol Broadcasting Co., 10 R.R.2d 579 (1967) (refusing to designate
for hearing renewal application of broadcast station that had aired political pro-
gram by one candidate that his opponent characterized as distorted and mislead-
ing because it consisted in large part of a "debate" collated from various
preexisting film clips). Capitol Broadcasting boasts a strong dissent by Kenneth Cox,
arguing that § 315 should not be read to prevent broadcasters from investigating
claims that political advertising is false and deceptive. Id. at 585. The majority did
not pass on the substantive question of whether the video was in fact fraudulent or
distorted. Instead, it dealt with the claim as a simple issue in which the licensee
could not censor the material broadcast by a political candidate because it was
aired as part of a use protected under § 315. Id. at 582.
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The FCC has also consistently held that a broadcaster cannot
dictate the content of political advertisements by limiting the sub-
ject matter or the scope of their discussions. Having qualified for
broadcast time under the equal opportunities of section 315, "the
candidate for political office cannot thereafter become disqualified
by refusing to meet the station licensee's standard for orthodox
campaign speeches."247
Nor has the FCC limited its interpretation of censorship either
to outright refusal to air a political spot or to deletion or change of
content. 248 Conditions potentially affecting the political spot's con-
tent have been deemed impermissible. Thus, for example, the FCC
has held that a licensee cannot condition a candidate's appearance
on his limiting his comments to one topic249 or extracting the can-
didate's promise to discuss only matters discussed by other candi-
dates.250 Nor can a station ask for a candidate's script or tape in
247. In WMCA Inc., for example, the FCC found that a broadcast station had
violated § 315 by refusing to air advertisements by the Socialist Labor Party candi-
date for New York City Council President. 40 F.C.C. 241 (1952). The licensee had
justified its refusal on the ground that "candidates must make a substantial show-
ing of their qualifications in their radio scriptsi,]" and this candidate's ads es-
chewed discussion of the election and the candidate's qualifications in favor of
philosophical discussions about Socialist ideology. Id. at 241-42. The FCC made
clear that a licensee could not, under § 315, "condition the use of broadcast time
to exclude the advancement of party doctrine as a method by which a candidate
may elect to pursue that office." Id. at 243. See also Pat Paulsen, 33 F.C.C.2d 835,
836 (1972) ("[s]ince candidates may broadcast whatever material they desire, a
licensee under no circumstances could limit such a candidate to 'political uses'
only .... ).
248. See Barry Commoner & LaDonna Harris, 87 F.C.C.2d 1, 5 (1980).
249. See, e.g., WANV, Inc., 50 F.C.C.2d 177, 179 (1974), forfeiture aff'd, 54
F.C.C.2d 432 (1975), application for remission offorfeiture denied, 36 1R.2d 1163, 1170
(1976) (fining station for inviting city council candidate to appear on condition
that he limit his comments to topics discussed in previously broadcast station edito-
rial and for providing tape of candidate's comments to his opponent). The FCC in
WANVinterpreted § 315
to mean that neither the content nor the format of... appearances could
be chosen by the station without candidates' prior consent with full
knowledge of their rights under Section 315 .... It must be emphasized
that a licensee cannot indiscriminately set the format of political speeches
any more than it can excise out 'undesirable' language.
36 RRI2d at 1167. Indeed, the Commission took the position that allowing broad-
casters so to condition candidates' political speech would not only be a violation of
§ 315, but also "would inevitably result in broadcasters setting the tone of election
campaigns by affording them the power to choose the issues on which elections
are decided ... a result which is totally inconsistent with the legislative history of
Section 315 of the Communications Act and its predecessor." Id. at 1166. See also
WMCA, 40 F.C.C. 241 (1952); Letter from RoyJ. Stewart, Chief, Mass Media Bu-
reau, to Joseph L. Doston, Ameron Broadcasting, Inc. (WERC(AM)), 7 F.C.C.R.
6537 (1992), application for remission of forfeiture denied, 9 F.C.C.R_ 228 (1994).
250. Hon. Allen Oakley Hunter, 40 F.C.C. 246, 247 (1952); WMCA, 40 F.C.C.
241 (1952).
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advance in order to clear its content.2 51 Even a broadcaster policy
of requiring political candidates to sign indemnification forms
prior to airing their advertisements was found to constitute a viola-
tion of section 315's "no censorship" provision because of the re-
quirement's tendency to chill or discourage speech that the
broadcaster was legally obliged to carry.252 The FCC has suggested
that even threats of litigation and discussions of indemnification
unduly burden the section 315 equal opportunity right.25 3 The
Commission has also made clear that the cancellation of all broad-
casts by candidates in a particular election because the broadcast
licensee did not approve of the material to be broadcast by the first
candidate is censorship under section 315 even though there was
no technical deletion or editing of parts of a program.254
251. Western Conn. Broadcasting Corp., 43 F.C.C.2d 730 (1973). Of course, this
does not mean that broadcasters cannot ask for pre-broadcast review in order to
determine whether the advertisement is a "use" under § 315 and whether the statu-
torily proper sponsorship identification has been included in the advertisement.
See The Law of Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C.2d 2209, 2272
(1978).
252. In re Complaint by Senator Hubert Humphrey, 35 F.C.C.2d 112, 113
(1972) ("[A]n indemnification promise is likely to be inhibiting with respect to the
content of the candidate's use, as well as his decision on whether or not to use the
station's facilities."), petition for review denied sub nom. D.J. Leary, 37 F.C.C.2d 576,
577 (1972) ("an indemnification requirement ... is likely to inhibit a candidate's
use of a broadcast facility and possibly to affect his decision on whether to utilize a
station to address the public."). See also supra note 239 and infra note 253 (discuss-
ing the impermissible chilling effect of threats of future libel litigation) and Cur-
ran Communications Inc., 89 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1982) (noting that broadcasters may
not intimidate candidates into making changes in their commercials by warnings
of legal liability, although finding factual insufficiencies to support liability under
§ 315 in Curran itself).
253. In re Radio Station WPAM, Curran Communications Inc., 81 F.C.C.2d
492, 495 (1980) (in admonishing the station for its mention of defamation litiga-
tion in the course of accepting a political ad, the FCC ruled that "in the future any
attempts by a licensee to coerce a candidate to revise his political announcement,
albeit by threat of litigation or otherwise, will be considered censorship."). The
Commission in the Barry Commoner case then cited the Curran case for the proposi-
tion that threats of litigation even against the sponsor of a political advertisement,
rather than against the candidate himself, constituted prohibited censorship
under § 315. Barry Commoner & LaDonna Harris, 87 F.C.C.2d 1, 5 & n.12 (1980).
254. Port Huron Broadcasting Co., 12 F.C.C. 1069, 1071 (1948). See also
Hammond for Governor Committee, 69 F.C.C.2d 946, 947 (1978) (since licensees
cannot exercise power of censorship over political broadcasts whether they are first
uses or equal opportunities responses to first uses under § 315, FCC refuses to
issue declaratory ruling that licensee's failure to censor political use that may have
violated National Association of Broadcasters Code of ethics is violation of law).
See a/soJack H. Friedenthal & RichardJ. Medalie, The Impact of Federal Regulation on
Political Broadcasting: Section 315 of the Communications Act, 72 HARv. L. REv. 445,
479-80 (1959) ("The unequivocal language of the refusal clause appears to be
overriding, and therefore the censorship clause should be applied only to situa-
tions in which some time is actually provided [and subsequently withdrawn].").
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The FCC has also rejected attempts to interpret the political
advertising rules contextually, in light of claimed charges of manip-
ulation. In a number of cases, for example, it is possible to discern
an underlying argument that particular candidates were not in fact
serious seekers of office, but were simply using their candidacies
and the political campaigning rules in order to obtain section 315
protection for a particular political message unrelated to their pur-
ported candidacies.2 55 Ironically, one of those cases involved an un-
successful attempt on the part of a listener to have an anti-abortion
candidate's remarks censored.2 56 Although it was claimed that the
candidate was actually seeking to influence an abortion measure
then being considered by the state legislature rather than advanc-
ing her own candidacy, the FCC held that no censorship of her
comments was permissible under section 315.257
c. Differences between Channeling and Censorship:
Even if WDAY is right in its reading of the legislative history
and the 1927 legislature intended to adopt an absolute prohibition
of censorship, and even in light of the FCC's virtually uniform re-
fusal to allow the imposition of conditions on political ads under
section 315, the questions remain of what is to be defined as censor-
ship and whether channeling should be deemed censorship. The
FCC's response to those questions seems predicated on the fact that
allowing temporal displacement of advertisements is not the same
as deleting or editing political statements. 258 Before this decision
by the Commission, however, the FCC staff had given a diametri-
cally opposing interpretation, refusing to permit channeling under
section 315 presumably because of a view that censorship can take
255. WMCA, Inc., 40 F.C.C 241 (1952), is a good example. See also supra note
247. In WMCA, the broadcaster was clearly arguing that the "no censorship" provi-
sion of § 315 was not intended to protect the ideological propaganda of a candi-
date not advertising his candidacy during his use:
Mr. Hass admitted that the Socialist Party was utilizing the election cam-
paign to propagandize the Socialist program; and that this had nothing
to do with the duties of the President of the New York City Council ....
(T] he action of station WMCA was not censorship in violation of Section
315 because the broadcast was a device for the use of an election to
spread propaganda unrelated to the office.
Id. at 242. See also Pat Paulsen, 33 F.C.C.2d 835, 836 (1972) (explaining that polit-
ical candidates are not restricted to political uses and "may broadcast whatever
material they desire").
256. Gloria Sage, 62 F.C.C.2d 135 (1976), rev. denied, 63 F.C.C.2d 148 (1977).
See also discussion supra note 242.
257. Gloria Sage, 62 F.C.C.2d at 135-36.
258. November Ruling, supra note 16, at 7648-49.
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many forms besides outright refusal to air and that channeling
should be characterized as a form of censorship.2 59
Expansive definitions of censorship have their pedigree in the
broad rhetoric of the Supreme Court's majority opinion in Farmers
Educational & Cooperative Union v. WDAY As quoted above, the
Court's focus on whether there was any examination of expression
in order to prevent publication of objectionable material might
lend support to the view that any administrative review should be
considered censorship. WDAY is not dispositive, however. The re-
view and subsequent channeling of advertisements by broadcasters
might not meet the WDAY Court's triggering test of "examination
... in order to prevent publication of 'objectionable' material."2 60 By
contrast to the situation in WDAY, the anti-abortion candidates us-
ing graphic imagery are not entirely precluded from getting their
message to the voting public. In WDAY, the complete elimination
of speech from the air was at stake. The channeling solution to a
conflict between the interests in political debate and social welfare
was not an option available in the defamation context of WDAY.
Moreover, the majority opinion in WDAYreasoned that permit-
ting broadcasters to censor allegedly libelous statements would
undermine section 315's basic purpose: "full and unrestricted dis-
cussion of political issues by legally qualified candidates." 261 In the
Court's view, Congress sought to foster the development of radio as
a medium of communication of political ideas "by insuring that...
candidates when broadcasting were not to be hampered by censor-
ship of the issues they could discuss."262 Allowing broadcasters to edit
out libelous material would both limit issues candidates could dis-
cuss and ensure that certain speech did not receive airplay at all.
This would naturally frustrate "full and unrestricted discussion of
political issues." The scenario of permissive broadcaster channel-
ing does not raise the same concerns.
259. Letter to Pepper and Gastfreund, supra note 22; see supra notes 35-39 and
accompanying text.
260. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 527 (1959)
(emphasis added). Resting the decision on this slender a reed, however, is prob-
lematic. After all, there was actual deletion of material at issue in WDAY and the
issue of channeling was simply not before the Court. Under those circumstances,
an attempt to limit the Supreme Court's language in WDAY to the prevention of
publication (rather than including constraints on publication or inconveniences
attendant on publication as well) would seem to be weighing the Court's dictum
too far.
261. Id. at 529.
262. Id. (emphasis added).
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In any event, the WDAY Court's broad language should not be
applied woodenly to all situations concerning political uses under
section 315. Admittedly, the WDAY Court dealt with defamatory
speech, which arguably could be said to be as harmful both to the
individual and to truthful public debate as any harm to children
suggested in the graphic advertising context. Yet, the Court's cen-
tral argument for prohibiting broadcaster excision of such harmful
material was the difficulty of defining defamatory material and the
chilling effect of permitting censorship. In WDAY, the Court con-
trasted the interest in full and free public debate with the likeli-
hood that permitting editing for defamation would have a highly
chilling penumbral effect on all sorts of non-defamatory speech as
well. That concern is arguably less salient in the graphic ad con-
text. Although the determination of harm in expressive contexts
also involves difficult and contestable judgments, defamation is a
legal conclusion and the graphic anti-abortion ads arguably present
a far smaller universe of discretionary factual and legal judgment
than what is involved in the editing of defamation.2 63 Finally, the
victim of defamation would still have a cause of action against the
defaming politician, thereby creating a disincentive for defamatory
speech. The harm to the individual could potentially be redressed
in the defamation context. All of these factors stand in contrast to
the situation at hand, involving graphic anti-abortion ads.
Even if WDAY is properly read to provide an extremely broad
interpretation of censorship in section 315, however, subsequent
Supreme Court precedent may undermine its application to chan-
neling. In FCC v. Pacifica,264 for example, the Supreme Court af-
firmed the FCC's channeling of George Carlin's "seven dirty words"
monologue - an explicitly political routine - to hours during
which children would be less likely to be in the listening audience.
In so doing, the Court exempted the notion of channeling from
statutory and constitutional infirmity in the context of indecent
speech. Justice Stevens' opinion held that section 326, the ban on
censorship by the FCC, did not limit the Commission's authority to
impose sanctions on those who engage in obscene or indecent
263. Admittedly, if the November Ruling were interpreted as the basis of a pol-
icy permitting channeling of all advertisements whose explicit and graphic content
might disturb children, this distinction would be less clear. The legal distinctions
are still finer in the defamation context, however, and the potentially expansive
use of the November Ruling is best addressed in context.
264. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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broadcasting when children are likely to be in the audience.2 65 If
channeling ordered by the government is not to be deemed censor-
ship under section 326, then, it could be argued, the authorization
of channeling by the private broadcaster should not be deemed
censorship under section 315 either.2 66
The bottom line is that there is no clear legislative or judicial
precedent on whether channeling these advertisements to late
night hours violates the anti-censorship provision of section 315.
On the one hand, it could be argued that channeling is nothing
more than temporal censorship, no less dangerous than the ordi-
nary variety of content deletion. Part of the candidate's control of
her image is the control not only of the content of her speech itself,
but also of the audience that it seeks to reach. While no access
right can realistically be interpreted as affirming the candidate's
every wish and whim, 267 ignoring the candidate's temporal strategy
undercuts (and arguably thereby censors) her message.
In support of such an argument, one could cite the FCC's ap-
parently liberal past interpretation of its anti-discrimination regula-
tion in regard to time choices for advertising. The touchstone for
finding a violation of the regulation appears to be whether a candi-
date was placed at a disadvantage vis-a-vis her opponent as a result
265. In the decision below, Judge Tamm had concluded that the FCC's de-
claratory order - that WBAI had violated § 1464's prohibition on indecent broad-
casts - constitued censorship and was therefore prohibited by § 326. Pacifica
Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 733.
The Supreme Court held that the FCC's action was not prohibited censorship
under § 326. Id. at 735. First, Justice Stevens opined that although the prohibition
in § 326 against censorship "unequivocally denies the Commission any power to
edit proposed broadcasts in advance and to excise material considered inappropri-
ate for the airwaves," the statute would not "deny the Commission the power to
review the content of completed broadcasts in the performance of its regulatory
duties." Id. Therefore, the opinion concluded that "the subsequent review of pro-
gram content is not the sort of censorship at which the statute was directed .... "
Id. at 737. Second, Justice Stevens found that § 326's history made it clear that it
was not intended to limit the Commission's power to regulate the broadcast of
indecent, obscene or profane language because
[a] single section of the 1927 Act is the source of both the anticensorship
provision and the Commission's authority to impose sanctions for the
broadcast of indecent or obscene language. Quite plainly, Congress in-
tended to give meaning to both provisions. Respect for that intent
requires that the censorship language be read as inapplicable to the pro-
hibition on broadcasting obscene, indecent, or profane language.
Id. at 737-38. See also discussion supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
266. Admittedly, on the other hand, the extent to which Pacifica can serve as
the definitive word on this issue is unclear. After all, Pacifica dealt with the FCC's
channeling of material that was assumed by all parties to be indecent and thereby
subject to regulation under § 1464 of the Criminal Code.
267. See supra Section II.A .lb.
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of a broadcaster's actions. 268 The FCC has found a denial of equal
opportunities when opposing candidates have been offered the
same amount of time, but the time offered to one is likely to attract
a smaller audience.2 69
The candidates could argue that channeling the anti-abortion
material is tantamount to isolating it from - and treating it differ-
ently than - other political speech that broadcasters do not see as
harmful to children. They could contend that such isolation
amounts to a discrimination or denial of equal opportunities in the
event that opposing candidates do not use this kind of advertising
and therefore do not have limitations placed on their audience
reach.2 70 The permission to channel this material suggests that
these particular political candidates are being penalized for their
choice to adopt a particular format as part of their statutorily-pro-
tected advertising.
On the other hand, the FCC's approach does not permit
broadcasters to bury these ads and make the appropriate audience
unavailable. Even if the ads are channeled by a broadcaster to safe
harbor hours, they will still be available for viewing by the only ap-
propriate audience under section 315 - namely the voting public.
In other words, section 315's statutory purpose is to enhance the
electoral public's debate about candidates. It is not designed to as-
sure a forum to reach populations to whom the election-related
speech would be irrelevant. 271 Moreover, if we interpret the "no
268. Letter to Joseph L. Doston, 7 F.C.C.R. 6537, 6538 (1992).
269. See The Law of Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C.2d 2209,
2260 (1978) (citing EA. Stephens, 11 F.C.C. 61 (1945)).
270. While channeling all political advertisements to late night hours would
eliminate the discrimination, it would violate the Commission's political advertis-
ing rules as to those advertisements that are not harmful and, more generally,
would impoverish public debate.
271. It could be argued that although the late night audience is almost all
adult, most television-viewing adults are not reached by late night television. The
effect of channeling any video programming to late night hours can be mitigated
by the now-ubiquitous VCR, however. People not awake to watch programs during
the evening can still see tapes of them at other times. Admittedly, the VCR allows
commercials to be "zapped" or eliminated, and permits unsupervised children to
happen upon otherwise channeled material. Moreover, not everyone owns or has
access to a VCR. Nevertheless, the overall effect of VCR capacity is to permit many
people to control the timing of their television viewing despite the set broadcast
schedule. Such control also presumably extends to children's access to videotaped
material in the home. Furthermore, although it is not per se necessary to have
identical safe harbor periods for indecency and graphic political advertisements,
the safe harbor for indecency is now ten o'clock p.m. to six o'clock a.m. The early
part of that safe harbor is certainly adequate for access to voting adults. (It might
be desirable for the FCC - either on its own or in response to a remand from the
Court of Appeals - to determine the appropriate safe harbor period for graphic
political ads that could reasonably be found harmful to children. This would en-
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censorship" provision of the statute as designed to promote each
candidate's own political voice and its unfettered content, that goal
is not undermined by the mere fact of moving the timing of the
broadcast. 272 In addition, the Commission's interpretation of the
political advertising rules still calls for good faith and individualized
determinations in order to avoid any possible violations of the anti-
discrimination principle.
Finally, if the FCC's interpretive rhetoric about broadcaster dis-
cretion in section 312(a) (7) is to have full meaning, reading the
section 315 "no censorship" provision as precluding any FCC leeway
to schedule the placement of graphic political advertisements
harmful to children would be problematic in terms of a structural
reading of the statute. Although, as noted above, the "no censor-
ship" mandate of section 315 is best interpreted as applicable to
section 312(a) (7) political uses as well, it should not be interpreted
in such a way as to undermine the flexibility statutorily granted in
section 312(a) (7).
Accordingly, although both legislative background and prior
precedent can be mined for absolutist rhetoric about censorship of
political ads, the statutory purposes of the Communications Act
would not be frustrated by the FCC's November Ruling approach
and a reviewing court could reasonably uphold the FCC's authority
to adopt such a reading.
3. The Proper Level of Deference on Judicial Review:
The ease with which the statutory component of the November
Ruling would pass muster depends on the standard of review
adopted by a reviewing court. That, in turn, requires that we ad-
dress two questions. First, whether the extremely deferential stan-
tail a more detailed review of the harm posed by graphic ads to children of various
ages.)
272. With regard to the anti-discrimination gloss on the censorship prohibi-
tion of § 315, channeling can be read not to constitute the kind of discrimination
between candidates that would be prohibited by the regulation. Discrimination
would involve different treatment on the basis of non-neutral grounds. The FCC
presents the option of channeling material that would be harmful to children as a
neutral principle that applies across the board to all candidate speech about abor-
tion. On this view, channeling is not a pernicious distinction used to isolate and
disadvantage any particular viewpoint. As broadcasters have a statutory duty to
effectuate the public interest, and as the protection of children is a compelling
interest, it could be argued that a uniform prohibition on political ads harmful to
children (linked with a requirement of individualized and accountable applica-
tion) would be consistent with both statutory and regulatory purposes under § 315.
In addition, the Commission's interpretation of the political advertising rules still
calls for good faith and individualized determinations that would be designed to
avoid any possible violations of the anti-discrimination principle.
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dard of what one commentator has called "Chevron acceptance" 273
applies to the November Ruling, which is nominally an adjudica-
tion and not a legislative rule. Second, even if Chevron would in
principle be applicable to this kind of administrative decisional for-
mat, whether the Supreme Court's apparently increasing ambiva-
lence toward full application of Chevron - demonstrated by the
Court's increasing reluctance to find legislative ambiguity or silence
sufficient to trigger Chevron deference - would lead to independ-
ent judicial interpretation here.
If a statute's plain language is silent or ambiguous with respect
to a specific issue before an administrative agency, Chevron estab-
lishes that a court must give deference to the agency's interpreta-
tion of the statute so long as that interpretation is reasonable. 274
The agency's interpretation of the silent or ambiguous statute may
not be disturbed as an abuse of discretion "if it reflects a plausible
construction of the plain language of the statute and does not
otherwise conflict with Congress' expressed intent."2 75
273. Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and
the Courts?, 7 YALEJ. ON REG. 1, 3 (1990).
274. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984). Chevron's two-step test for judicial review of agency interpreta-
tions of statutes administered by the agency is as follows:
First, always, is the question of whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the stat-
ute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpreta-
tion. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
275. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184 (1991). See also Seidenfeld, supra note
120, at 103 (noting that Rust Court gave Chevron deference despite "blatantly polit-
ical" impetus for Development of Health and Human Services' new regulations
intrepreting statutes that prohibited expenditure of family planning funds for pro-
grams including abortions). The court applying Chevron need not find that the
particular construction adopted by an agency was "the only one it permissibly
could have adopted . . . or even the reading the court would have reached if the
question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843
n.11. Moreover, deference is paid by courts to administrative agency interpreta-
tions of ambiguous statutes even when a particular interpretation constitutes a
sharp break from prior interpretations by the agency. Rust, 500 U.S. at 186-87;
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862-64. But see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-44, 50-51, 58 (1983) (requiring agencies which
change their policies to "articulate a reasoned explanation for [their] departure
from prior norms."). Revised interpretations deserve deference because agencies
are designed to adapt their regulations in order to address changing circum-
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The lower courts in administrative law cases have reflexively
cited Chevron and routinely accorded deference to agency construc-
tions of ambiguous statutes so long as the agency readings are not
manifestly unreasonable. 76 Indeed, although Chevron itself in-
volved a legislative rule, and its rationale for deference was most
clearly applicable to such legislative rules,277 lower courts have ap-
plied Chevron to other, non-rulemaking proceedings.278 The FCC
decision here is both an adjudication and a declaration adopted
after a proceeding that called for public comment, akin to a formal
notice and comment rulemaking.2 79 Therefore, even if the Chevron
level of deference is thought by the Court to be appropriate only in
the context of rulemakings, the rationale for the Chevron standard is
easily applicable to the November Ruling because of the legislative
character of the Commission's action. The November Ruling
should not be denied review under the deferential Chevron ap-
stances. Rust, 500 U.S. at 187. Thus, when the agency has provided a reasoned
analysis for the change, deference is still warranted.
Admittedly, the inquiry under Chevron is not merely intended as a rubber
stamp of all interpretations of a statute by its enforcing agency. The "deference
owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia which
results in the unauthorized assumption by an agency of major policy decisions
properly made by Congress." Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. Federal
Labor Relations Auth., 464 U.S. 89, 97 (1983) (quoting American Ship Bldg. Co. v.
NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965)). When courts believe that agencies' interpreta-
tions are inconsistent with a statutory mandate or frustrate congressional policy
underlying the statute, then deference is not appropriate. Id. at 97 (citing NLRB v.
Bron, 380 U.S. 278 (1965)).
276. KENNETH C. DAvis & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREA-
TISE § 3.2, at 110 (3d ed. 1994); Pierce, Hypertextualism, supra note 100, at 749-50;
Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DuKE LJ. 984, 1029-36, 1058-59; Seidenfeld, supra
note 120, at 84, 94-96, 100.
277. The Chevron approach was animated by a concern about the anti-demo-
cratic effects of allowing a politically unaccountable judiciary to interpret ambigu-
ous statutes to favor judicial policy preferences rather than preferring the
interpretations of politically accountable administrative agencies. See Chevron, 467
U.S. at 865-66. See also Schacter, supra note 120, at 613-18 (noting, in context of
describing Chevron as an example of a "preservationist" approach to democratic
legitimacy, that "[tihe ability to protect democratic values by ensuring political
accountability (through the president) for an agency's interpretive choices consti-
tutes the primary justification for the Chevron rule"); Seidenfeld, supra note 120, at
97 (noting "theory that agencies are more politically accountable than courts").
278. Anthony, supra note 273, at 4, 42-43.
279. Although styled an affirmance of the Mass Media Bureau's decision that
the abortion ad at issue was not indecent, the Commission's language was much
broader and involved discussion of the propriety of broadcaster channeling of ma-
terial found harmful to children.
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proach solely because it was a declaratory ruling and not a de jure
rulemaking proceeding. 28 0
The application of Chevron's lenient standard of judicial defer-
ence to the Commission's November Ruling would likely lead to
judicial acceptance of the agency's decision. First, both sections
312(a)(7) and 315 fit the first step of the Chevron doctrine -
namely, a finding that the statute in question is silent or ambiguous
on the issue at hand. With respect to section 312(a) (7), the statute
requires a finding of reasonableness and it is understood that the
FCC is charged with making the reasonableness determination.
The Court, in another context, opined that a ratemaking statute's
requirement of "reasonableness" should initially be interpreted by
an agency and deserved Chevron deference. 281 Although the term
"reasonable" in the context of section 312(a) (7) is not used in the
same context or manner as its use in the ratemaking statute, there
is little reason to believe that the Court's rationale for deferring to
administrative interpretation in that case would not apply to the
graphic anti-abortion ad situation as well. As for section 315, the
statute simply does not address whether channeling to protect chil-
dren is to be considered "censorship" - exemplifying Congres-
sional silence.
To the extent that both sections 312(a) (7) and 315 are silent
or ambiguous, the second Chevron question is whether the adminis-
trative agency's interpretation of the statute was reasonable. It is
very difficult to conclude that any agency interpretation was com-
pletely unreasonable, 28 2 and the FCC's rationale of interpreting the
silent statutes here in light of important societal interests in the pro-
280. SeeAnthony, supra note 273, at 36-63 (taking position that judicial defer-
ence is only appropriate for legislative regulations and other agency actions pos-
sessing force of law).
281. Northwest Airlines v. County of Kent, 114 S. Ct. 855, 863 (1994) (noting,
in dictum, that the term "reasonable" should initially be defined and applied by
agency). See also Pierce, Hypertextualism, supra note 100, at 754, 762 (discussing
Northwest). In the context of criticizing the Supreme Court's increasingly wooden
textualism in statutory interpretation, Professor Pierce rued that "[the only statu-
tory term that a majority of Justices found to be sufficiently ambiguous to justify
deference to an agency's construction was the word 'reasonable.' " Id. at 762.
282. One commentator has observed that judges have found agency interpre-
tations of statutes unreasonable under step two of Chevron only if they would actu-
ally frustrate the policies Congress was seeking to effectuate by legislating.
Seidenfeld, supra note 120, at 96 ("[slo long as the interpretation furthers some
statutory goal, a reviewing court has no business reversing the agency determina-
tion, even when the court believes that the agency interpretation reflects an unjus-
tified balance of competing interests."). See also id. at 100 ("[alt step two, courts
almost never overturn agency interpretations as unreasonable.").
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tection of children certainly is not irrational. Thus, Chevron would
likely require judicial affirmation of the Commission's decision.28 3
Admittedly, there is currently a debate about the continuing
vitality of the Chevron doctrine at the Supreme Court level. Unlike
the lower courts, the Supreme Court's administrative law decisions
in the past several terms have not consistently and automatically
applied Chevron.28 4 Some commentators suggest that the Court's
post-Chevron administrative law jurisprudence is "so confused that it
is difficult to determine what remains of the original, highly defer-
ential test."285 Apparently as a result of an increasing use of textual-
ism rather than legislative intentionalism as its approach to
statutory interpretation, the Court has recently acknowledged the
existence of statutory ambiguity only rarely, thereby eliminating the
second step of the Chevron inquiry in most cases involving agency
constructions of statutes.28 6
Even the increasingly textualist Supreme Court recently ap-
plied a deferential version of the Chevron test to a statute using the
283. For an argument that reviewing courts should be required to scrutinize
the reasonableness of administrative agencies' statutory interpretations at step two
of the Chevron analysis in order to promote deliberative democracy, see Seidenfeld,
supra note 120, at 128-30.
284. Merrill, Executive Precedent, supra note 120, at 980-85; Merrill, The Chevron
Doctrine, supra note 120, at 359-60; Pierce, Hypertextualism, supra note 100, at 750-
62.
285. See Pierce, Hypertextualism, supra note 100, at 750. See also Merrill, Execu-
tive Precedent, supra note 120, at 980-85 (concluding that 'judicial understanding
that informs the deference question is probably more confused today than it has
ever been").
286. Pierce, Hypertextualism, supra note 100, at 750 & n.9 (citing similar au-
thority). See also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 DuutE L.J. 511, 512-20 (arguing that although courts should always defer
to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, statutes should rarely be found
ambiguous). It should be noted that the textualists (like Justice Scalia) were not
initially hostile to the Chevron approach, but became increasingly so. Pierce,
Hypertextualism, supra note 100, at 777-78; Wald, Sizzling Sleeper, supra note 120, at
308 n.179 (pointing to Scalia's support for Chevron deference).
The version of textualism that has emerged from some of the recent Supreme
Court cases is an aggressive one, in which the textualist statutory interpreter con-
structs the meaning of the statutory terms by selecting among dictionary defini-
tions. See, e.g., Merrill, The Chevron Doctrine, supra note 120, at 372. Pierce,
Hypertextualism, supra note 100, at 752 (accusing Court of engaging in "hypertextu-
alism," meaning "finding linguistic precision where it does not exist, and relying
exclusively on the abstract meaning of a particular word or phrase even when
other evidence suggests strongly that Congress intended a result inconsistent with
that usage."). Professor Pierce is highly critical of this "hypertextualism," arguing
that it suffers from the same defects as the extremes of intentionalism it was
designed to curb. He warns that the Court's administrative law jurisprudence will
lead to incoherence among the lower courts trying to follow the Supreme Court's
lead and will undermine administrative agencies' attempts to implement rational
national regulatory policies. Id. at 752, 762-66.
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term "reasonable," however, as previously noted. Thus, the change
in the Court's interpretive approach could theoretically affect the
reading of section 315 only. The application of a more stringent
level of judicial review of the FCC's action could potentially create
some difficulties for that aspect of the November Ruling. The
beauty of Chevron from the vantage point of the administrative
agency is that its application forecloses a judicial search for the
"real" legislative intent behind a statute, substituting unquestioning
acceptance of the agency's view. Whatever its shortcomings, the
traditional standard of review of agency action not subject to Chev-
ron deference involves the court in an independent assessment of
the meaning of the statute.287 The traditional reviewing court
under a less deferential standard of review would seek to discern
the legislative purpose in the political advertising rules and thereby
attempt to define a rule consistent with what the legislature would
have done had it expressly contemplated the question of graphic
anti-abortion imagery in political advertisements.288 Some scholars
have added to this purposive analysis a set of factors considered by
courts, including the importance of agency expertise in the particu-
lar question, consistency of prior administrative interpretation,
closeness of the administrative interpretation to the statutory enact-
ment date, and the possibility of congressional acquiescence.28 9 In
theory, although the agency's interpretation of its statute "is a sub-
stantial input and counts for something,"290 the court is the final
interpreter and approves the agency view "only if it is deemed
correct."291
A court could presumably argue that the "no censorship" pro-
vision of section 315 reflects neither congressional silence nor am-
biguity sufficient to trigger the second step of Chevron. It could
search for dictionary definitions of censorship that would be capa-
cious in their coverage and therefore cover the issue of time chan-
neling, at least by implication. With regard to the meaning of
censorship, however, the common understanding and common dic-
tionary definitions seem to focus on affirmative interference and
287. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); Anthony, supra note
273, at 3, 13.
288. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 104, at 817 (advising judicial attitude of "im-
aginative reconstruction").
289. Anthony, supra note 273, at 14 n.51 (citing relevant authority). Needless
to say, critics have attacked both these factors individually, and also the entire en-
terprise of intentionalist statutory interpretation based on such factors. See, e.g.,
supra note 120 and sources cited therein.
290. Anthony, supra note 273, at 13.
291. Id.
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change, rather than time displacement. 292 Even under a less defer-
ent standard, then, it is likely that the FCC's November Ruling
would be deemed to be consistent with the Communications Act.
Moreover, even when Chevron acceptance is not applied,judicial re-
view of agency adjudications in practice is usually rather deferen-
tial.2 93 Agency interpretations of statutes they administer are
virtually always given "special consideration," "respectful considera-
tion," or deference, even if they do not qualify for the complete
acceptance that would follow from a full-fledged application of the
Chevron standard. Finally, even if a reviewing court were simply to
review the FCC's November Ruling de novo, without special consid-
eration, the agency's action might well pass such a review. A court
could arrive at the conclusions suggested above after a review of the
doctrinal issues, the legislative background, the policies addressed
by the Commission and its prior approaches.
B. The Constitutional Dimension:
Even if the channeling of political speech harmful to children
is statutorily permissible under sections 312(a) (7) and 315, there
still remains the question of the constitutionality of the November
Ruling. Unlike some possible alternative rulings, the Commission's
decision seems designed to avoid constitutional difficulty.
The effect of the FCC's position in the November Ruling is:
(1) to assure the agency's continuing power to censor sexualized
indecent speech by avoiding another constitutional attack on the
definition of indecency, while at the same time (2) removing con-
tent-based regulation of political speech from constitutional chal-
lenge by the simple expedient of permitting, but not compelling,
private broadcasters to channel such speech.
The first question is whether the FCC's decision not to inter-
fere with private broadcasters' choices to channel graphic ads to
292. See, e.g., AMERICAN HERITAGE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY 290
(Houghton Mifflin Co. 1987) (defining censorship as "[t] he act or process of cen-
soring," with censoring defined as "[t]o examine and expurgate."); BALLANTINE'S
LAw DICTIONARY 185 (3d ed. 1969) ("An examination ... for the purpose of ap-
praising its decency and prohibiting publication or production where the same is
found objectionable as indecent, obscene or immoral . . . ."); BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 224 (6th ed. 1990) (stating virtually same thing); OxFoRD ENGLISH DIC-
TIONARY 1030 (2d ed. 1989) (defining censorship as "official supervision");
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 220 (Merriam-Webster 1990) (de-
fining censorship as "the institution, system or practice of censoring," with censor-
ing defined as "to examine in order to suppress or delete anything considered
objectionable").
293. Anthony, supra note 273, at 47-52.
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late night hours is constitutionally permissible, or whether the FCC
has an affirmative constitutional obligation to mandate carriage of
such political ads. In other words, does any party - candidate or
viewer - have a legitimate claim that her First Amendment rights
require the FCC to make an affirmative decision rather than punt-
ing to private action?
The answer to this first question under current doctrine is al-
most surely "no." The Supreme Court has held that there is no
constitutionally mandated general right of access to the broadcast
media.294 Despite that, some have argued that the audience for
broadcast speech has a First Amendment interest in untrammeled
exposure to political speech.2 95 Although the Supreme Court's
broadcast cases have historically contained dicta about the para-
mount First Amendment rights of viewers and listeners,296 First
Amendmentjurisprudence will not bear this level of affirmative and
unconstrained incursion on broadcaster editorial judgments.
Moreover, sections 312(a) (7) and 315, even were they read to con-
strain the FCC's discretion more directly than the November Rul-
ing suggests, are still statutory commands and not constitutional
mandates.
The second constitutional question is whether a court would
find a First Amendment violation in the FCC's decision to leave
channeling to broadcaster discretion simply because that decision
294. CBS, Inc. v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 110 (1973). Admittedly, the CBS v. DNC
decision came down during the heyday of the fairness doctrine, and the Court
used the broadcaster's obligation to provide full and fair coverage of public issues
as a factor undermining the lower court's finding that licensees would impermissi-
bly discriminate by accepting commercial advertisements and refusing editorial
ads. Id. at 128-31. To the extent that the Court's opinion on access hinges on the
Commission's belief that the fairness doctrine adequately addresses the issue, the
demise of the fairness doctrine might be thought to cast doubt on the continuing
vitality of the CBS v. DNC holding on rights of access. I believe such a reading of
the case would be mistaken, however, especially as many of the justifications for
deleting the fairness doctrine also support arguments against a general right of
access.
295. The WACCI-VCR Statement of Issues, supra note 25, implies an argu-
ment of this sort.
296. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969), in
which the Court noted that:
It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcast-
ers, which is paramount .... It is the right of the public to receive suita-
ble access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and
experiences which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be
abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.
For an interesting account of the "creative misreadings" of the marketplace meta-
phor that have expanded this dictum into the access right of a case like CBS v. FCC,
see David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment Tradition,
95 YALE L.J. 857, 892-904 (1986).
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would permit private parties to discriminate among political
messages on the basis of content or viewpoint. In other words,
would the non-intervention decision fail because it did not provide
sufficiently clear bases for the exercise of broadcaster discretion,
even though the state would not itself actually be exercising the
discretion conveyed.
A facial challenge under the First Amendment lies whenever a
licensing statute gives a government agency unbridled discretion to
regulate expressive activity.2 97 Under that principle, there would be
a potential First Amendment problem if the Commission had
broadly expanded its definition of indecency to include graphic
political advertising, or if it had mandated channeling of such mate-
rial on the grounds of its harmfulness to children. This would be so
especially if the agency did not provide sufficient guidelines to con-
strain the discretion of administrative actors. The general charac-
terization of "harmfulness" is sufficiently malleable that, without
constraining guidelines, the standard could mask impermissible dis-
criminations based on content and thereby frustrate constitutional
review. 298
297. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750
(1988) (holding unconstitutional portions of city ordinance regulating placement
of newsracks on public property, and giving mayor discretion to deny newsrack
permit application and condition permit on any terms he deemed necessary and
reasonable); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (striking down state mo-
tion picture censorship statute that required advance submission of movies to
Board of Censors, lacked sufficient safeguards for confining censors' action toju-
dicially determined constitutional limits, and effectively permitted ban without ju-
dicial participation); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (holding facially
invalid local ordinance that comprehensively prohibited the distribution of litera-
ture of any kind without first obtaining written permission from City Manager).
298. Admittedly, as a statement about specific types of graphic anti-abortion
advertisements, the November Ruling is probably not to be read as broadly as the
text suggests. In addition, the Commission's November Ruling does contain some
guidelines to direct the exercise of broadcaster discretion. As is discussed below,
the November Ruling proposes three standards for broadcaster discretion on
grounds of harm to children. See infra notes 380-89 and accompanying text.
Moreover, the FCC has a continuing statutory duty with regard to station opera-
tions, including periodic license renewal. Although the agency now eschews con-
tent-review of programming, broadcasters' statutory obligations to operate in the
public interest and the FCC's oversight of that operation might provide the kind of
accountability that would cure any initial appearance of standardless delegation. It
is possible, therefore, that a court might consider the November Ruling standards
sufficient to pass constitutional muster under the standardless delegation doctrine,
particularly when interpreted in context. In Lovell, Freedman, and even City of Lake-
wood, supra note 297, there was a striking lack of standards at all (unlike the Novem-
ber Ruling). The standards do not have to be explicit and completely concrete in
order to satisfy the First Amendment. So long as there are "procedural safeguards
designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system[," the First Amendment is
not a bar. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 738-39.
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The narrow constitutional question is whether the Commission
may permit the private broadcasters to do what it might not be able
to do constitutionally by direct government action. Is the private
broadcaster's license to channel under the November Ruling to be
considered a delegation of state power requiring constitutional test-
ing? This is a close question which raises the thorny issue of state
action.2 99 I conclude that the constitutional question would proba-
bly be resolved in the Commission's favor under current doctrine,
although there are conflicting strands of constitutional law that
could support a different state action reading.
Indeed, the guidelines for broadcaster discretion in the November Ruling re-
semble the types of procedural safeguards cited approvingly as examples in Freed-
man. (There, the Court said that the burden of proving that a film was
unprotected expression must rest on the censor, and that only procedures requir-
ing judicial determinations would suffice to impose valid final restraints. Id. The
administrative review by the FCC under the November Ruling, as well as the broad-
caster's burden as described below, would appear to satisfy the spirit of the Freed-
man Court's language). In addition, in CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 394-96 (1981),
the Court found that the FCC's interpretation and implementation of the reason-
able access provision of § 312(a) (7) did not violate the First Amendment. Those
standards were not articulated in a significantly more precise fashion than the di-
rections in the November Ruling. Nevertheless, a standardless delegation argument
would be possible if the FCC itself had mandated channeling. It could be argued
that the "reasonableness" notion interpreted in CBS v. FCC, for example, was less
vague - both in the Commission's rhetoric of broadcaster discretion and in its
enforcement practice of de facto deference to candidates' needs - than the no-
tion of harm to children under the November Ruling. If such an argument would be
successful, then the question of whether the channeling should be attributed to
the state - and should therefore become subject to constitutional review - or
whether it should simply be considered private action becomes the critical inquiry.
299. The state action doctrine is assertedly based on the notion that the Con-
stitution does not regulate the affairs of private parties, but rather, only of the
state. See R. ROTUNDA, J. NowAK &J. YOUNG, 2 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 523-77 (2d ed. 1992); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1688 & n.1 (2d ed. 1988). Accordingly, the First Amend-
ment guarantees only that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of
speech, and does not directly regulate private parties. CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 114;
Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952). To the extent that the
private broadcasters' decisions pursuant to the November Ruling are not attributable
to the state, there is no trigger for First Amendment review.
This discussion concerns the argument that the FCC's November Ruling should
be subjected to review under the First Amendment even though it did not man-
date channeling. It does not address the constitutional claims of private parties for
broadcaster channeling. If the broadcaster is not deemed to be a state actor, how-
ever, then a constitutional claim by a disappointed candidate against a broadcaster
would not be countenanced by the courts. In addition, the discussion does not
address any statutory claims against broadcasters by candidates because the courts
have not implied a private right of action under § 315 of the Communications Act.
Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm. Network Found., 22 F.3d 1423, 1427-
28 (8th Cir. 1994), reversing in part and aff'g in part, DeYoung v. Patten, 898 F.2d
628 (8th Cir. 1990); Arons v. Donovan, 882 F. Supp. 379, 384-85 (D.N.J. 1995).
(Note that the cases are silent on the issue of a private right of action under
§ 312(a) (7), but that presumably the same result obtains).
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Although the deference to private parties was made in a gov-
ernmental declaratory order (and therefore is nominally a govern-
mental act), it is probable under current state action precedent that
the wholly permissive character of the ruling - the fact that broad-
casters themselves have the choice to make timing decisions on
harmful ads - would be deemed to eliminate the direct state ac-
tion necessary to trigger a finding of First Amendment violation.
Although the state action doctrine is amorphous at best when deal-
ing with anything other than the most direct state order, it is likely
that under the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the ambit
of state action in recent years, there would not be sufficient govern-
mental involvement, either in the permissive stance taken by the
FCC toward private conduct or in a broadcaster's decision to chan-
nel an anti-abortion ad, to subject the broadcaster's decision to con-
stitutional scrutiny.300 This is particularly so because the FCC's
November Ruling could be conceived to return to broadcasters a
discretion to program that they would have but for sections
312(a) (7) and 315 and some FCC precedents that could be said to
read the statutory rights more broadly than necessary.
300. Countless articles have criticized the state action doctrine, labeling it,
among other things, incoherent, inconsistent, grounded on an unworkable pub-
lic/private distinction, and a proxy for substantive judgments about the constitu-
tional status of the examined action. See, e.g., ROTUNDA, supra note 299, at 573-76;
TRIBE, supra note 299, at 1690. See also Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court 1966
Term - Forward: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81
HARv. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967); Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296 (1982); Kenneth M. Casebeer, Toward
a CriticalJurisprudence - A First Step By Way of the Public-Private Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law, 37 U. MmiAI L. REv. 379 (1983); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State
Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 503, 503-05 (1985);Jesse Choper, Thoughts on State Action:
The "Government Function" and "Power Theory" Approaches, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 757;
Frank 1. Goodman, Comments: Professor Brest on State Action and Liberal Theory, and a
Postscript to Professor Stone, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1331 (1982); Harold Horowitz, The
Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REv.
208 (1957); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction,
130 U. PA. L. REv. 1349 (1982); Henry P. Monaghan, State Law Wrongs, State Law
Remedies, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 979 (1986); Thomas D.
Rowe, The Emerging Threshold Approach to State Action Determinations: Trying to Make
Sense of Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 69 GEo. L.J. 745 (1981); Henry C. Strick-
land, The State Action Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 587
(1991).
The Rehnquist Court's state action decisions have been characterized as
adopting a particularly narrow definition of the constitutional trigger of state ac-
tion and have been subjected to searching critique on that ground. See, e.g., Alan
R. Madry, State Action and the Obligation of the States to Prevent Private Harm: The
Rehnquist Transformation and the Betrayal of Fundamental Commitments, 65 S. CAL. L.
REv. 781 (1992); cf. Strickland, supra, at 587 n.1 and sources cited therein (sug-
gesting some movement toward a more embracing view of state action in some of
the Court's opinions).
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The governmental action inquiry involves a determination of
"whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and
the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of
the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself."3 01 Private
conduct is fairly attributable to the state if the state is not merely
passive toward the underlying private conduct and instead provides
significant encouragement and endorsement.3 02
301. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974); Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1972). See also ROTUNDA, supra note
299, at 526-27.
302. Obviously, the state action precondition for constitutional review is clear
in the context of overt and direct activities of governmental officials and employ-
ees. But findings of state action are not limited to direct governmental action,
however. As the Court put it in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265
(1964), in finding state action in the application of state law in a civil action be-
tween private parties, "[t]he test is not the form in which state power has been
applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised."
Yet, "the question whether particular conduct is 'private,' on the one hand, or
'state action,' on the other, frequently admits of no easy answer." Jackson, 419 U.S.
at 349-50.
The state is to be deemed responsible for private acts when it has compelled
the private action by law or otherwise. See Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,
164 (1978) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970)). Some
Supreme Court cases also suggest that state action might be found when the gov-
ernment and the private actor are so closely intertwined that they are in a symbi-
otic relationship or virtually a joint venture, see, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), or when the private party performs tasks that are tradi-
tionally exclusively reserved to the state. See, e.g., Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 159-64;
Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352-54; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
In Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), however, the Court stated that the
government "normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it
has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement,
either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the
State." Id. at 1004. See also, Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-41 (1982)
(holding that receipt of substantial public funding by private school will not itself
convert school's activities into state action); Jackson, 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974) (ex-
plaining that state utility commission's mere approval of regulated utility's request
does not change the request to state action); Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 176-77 (hold-
ing that regulation, albeit detailed, did not "foster or encourage" private defend-
ant's racial discrimination). The Court has made clear that the state's "mere
acquiescence in a private action" does not transform the private act into state ac-
tion. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 164. Moreover, the acts of a private entity are not
characterizable as state action simply because the entity is subject to general state
regulation. See, e.g., Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357 (insufficient state action to trigger
relief under § 1983 for public utility's termination of electric service without due
process, despite extensive regulation of utility, partial monopoly status, and elec-
tion to terminate service in a manner found permissible by state utility commis-
sion). In the broadcasting context itself there was no majority in support of the
proposition that broadcasters are state actors and therefore constitutionally re-
quired to provide general access to the air for paid editorial advertisements. CBS
v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 94. In CBS v. DNC, Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart,
Rehnquist (and probably Douglas) concluded, even though the FCC had specifi-
cally permitted the private conduct, that a broadcast licensee's refusal to accept
paid editorial advertisements was not governmental action for First Amendment
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On the one hand, it could be argued that the FCC's November
Ruling should be deemed to constitute encouragement and tacit
endorsement of the broadcasters' foreseeable channeling activity
without adequate standards. After all, given the controversial char-
acter of the ads and the public outcry when they aired, it is highly
unlikely that broadcasters would not choose to exercise their discre-
tion to channel at least some of the commercials to times of the day
when fewer children are in the audience.303
purposes. ChiefJustice Burger found, inter alia, that the FCC had not fostered the
licensees' policy and had merely declined to command acceptance because the
subject was a matter within the area of journalistic discretion. Id. at 121. Justices
White, Blackmun and Powell considered it unnecessary to decide the governmen-
tal action issue and concurred on other grounds. Id. at 147-58.
There is no formal test for the amount of contact which will subject private
persons' activities to constitutional restrictions. ROTUNDA, supra note 299, at 543.
As to the question of how much encouragement would be considered sufficient to
trigger a finding of state action, the fact that the Court has not recently found state
action on these grounds makes the inquiry quite speculative. See ROTUNDA, supra
note 299, at 544 ("how much encouragement ... is necessary is, to say the least,
unclear[.]"). As commentators have noted, however, if the Court did not find
sufficient involvement and encouragement in Blum, 457 U.S. at 991, which ad-
dressed nursing home patient transfer decisions made pursuant to state and fed-
eral regulations requiring periodic assessments of the level of care for Medicaid
patients, then it is difficult to predict what level of involvement would jump the
state action hurdle under the Court's approach. See, e.g., Strickland, supra note
300, at 620 (arguing that Blum decision raises doubt that any regulation short of a
specific directive to perform challenged action or to make challenged decision will
suffice to treat activity as state action).
303. For a similar argument in the context of the Cable Act, see, e.g., Michael
I. Meyerson, The First Amendment and FCC Rule Making Under the 1992 Cable Act, 17
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 179, 192-95 (1994). See also RonaldJ. Krotosaynski,
Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Arguement in Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in
State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302, 320, 322 n.107 (1995) (assuming
state action in discussion of case on constitutionality of Cable Act indecency
provisions).
Supreme Court precedent can be cited in support of such a view. In Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 634 (1944), for example, the Court held that the exclusion of
African-Americans from voting in a Democratic primary to select nominees for the
general election was state action in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. The
Court so held even though the exclusion had been effected by a resolution of a
private actor - the Democratic state convention - that party membership would
be limited to white citizens. One could also argue from Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982), that the delegation of licensing discretion to private
parties should be attributable to the government. There, the Court held that a
state statute vesting in the governing bodies of schools and churches veto power
over the issuance of liquor licenses within 500-foot radii violated the Establishment
clause of the First Amendment. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), can also
be mined for support, and was the basis of the panel's affirmative finding of state
action in Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1993),
vacated, 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 471 (1995). In
Reitman, the Court affirmed a state court decision striking down as unconstitu-
tional a state constitutional amendment that prohibited the state from limiting the
right of any person to dispose of his real property in his absolute discretion,
thereby encouraging discrimination by implicitly repealing an earlier fair housing
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On the other hand, the FCC's November Ruling is precisely
drafted to emphasize the agency's neutrality with respect to broad-
caster decisions to channel. 30 4 All the Commission has done with
its November Ruling, it assures us, is to allow broadcasters to exer-
cise discretion to consider the interests of children in making
scheduling decisions for political spots. Therefore, the FCC's deci-
sion is arguably tantamount to "mere approval of or acquiescence
in" private acts, and thereby not a proper subject for attribution of
those acts.30 5 Mere permission to do something that a private party
statute that prohibited private racial discrimination in housing. For ways in which
this precedent can be distinguished from the November Ruling context, see discus-
sion infra note 305.
304. November Ruling, 9 F.C.C.R at 7647.
305. See id., at 7 (citing and discussing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. at 991). Like
Blum, the channeling decisions permitted by the November Ruling require good
faith, professional judgments on the part of individual licensees in connection with
each challenged advertisement. See Blum, 457 U.S. at 991. A mere suspicion that
broadcasters might evade those judgments and simply find harm in the vast major-
ity of cases would probably not be deemed to trigger state action. See, e.g., Kuczo v.
Western Conn. Broadcasting Co., 41 R.R.2d 1224 (1977) (because licensee's action
in violating § 315 was not specifically approved by the FCC, station censorship not
tantamount to state action despite monopoly status of licensees).
Moreover, the Supreme Court cases pre-dating the Rehnquist Court that can
be used in support of arguments that would broadly attribute private action to the
state are also distinguishable on their facts from what is involved in the November
Ruling. In Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 634 (1944), for example, the Court found
that the place of the primary in the electoral scheme was such that "state delega-
tion to a party of the power to fix the qualifications of primary elections is delega-
tion of a state function that may make the party's action the action of the State."
Id. at 660. In addition, that the system for the selection of party nominees for
inclusion on general election ballots was heavily statutory was deemed to make the
Democratic party an agency of the state for these purposes. Id. at 663. The tradi-
tional state function argument can also serve to distinguish Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
Inc., which dealt with the delegation to private parties of licensing powers ordina-
rily vested in governmental agencies. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 116 (1982). That is not
the case in the context of the graphic anti-abortion advertisements, where editorial
freedom on the part of broadcasters is the norm and where holding otherwise
would assume the conclusion about the proper extent of broadcaster freedom
under the political broadcasting rules of the Communications Act. Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), also presented different circumstances. The
Supreme Court in Reitman rejected the argument that the constitutional amend-
ment prohibiting interference with private freedom merely restored the power to
discriminate that private owners of property had previously had prior to the pas-
sage of fair housing laws prohibiting private discrimination. The Court did not
envision what happened in Reitman as a mere restoration of the status quo ante. Id.
at 381. Rather, the Court found that the constitutional amendment was intended
to authorize, and did authorize, racial discrimination; that "the right to discrimi-
nate is now one of the basic policies of the State . . . [and that the constitutional
amendment] will significantly encourage and involve the State in private discrimi-
nations." Id. Moreover, because Reitman involved a constitutional amendment, fu-
ture enactment of fair housing laws would be foreclosed without another
constitutional amendment. See Alliance, 56 F.3d at 110 (relying on this distinction).
The permission granted by the November Ruling for broadcasters to take the welfare
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will predictably do does not automatically transform that action
into state action. If the D.C. Circuit recently found no state action
sufficient to trigger constitutional review of some permissive provi-
sions of the 1992 Cable Act regarding indecency on leased access
channels, then it is highly unlikely that broadcaster action permit-
ted by the FCC's November Ruling would trigger scrutiny under the
First Amendment in the D.C. Circuit.3 0 6
of children into account when making determinations about when to air political
advertisements does not entail either the traditional state function or the level of
affirmative and intentional encouragement as would automatically be considered
state action under these precedents.
306. See Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 471 (1995). Admittedly, the court of appeals stayed its mandate
pending the filing of petitions for certiorari n the Supreme Court. And the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York recently granted a pre-
liminary injunction prohibiting Time Warner Cable of New York City from scram-
bling the late-night, sexually oriented program "Midnight Blue" that is cablecast
on a Time Warner leased access channel. Goldstein v. Manhattan Cable TV, Inc.,
90 Civ. 4750, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13716 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1995). Judge Sand
entered the injunction in order to maintain the status quo until possible Supreme
Court resolution of the constitutional issue. Id.
Nevertheless, the argument that the November Ruling is state action is far
weaker than the argument for state action in Alliance. Therefore, although the en
banc opinion in Alliance is strong support for the result in the November Ruling, an
affirmance of Alliance is not necessary to a likely finding that the permissive Novem-
ber Ruling should not be considered state action. In Allianc the court upheld FCC
orders implementing § 10 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Com-
petition Act of 1992, part of which permitted cable operators to refuse to carry
leased access programming that they believed to be indecent and another part of
which compelled cable operators carrying such material to "zone" it to a separate
channel and block it until requested to unscramble by viewers. Alliance, 56 F.3d at
115. The majority opinion emphasized that the statute and regulations in question
merely restored to cable operators their option to reject indecent cable program-
ming, an option that had been denied them under the previous cable legislation.
Id. The court stated that:
[t] o suppose that whenever Congress restores to cable operators editorial
discretion an earlier statute had removed, the operators' exercise of this
discretion becomes state action subject to the First Amendment, not only
would disable the legislature from correcting what it perceives as mistakes
in legislation, but also would deter it from experimenting with new meth-
ods of regulating.
Id. The court held that neither the existence of expressed legislative preferences
for the elimination of indecency on cable, nor the form of legislation that "encour-
ages" private action in the sense of making it possible, would be sufficient to trans-
form private cable operator decisions to reject indecent access programming into
state action. Id. Judge Wald's dissent emphasized the fact that, when read to-
gether, the statutory provisions regarding indecency on cable were far from per-
missive. Even if the majority's reasoning is rejected on review, however, the
November Ruling does not have the same coercive effect as the indecency provisions
of the Cable Act could be deemed to have.
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III. THE WISE POLICY APPROACH TO "HARMFUL" POLITICAL
ADVERTISING
A prediction of the likely doctrinal outcome does not end the
inquiry. Ultimately, the assessment of the FCC's November Ruling
involves an evaluation of policy.30 7 In leaving decisions about anti-
abortion advertisements to broadcasters, the FCC has taken a par-
ticular policy decision that has both institutional and substantive
aspects. Cogent arguments - supported by various visions of the
public interest and the proper role of the administrative agency in
editorial decisions - can be made both in support of and in oppo-
sition to the FCC's approach to graphic anti-abortion images in
political advertising. I will sketch out both positions, and conclude
that the FCC's approach, while dangerous, is the more socially de-
sirable at least as an initial experiment. I will then propose a stan-
dard for FCC review of broadcaster decisions under the November
Ruling that more explicitly articulates the FCC's approach in light
of both the possible abuses of broadcaster discretion and the likeli-
hood of strategic behavior by candidates.
As is often the case with complex social issues, support for the
FCC's November Ruling might well cross ideological lines. Albeit
for different reasons, broadcasters, mainstream conservative propo-
nents of "family values," political progressives and even some tradi-
tional libertarians might find merit in the FCC's approach.308 The
policy arguments about channeling graphic political speech can be
gathered from all these points of view.
307. Under administrative law principles, the deferential Chevron approach
would effectively obligate courts to accept the FCC's policy decision. Other stan-
dards might shift the policy analysis to a reviewing judge.
308. A number of news articles quote broadcasters, pro-choice and pro-life
advocates, and political leaders in opposition to the presentation of graphic anti-
abortion advertising. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 1 (quoting Bill Price, president,
Texans United for Life, and Janie Bush, executive director, CHOICE); Harry A.
Jessell, Broadcasters Oppose Widening Indecency Net to Include Political Anti-Abortion Ad-
vertisements, BROADCASTING, Feb. 1, 1993, at 54. See also Mary Dieter, Leising's Old
Fashioned Campaign Beat Bailey's "Offensive" Tactics, COURIER-J. (Louisville), May 5,
1994, at 4B (noting Indiana Right to Life Political Action Committee's endorse-
ment of Michael Bailey's Republican opponent); Maureen Groppe, Indiana: Myer
Steps Past 4 Challengers to Face Tough November Foe, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., May 7,
1994, at 1145 (noting GOP chairman's pleasure in Leising's political win over
Michael Bailey); Brian Stonehill, Sex and Violence, MIAMi HERALD,July 9, 1995, at Cl
(observing that, by keeping both sex and violence as single issue, Washington left
and right weigh in against Hollywood). For observations about ideology-crossing
coalitions in other contexts, see, e.g., DONALD ALEXANDER DowNs, THE NEW POU-
TICS OF PORNOGRAPHY, 26-32 (1989) (describing alliance of feminists and social
conservatives regarding regulation of pornography); Schacter, supra note 120.
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A. Policy Assessments of the November Ruling:
Broadly speaking, there are two sorts of policy arguments
about the FCC's approach to graphic anti-abortion ads. One set of
arguments is institutional, and focuses on the policies regarding the
appropriate decisionmaking entity. The other set of arguments is
substantive, focusing on the pros and cons of channeling political
speech from the points of view of various target groups. That is, the
FCC's November Ruling involves both consideration of the agency's
own institutional role and of the public interest.
1. Institutional Arguments:
a. Government Neutrality and Editorial Freedom:
Many who focus on the government's role in the regulation of
broadcasting would easily support the FCC's position entirely on
the basis that it leaves the channeling decision to the discretion of
the private broadcaster. 30 9 They might do so on the basis of con-
cerns for broadcaster autonomy and government neutrality. These
arguments could be based on notions of institutional competence,
namely, the view that the broadcaster is a more competent institu-
tional actor to exercise editorial discretion and make the broadcast
schedule decision. They could also be grounded on deeper norma-
tive notions about the appropriate relationship between govern-
mental agencies and the press, rooted in. the policies of the First
Amendment. Furthermore, both those who are doubtful about ac-
cess rights in general and those who are merely disenchanted with
their particular interpretation and application by the FCC in the
context of section 312(a) (7) would applaud the agency's decision
to return to a model of broadcaster discretion in this context.
Thus, advocates of broadcaster discretion would support the No-
vember Ruling against both increased governmental control and
more unfettered candidate access.
Some might take an entirely deregulatory position from the
outset. They would oppose both the 312(a) (7) right of access to
309. In fact, as a strategic matter, some broadcasters might choose not to have
the discretion to channel, preferring instead to be able to deflect complaints about
their judgments by simply saying that they were forced to act by government. It
would be most convenient for their relations with political advertisers, for exam-
ple, for the stations to be able to take the position that they were channeling these
ads because they were ordered to do so by the FCC. While we can only speculate
as to the broadcaster petitioners' interests in mounting a campaign to have
graphic abortion ads labeled indecent, this explanation seems quite plausible.
However, it is likely that no broadcaster would publicly admit to this kind of strate-
gic thinking in an area involving expressive rights.
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the airwaves and the section 315 prohibition on censorship. They
could claim that generalized access rights assure nothing but a me-
lee of voices on the air and pose immense problems of adminis-
trability.3 10 Opponents of access rights also argue that there is
today nothing in the nature of broadcasting that suggests that we
ought to give broadcasters less discretion to determine when to
broadcast an advertisement than we give newspapers to determine
where to place the advertisements.31' On this view, discretion to
channel distasteful political speech is the preferred position be-
tween untrammeled access and total censorship.
Even those who do not entirely condemn political access
rights, however, could still argue that they should not be inter-
preted to require complete capitulation to the desires of candidates
wishing to display graphic anti-abortion images. One might say, for
example, that the general access right approved by section
312(a) (7) does not require that broadcasters lose all discretion to
channel harmful material. Proponents of editorial discretion
would argue that there is a public interest both in exposure to a
broad spectrum of public debate and in the protection of children.
On this view, the hard questions about balancing those interests
and access to the air should be left much more directly to the edito-
rial discretion of broadcasters than to the dictates of self-interested
candidates, enforced by the intrusive oversight of government.31 2
Broadcaster discretion, on the view of its proponents, pro-
motes important values including journalistic freedom and govern-
ment neutrality as to speech and social values. Those who are
concerned about governmental neutrality in the "marketplace of
ideas" would clearly approve of the FCC's decision to leave the issue
of channeling to the good faith decisionmaking of the broadcaster.
The FCC's decision does not necessarily adopt any particular sub-
stantive viewpoint on abortion or politics. It merely leaves the
choice to the individual licensee. This takes the government out of
310. Indeed, even the Supreme Court in CBS v. DNC, in the context of re-
jecting a generalized access right to the air under the First Amendment, enumer-
ated problems attributable to access regimes. CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 123-29. For
an argument that access is problematic because it provides merely the illusion of
diversity, see, e.g., David L. Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the
Mass Media: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1973).
311. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (strik-
ing down Florida "right to reply" statute obligating newspapers to provide access to
politicians attacked by newspapers).
312. The problem of graphic anti-abortion advertising is a relatively easy one
for those who believe in total broadcaster control of content over the air and who
reject broad access notions, and even for those who, short of that, would seek to
establish few regulatory limits on broadcaster editorial judgments.
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the business of either censoring candidate speech or foisting any
particular candidate speech on an unwilling public. In addition to
all the policy reasons to support the displacement of government as
arbiter in controversial issues of expression, supporters of the No-
vember Ruling on institutional grounds also argue that private
broadcasters are affirmatively more knowledgeable and accounta-
ble decisionmakers - capable of assessing the local strength of
competing interests - than is the bureaucracy of the FCC.
b. Two Critiques of Institutional Arguments for Broadcaster
Discretion:
Critics of the institutional arguments in support of the FCC's
approach could contend that the FCC's holding in its November
Ruling is unjustifiable, strategic and dangerous, and that the wise
policy on the part of the FCC would have been to read the political
advertising rules strictly and compel broadcasters to allow the anti-
abortion advertising throughout the broadcast day. These critics
could make two responses to the institutional arguments. The first
is an empirical claim, based on the economic incentives for broad-
caster behavior. The second is an argument based on the FCC's
administrative strategy. Critics could also raise broader philosophi-
cal issues about the rationale for privileging the value of govern-
mental neutrality and the coherence of claims of government
neutrality in general.3 13
(1) Mercantile Pressures on Broadcasters:
Critics have observed that commercial broadcasting suffers
from a particular sort of blandness that arises from advertising sup-
port. Advertiser desire to avoid any controversy that might affect
consumer goodwill creates a significant incentive for broadcasters
not to offend the purchasing public.3 14 As a result, broadcasters
313. These arguments are beyond the scope of this paper.
314. See, e.g., CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 187 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[A] ngry
customers are not good customers and, in the commercial world of mass commu-
nications it is simply 'bad business' to espouse - or even to allow others to es-
pouse - the heterodox or controversial."). C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A
DEMOCRATIC PRESS 27-28, 30, 56-58 (1994); C. Edwin Baker, Advertising and a Demo-
cratic Press, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 2097, 2153-56 (1992); Steven Shiffrin, The Politics of
the Mass Media and the Free Speech Principle, 69 IND. L.J. 689, 694-98 (1994) and
sources cited therein; Cass R. Sunstein, Half-Truths of the First Amendmen 1993 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 25, 34 (1993); Weinberg, supra note 120, at 1155-56 and sources
cited therein. See also Rhonda Brown, Ad Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Ad-
vertising on Television and Radio, 6 YALE L. & POL. REv. 449, 470 (1988) (explaining
reasons for which elimination of fairness doctrine obligations unlikely to lead to
expanded forum for opinion on broadcast stations); Karen Peart, At Odds With the
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have sought to keep offensive or tasteless advertising off the air,
with offensiveness and tastelessness being measured from the point
of view of the more sensitive elements of the mass public.31 5 As
everyone involved in the abortion ad issue concedes, the graphic
ads definitely offend many people. Broadcasters would likely wish
to be able to reject or channel such unpopular material.
Moreover, newspaper accounts indicate that some viewers com-
menced lawsuits against stations and candidates in order to enjoin
the broadcast of the graphic abortion imagery.31 6 The expense of
such litigation might constitute an additional economic incentive
for broadcasters to funnel virtually all graphic anti-abortion adver-
tising to safe harbor hours if they have the option to do so.
There are several responses to these institutional arguments.
None of the lawsuits against broadcasters was successful, as could
easily have been predicted.317 Therefore, rational broadcasters
Ads; Controversial Advertising, 125 SCHOLASTIC UPDATE, No. 14, May 7, 1993, at 16
(quoting ABC-TV executive as saying that "[a] s an overall policy, we do not accept
controversial advertising of any sort[.]"). Similarly, much has been written on the
mainstream and conventional character of much news coverage, given the press'
reliance on elite (usually governmental) sources. See, e.g., Robert M. Entman, Put-
ting the First Amendment in its Place: Enhancing American Democracy Through the Press,
1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 61 (1993) and sources cited therein. For a description of
the uncontroversial and mainstream character of early radio fare as a result of
commercial sponsorship, see, e.g., MCCHESNEY, supra note 197, at 92-98.
315. For many years, personal products advertising was not allowed by the
networks. See Bruce Horovitz, Women Will Model Bras in TV Ads as Decades-Old Taboo
Falls, LA. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1987, pt. 4 (Business), at 1; Herbert Rotfeld, Power and
Limitations of Media Clearance Practices and Advertising Self-Regulation, 11 J. PUB. POL'Y
& MARKETING 87 (1992); Gary Shinners, Offensive Personal Product Advertising on the
Broadcast Media: Can It Be Constitutionally Censored?, 34 FED. COM. L.J. 49 (1982).
These days, while more frank advertising is allowed by broadcast stations, even
governmentally prepared and quite modest public service announcements about
condom use and safe sex have been edited, relegated to late night hours or simply
not accepted for broadcast at all. See, e.g., Karen de Witt, U.S. Aims Candid AIDS
Prevention Ads at Young, CHI. TRiB.,Jan. 5, 1994, at Ni; Karen Peart, supra note 313,
at 16.
More generally, a number of sophisticated commentators have addressed the
tendency of media corporations to stick to mainstream views and increasingly use
the First Amendment as a sword in order to do so. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Ideological
Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REv. 869 (1993);J.M. Balkin, Some
Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DuKE
L.J. 375, 375-87; Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle,
64 U. COLO. L. REv. 935, 942 (1993) (discussing "rightward shift in political center
of gravity of free speech argumentation"); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Resurrecting Free
Speech, 63 FoRDHAM L. REv. 971, 973 (1995) (describing views of new "speech regu-
lators" who justify regulatory agenda on ideological drift); Weinberg, supra note
120; Steven L. Winter, Fast Food and False Friends in the Shopping Mall of Ideas, 64 U.
COLO. L. REv. 965, 967 (1993).
316. See supra note 15.
317. See Bailey Plans, supra note 1; Maddox, Graphic Ads, supra note 2.
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would significantly discount the future costs and risks of such suits
in making their channeling decisions.3 18
Moreover, there is no guarantee that broadcasters would uni-
formly choose to channel all graphic political ads to late night
hours. It is unlikely that all broadcasters would end up with mono-
lithic responses to every graphic ad in every market. Even within
parameters of conventionality, there is sufficient room for differ-
ences of judgment among broadcasters. Controversial advertising
increasingly has found a home in the print medium, and the grow-
ing fragmentation of audience in the electronic marketplace might
well lead to a greater degree of tolerance for challenging advertis-
ing by some electronic media owners.
Finally, the observation that broadcasters have economic in-
centives to over-channel political speech does not necessarily mean
either that channeling should be undertaken by the government,
or that all political messages should be aired at a time of the candi-
date's choosing. It may, however, place a burden on the agency to
take such incentives into account and to place some constraints on
broadcaster discretion in order to counterbalance the economic in-
centives for blandness.
(2). The Strategic Character of the November Ruling:
Some critics may contend that the permissive structure of the
November Ruling is precisely its problem from the point of view of
institutional legitimacy. More specifically, they could say that the
FCC should not be able to achieve indirectly what it may not man-
date directly. Had the FCC expanded its definition of indecency to
include these ads, channeling would have been mandated and the
Commission's ruling would have been subject to First Amendment
testing. This Article has shown that the FCC's expressed reasons for
refusing to characterize this material as actionably indecent are not
intellectually compelling or doctrinally necessary. Therefore, the
FCC avoided constitutional challenge solely because it permitted,
but did not mandate, the channeling.3 19 Because it structured its
decisions to evade stringent constitutional review by hiding behind
the open-endedness of available legal doctrine and the narrowness
of current state action precedents, some might fault the FCC's ap-
318. This assumes that a low chance of winning deters suits from being
brought. Admittedly, groups may bring suits, despite a slight chance of winning,
for non-economic reasons. Nevertheless, although legal fees can affect broad-
caster positions significantly, the low risk of damage recovery undoubtedly has an
important effect on broadcaster perceptions of threat.
319. See supra notes 297-306 and accompanying text.
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proach as overly strategic and manipulative of the administrative
and judicial process.
Another way to phrase this argument is to suggest that, in fact,
the November Ruling does not provide for editorial diversity and
government neutrality. Rather, it could be argued, the government
simply uses the illusion of neutrality and autonomy to achieve a re-
sult that it might not otherwise have been able to justify. This is
because, as noted above, economic incentives will arguably lead
most major broadcasters to channel graphic anti-abortion ads.
Therefore, the FCC's decision is in operation nothing more than
an invitation for most broadcasters to channel. Moreover, it is an
invitation to do so without the kind of clear guidance that would
minimize discriminations on the basis of content and viewpoint.
Our commitment to ideas of free expression and robust debate sug-
gests that a policy implicitly promoting one particular substantive
value is to be avoided. And while the particular decisionmakers in
the anti-abortion ad situation will be private broadcasters rather
than the government as such, there is danger in having any one
powerful decisionmaker - whether the government or the broad-
caster impelled by economic considerations - deciding what is
"good" or "acceptable" political debate.
On the other hand, it seems counter-intuitive, from the policy
point of view, to criticize the FCC for an Order that avoids constitu-
tional and statutory problems. The FCC faced three choices in
dealing with the question of graphic anti-abortion ads: mandating
channeling, permitting channeling, or forbidding channeling.
Mandating channeling would require the FCC to make direct judg-
ments about the content of ads in general or in particular cases.
Indeed, it would enroll the government on the other side of a con-
troversial debate and require intrusive governmental oversight into
the implementation of the mandate. Similarly, a requirement to
forbid channeling and permit the ads to run at any time could be
read effectively to place the government's imprimatur on a substan-
tive view not only about the protection of unborn children, but also
about the question of women's power and social roles.320
Proponents of the FCC's strategy would contend that it allows
various forces to operate in determining the place of the ads rela-
tively free of government interference. Leaving the matter up to
the broadcaster's discretion would allow different broadcasters to
320. This insight has been ably argued in Stephen J. Schnably, Normative Judg-
ment, Social Change, and Legal Reasoning in the Context of Abortion and Privacy, 13
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 715 (1984-85).
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make different decisions - station by station, market by market,
and commercial by commercial - whether to channel any given
graphic ad. The Commission could appropriately decide as a nor-
mative matter that broadcasters could look to their local communi-
ties to determine whether the public sphere is robust enough to
tolerate such ads during the daytime. Local markets are in many
ways distinct, each with its own demographic characteristics. And
members of the community may have a better opportunity to influ-
ence broadcaster decisions than do the cumbersome processes of
administrative agencies such as the FCC. Therefore, what the com-
munity wishes to see on the air can be reflected more accurately if
broadcasters have discretion over their political advertisement
schedules. In addition, while broadcasters as a class are in fact pow-
erful, particularly because they can serve as bottlenecks on the in-
formation people can transmit over the mass media, it would be
naive to think of the political candidates at issue here as being pow-
erless individuals pitting themselves against a center of private
power virtually as coercive as government. They too are part of an
increasingly vocal and organized interest group. Without govern-
mental intervention into the selection of material to be aired, there
might be a negotiated balancing of candidate influence and broad-
caster assessments of the strength of competing interests at the lo-
cal level.
Even if a parallelism of action would often result, the constitu-
tionally significant notion of state action today suggests that permis-
sion to do something a private party will predictably want to do
should not be considered an illegitimate governmental policy
choice. It would be a bootstrap, undermining the state action no-
tion, to claim that administrative attempts to conform to it are
thereby illegitimate. Nor should the inevitable line-drawing and se-
lection of precedent from super-saturated doctrinal fields be con-
sidered ipsofacto questionable.
The political advertising statutes do not call for an interpreta-
tion that would require virtually complete capitulation to federal
political candidates. We might be particularly loath to have the
FCC explicitly adopt such a reading of the statute, especially as it
undermines government neutrality and broadcaster autonomy. All
general objections to the notion aside, it could be argued that there
is something to be said for the government's refusal to read a statu-
tory command unnecessarily broadly in a fashion that would under-
mine broadcaster editorial discretion. Editorial discretion permits
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broadcasters to balance harm to children and political speech on a
case-by-case basis.
Despite such arguments in favor of government neutrality and
broadcaster editorial autonomy, however, critics' concerns about
broadcasters' economic incentives and strategic administrative deci-
sions are powerful warnings. The fear of a chilling effect on polit-
ical speech by censorious and discriminatory (or even timid)
broadcasters with the blessing of government is a worrisome scena-
rio. The "local self-determination and negotiation" model does not
fully quell those concerns. The community benefits to be gained by
looking to community views of what should be channeled are bal-
anced by the difficulties of resting political access rights on commu-
nity views. This approach could predictably have the effect of
reflecting the views either of the majority in a community or those
of a well-organized and vocal minority interest group. This in turn
is manipulable, limits the dissemination of unpopular views, and
promotes orthodoxy. Moreover, while the FCC's elegant end-run
of constitutional review is beneficial from the point of view of for-
mal governmental neutrality and consistency with the First Amend-
ment, it is institutionally worrisome in its lack of candor. These
observations of the complexity of the institutional arguments for
broadcaster discretion counsel vigilance with regard both to broad-
casters and to the Commission.
2. The Substantive Arguments for Channeling:
In addition to policy arguments about institutional roles,
graphic anti-abortion advertising raises substantive issues implicat-
ing the FCC's statutory mandate to promote the "public interest."
The substantive arguments can be articulated positively or nega-
tively, and divided into arguments based on harm to society321 and
harm to children. I conclude here that even though the societal
arguments in favor of channeling are illuminating, the child-protec-
tive rationale is the most supportable. The substantive arguments
in support of the FCC's November Ruling proceed from the as-
sumption that even if all broadcasters exercised the discretion pro-
vided by the FCC's approach and channeled all graphic anti-
321. The substantive arguments of those who would regulate this kind of
political advertising for reasons grounded in protection of public debate do not
single out the broadcaster discretion element as a legitimating factor. In addition,
some of their arguments would justify banning or mandated channeling of these
sorts of ads. Nevertheless, the Commission's laissez-faire approach is a close sec-
ond best for people who have a substantive objection to this kind of advertising.
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abortion advertising, their substantive decisions to do so would be
laudable as a policy matter.
a. The Protection of Political Debate:
One set of substantive arguments for the regulation of graphic
anti-abortion ads is based on the protection of political debate.
This notion, in turn, is grounded on a particular theory of politics
and the role of mass media. On this view, public debate should be
rational and based on truthful and complete information. Those
who adhere to this view would argue that the Communications Act
does not demand complete access and untrammeled political de-
bate in the mass media. In fact, there is a significant societal senti-
ment that, while it is desirable in some ways to allow politicians
their own voices on the air, there is also something democratically
unsatisfying about a political debate conducted primarily through
paid political advertising.
On the other hand, there are significant slippery slope dangers
of using a single theory of politics, particularly this view of politics,
to legitimate the disciplining of political speech. Difficult policy is-
sues are raised by the related arguments about non-deceptive and
rational political discourse.
(1). Arguments from Manipulation:
Disapproval of unrestricted airing of graphic anti-abortion ad-
vertisements is frequently rooted in an argument based on distaste
for political manipulation. For example, many viewers object to
what appears to be the strategic and manipulative character of
some of these advertisements and anti-abortion candidacies. 322
322. See, e.g., Booth, supra note 1; Crossfire, supra note 4 (comments ofJanelle
Yamarick, director of Georgia Abortion Rights Action League, labeling the ads
"crude, misleading and false"); John Harmon, Anti-Abortion Ad Rattles TV Station;
Court Asked to Declare it Indecent, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 29, 1992, at E4; Jackson,
supra note 300; Walston, supra note 4. See also Sheppard, supra note 3, at 407-08.
There are many senses in which such advertisements could be characterized
as manipulative. The text discusses a number. Two additional particular instances
should be mentioned, however. Some of these ads lead to a charge of incitement.
As the comments of Planned Parenthood in the FCC's proceeding preceding the
November Ruling point out, Howard Phillips, one of the anti-abortion congressional
candidates, aired an ad which featured a series of pictures of dead and aborted
fetuses with a voiceover that concluded as follows: "Here are some of the names,
addresses and faces of the abortionists who kill for money and who commit their
grizzly deeds in our state." Comments of Planned Parenthood, supra note 8, at 4.
The ad then identified - by picture, name and home address - a former medical
director of Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa while the narrator stated: "How-
ard Phillips urges you to contact these baby killers and urge them to mend their
ways." Id. at 4-5. When the ad identified the current medical director, the narra-
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Some of the candidates have essentially admitted that they were not
serious candidates for the offices they were formally seeking, and
were not waging campaigns designed to win seats.323 They were
don assured that "[a] vote for Howard Phillips is a vote to prosecute the baby
killers for premeditated murder." Id. See also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Moreover, exposure to graphic anti-abortion imagery has been claimed to trig-
ger violent anti-abortion protest behavior. For example, the attorney for the con-
victed murderer of a physician who performed abortions claimed that his client's
actions were influenced by excessive exposure to graphic images of abortion. See,
e.g., William Rabb, USA: Defendant Guilty, Sentenced to Life in Doctor's Murder, REUTER
NEWSWIRE, March 6, 1994; Id. at Mar. 4, 1994 (repeating abortion doctor killer
Michael Griffin's claim that repeated viewings of graphic anti-abortion videos
poisoned his mind); infra note 330. While the context of these claims in a criminal
trial necessarily requires that they be taken with a grain of salt, it is nevertheless
significant that charges of manipulation and brainwashing have been associated
with the abortion images even by a person of the same political stripe as the candi-
dates who seek to air the ads.
For a critique of manipulative television political spots and a pitch for "fair,
accurate, contextual, comparative, engaged campaign discourse ... [,]" see KATH-
LEEN HALLJAMIESON, DIRTY PoLrmcs: DECEPTION, DISTRACTION, AND DEMOCRACY 11
(1992).
323. Michael Bailey, for example, has said that he entered the congressional
race to "make sure TV stations would have to run his anti-abortion ads without
censorship." Leslie Scanlon, Woman Again Tries to Block Abortion Ads Candidate,
COURIER-J. (Louisville), Apr. 25, 1992, at 9A. "TV stations never accepted my pro-
life scripts before," said Mr. Bailey. Id. "Running for Congress gave me the oppor-
tunity to say 'Hey, you've got to run these.'" Jan Hoffman, The 1992 Campaign:
Media; Picture is Jumbled on Which Abortion Messages Can Get on TV, N.Y. TIMES, June
11, 1992, at A18. See, e.g., Nightline, supra note 10 (Jackie Judd, ABC News: "As for
Michael Bailey, he will admit that he got into the race for the purpose of getting
the anti-abortion footage on the air. Critics say that's cynicism at its worst."); Cross-
fire, supra note 4 (comments by Rep. Dornan: "Not one of those... candidates was
even on the radar screen till they ran those ads, and like the horrible films of the
Holocaust, it's educating America that we're killing babies with a beating heart and
brain waves."). Although Michael Bailey himself bemoans his political loss, which
he appears to attribute to broadcasters and the FCC, he admits to the ideological
purpose of his ads: "because our ads were kept off the air before 8:00 P.M., hun-
dreds of unborn babies, whose mothers might have seen the truth and made the
decision to keep them, were aborted in the weeks that followed." Bailey, supra
note 1, at 162. Republican Senate candidate Rod Beck of Idaho stated: "[m]y
eventual goal, of course, is to be elected to the U.S. Senate. My primary goal,
however, is to save the lives of children." Dan Popkey, Idaho Senate Candidate Airs
Graphic Anti-Abortion Ads, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, May 18, 1992.
On the other hand, some of these candidates "brisde[ I at claims that [they
are] taking advantage of the rules to use the airwaves as a pulpit." Ed Garsten,
Political Candidate Allowed to Run Controversial Ads, CNN, INSIDE POLrrIcS, Transcript
No. 291-5, Mar. 15, 1993 (discussing Republican congressional candidate Ken Cal-
lis and quoting Callis' disclaimer: "First of all, I'm not doing it just to get the
commercials on. Secondly, if getting elected was not an issue, I would drop out
today."). See also Scott Rothschild, Democrats Engage; Hutchinson's Fight is in Court,
AP POLIT. SERVICE, Feb. 11, 1994, 1994 WL 3356755 (quoting anti-abortion and
pro-gun rights candidate Stephen Hopkins as saying: "if I'm elected you will have
someone who will kick butt and take names and not worry about the fallout").
Even Michael Bailey has said that he has a broader platform of "conservative Chris-
tian positions," Scanlon, supra note 323, and, in response to the suggestion that his
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simply taking advantage of access opportunities fortuitously af-
forded by the law to obtain otherwise unavailable media coverage
for their cause.3 24
Section 312(a) (7) requires a commitment to provide access to
candidates "on behalf of [their] candidacy." The single-issue candi-
dacies of Michael Bailey and his cohorts were designed more as ge-
neric platforms for the anti-abortion position, regardless of the
candidate, than as opportunities for the presentation of particular,
well-rounded political personas. While the statutory language does
not define the term "candidacy," and while notions of political cam-
paigns centered on the candidate rather than her beliefs do not
have any intrinsic desirability, it could be argued that the Congres-
sional commitment to a candidate-centered politics is not pro-
moted by cookie-cutter scripts for indistinguishable candidates.
The graphic ads themselves, as well as the candidacies, are sub-
ject to the charge of manipulation. First, it might be argued that
the decision to use such graphic ads to make the anti-abortion
point was intended as a political ploy, to manipulate both the polit-
ical process and the system of political coverage by the press in this
country. As noted above, the very fact that anti-abortion candidates
were attempting to air graphic ads of abortions itself created con-
troversy and became a news story. Accordingly, the ads were re-
broadcast and discussed in talk shows for free. 32 5 Second, several of
the ads' sponsors publicly affirmed their intentions to shock viewers
with their images.326 Advertisements designed to elicit shock - a
was not a legitimate run, that "it's not based on the facts. We are running this race
to win, we have from the very beginning .... Nightline, supra note 10.
324. Michael Bailey explained his candidacy thus:
And I was reading the law, the reasonable access law, that said if you are a
federal candidate and you run for high office in America, your television
ads, by law, cannot be censored, they must be aired during prime time,
and they must be aired for the lowest political rate. And I went, "Eureka,
praise god, there's a way to get the truth on television."
Nightline, supra 10 (comments of Michael Bailey). See also id. (comments of Mark
van Loucks, plaintiff in court case to enjoin graphic ads: "in my judgment, this is
indeed a sham and a fraud. These people, in my opinion, are not legitimate candi-
dates for public office. They're hiding behind the skirts of Section 315 of the
communications act."); Sheppard, supra note 3, at 408-09 (discussing and rejecting
this argument).
325. See supra note 10. Michael Bailey "got almost as much free publicity from
the local media.. . as he did in terms of... the amount of minutes that his ads
ran." Nightline, supra note 10 (comments of Prof. Thomas Wolf, Indiana Univ.
Southeast). See alsoJAmrESON, supra note 322, at 123-35 (concerning incorporation
of ads into news and effect of ads on news); Perl, supra note 46 (quoting Becker
opponent as saying that Becker's ad campaign "was a political ploy to get as much
political exposure as he could.").
326. See supra note 11.
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programmed response to gore - instead of a thoughtful political
stance might be said to be definitionally manipulative.3 27
Indeed, the graphic approach to political ads in general seems
largely designed to prey on viewers' preconceptions. For example,
California State Controller Gary Davis, running in the Democratic
primary for Governor Pete Wilson's Senate seat in 1992, showed a
thirty second commercial featuring scenes of the Los Angeles riots
and the April 29 beating of white trucker Reginald Denny by Afri-
can-American men.3 28 The appeal to prejudice is also particularly
327. Such advertisements might even have the opposite effect than desired,
by offending people and alienating potential adherents. Whether because of a
concern that viewers would feel manipulated, or from the fear that they would
simply feel offended by the images, Michael Bailey did not receive the endorse-
ment of his local anti-abortion group. See infra notes 354-59 and accompanying
text. See also Michael Basil et al., Positive and Negative Political Advertising: Effective-
ness of Ads and Perceptions of Candidates, in TELEVISION AND POLITICAL ADVERTISING
VOLUME I: PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES 245, 250 (Frank Biocca ed. 1991) and
sources cited therein (on reactions to negative advertising); JAMIESON, supra note
322, at 262-63 (describing negative voter response to Pat Buchanan ad featuring
scenes from gay documentary Tongues Untied); MONTAGUE KERN, 30-SECOND POLI-
TICS: POLITCAL ADVERTISING IN THE EIGrTIES 209 (1989) (concluding that "hard-
sell [negative] ads have greater potential for backfiring"); MICHAEL PFAU & HENRY
C. KENSKI, ATTACK POLIIcs: STRATEGY AND DEFENSE 11-12, 158 (1990) (concerning
"backlash-generating potential" of negative ads).
Naturally, many factors interact to determine the success of a given advertising
campaign. Research on the effectiveness of negative advertising has produced
complex and even inconsistent results. For discussions about the negative political
ad, see generally BRUCE L. FELKNOR, POLITICAL MISCHIEF: SMEAR, SABOTAGE, AND RE-
FORM IN U.S. ELECTIONS (1991); JAMIESON, supra note 321; KAREN S. JOHNSON-
CARTEE & GARY A. COPELAND, NEGATIVE POLrrICAL ADVERTISING (1991); KERN,
supra; FRANK I. LUNTZ, CANDIDATES, CONSULTANTS, AND CAMPAIGNS (1988); PFAU &
KENSKI, supra; TELEVISION AND POLITICAL ADVERTISING VOLUME I: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PROCESSES 197-263 (Frank Biocca ed. 1991); Spencer F. Tinkham & Ruth Ann
Weaver-Lariscy, A Diagnostic Approach to Assessing the Impact of Negative Political Televi-
sion Commercials, 37J. BROADCASTING & ELEC. MEDIA 377, 377-78 (1993); Peter F.
May, Note, State Regulation of Political Broadcast Advertising: Stemming the Tide of De-
ceptive Negative Attacks, 72 B.U. L. REV. 179, 179 (1992).
328. Associated Press, Candidates Using Graphic TV Ads, CHI. TRIB., May 24,
1992, at C5. This is not to say that shocking ads were not broadcast prior to 1992,
nor that negative television and radio advertising has not made a place for itself in
political life. Lyndon Johnson's famous Daisy ad - which suggested that Barry
Goldwater would lead the country to nuclear war - is a famous example of classic
negative campaigning and visceral politics. See EDWIN DIAMOND AND STEPHEN
BATES, THE SPOT: THE RISE OF POLITICAL ADVERTISING ON TELEVISION 121 (1988);
JAMIESON, supra note 322, at 54; PFAU & KENSKI, supra note 327 at 5-12; Jeffrey A.
Levinson, Note, An Informed Electorate: Requiring Broadcasters to Provide Free Airtime to
Candidates for Public Office, 72 B.U. L. REV. 143, 157 n.51 (1992). More recently, for
example, Republican Presidential candidate Pat Buchanan ran an ad accusing
President Bush of supporting "pornographic and blasphemous art;" the ad appar-
ently contained footage, from the documentary Tongues Untied, of scantily clad gay
men dancing. JAMIESON, supra note 322, at 262-63; Lafayette, Candidate's Ads, supra
note 1. As noted above, Larry Flynt once threatened to run for president and air
X-rated clips in his campaign advertising. See supra note 42. Further, surely no one
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evident in Bailey-produced ads for an Ohio congressional candidate
running on an anti-homosexuality platform in 1994. The ads were
described by Bailey as being "the most powerful anti-homosexuality
ads ever to hit American television," featuring a number of men
kissing passionately.32 9 Obviously, these images were designed to
elicit an automatic reaction of distaste from a largely homophobic
population.
In addition to seeking an automatic reaction of disgust, the
graphic anti-abortion ads have been claimed to be misleading in
blowing up one inch fetuses to video screen size and showing third
trimester abortions, thereby implicitly and erroneously suggesting
that such late procedures are typical.330
needs reminding of the infamous Willie Horton ad in the Bush-Dukakis presiden-
tial contest. See, e.g., JAMIESON, supra note 322, at 15-42. See also sources cited infra
note 339. However, viewers might easily find that these anti-abortion ads use quali-
tatively more graphically shocking imagery than any other political advertisement
seen on television. See, e.g., TV Monitor, Abortion 0, Braves 1, THE HOTLINE, July 7,
1992 (quoting unidentified woman regarding Becker ad: "I thought it was the
most graphic commercial I've ever seen in my life and so extremely distasteful.").
329. Tom Dorsey, Bailey is Putting Graphic Ads on Abortion, Gays Back on TV,
COURIERJ. (Louisville), Feb. 24, 1993, at 2C. Ironically, the possibility of ads fea-
turing graphic images of homosexuality was one of the arguments offered by Mark
van Loucks, a viewer who sued to enjoin the anti-abortion ads, in support of his
view that this type of advertising would be harmful to children and should be chan-
neled or banned. Nightline, supra note 10 (Mr. van Loucks: Tnext time we'll have a
gay rights advocate running for Senate wanting to show sexual intercourse be-
tween two men in day [crosstalk] television, or maybe ... an animal rights activist
. .. "). For a careful description of the ways in which negative political ads trigger
visceral responses and stereotypes, see JAMIESON, supra note 322, at 64-101.
330. See, e.g., Booth, supra note 1 (noting abortion rights advocates' claim that
graphic anti-abortion ads are misleading in part for this reason); Crossfire, supra
note 4 (discussing claim that portrayal of third trimester abortions as typical is
misleading because no more than one percent yearly are third trimester abor-
tions); Nightline, supra note 10 (comments of Janet Benshoof, Center for Repro-
ductive Law & Policy); Crier & Company, supra note 4 (on rarity of third trimester
abortions). State law severely limits the availability of third trimester abortions in
manyjurisdictions. See alsoJerry Gray, House Acts to Ban Abortion Method, Making Use
Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1995, at 1 (noting congressional vote to ban dilation and
evacuation abortion performed in third trimester) [hereinafter Gray, House Acts].
The ads have also been characterized as misleading in a broader fashion. One
commentator argued that the abortion debate in 1992 showed "the unwillingness
of some individuals to deal with the real, critical economic and social problems
that face America. It's always easier, in tough times, to talk about morality, to beat
up on women than it is to come up with hard answers to real social and economic
problems." Crier & Company, supra note 4 (comments of Ellen Chesler, author of
WOMAN OF VALOR: MARGARET SANGER AND THE BIRTH CONTROL MOVEMENT IN
AMEICA). In a similar vein, one of the anti-abortion candidates' opponents said
that the graphic tactics ignored the public outcry against the ads and obscured
other issues, such as reforming health care, reducing the federal deficit, and en-
hancing the state's economic development. Harmon, supra note 322, at E4.
For an argument that negative political ads should be regulated on deceptive-
ness grounds, see generally May, supra note 327.
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Finally, the manipulative aspect of the advertisements is argua-
bly exacerbated in the larger social context in which they are to be
assessed. The meaning and power of these ads are in large measure
contextual. Therefore, it may be that seeing a graphic anti-abor-
tion ad today - against the backdrop of the increasingly anti-abor-
tion Republican-controlled Congress and a rash of abortion clinic
violence and murder - sends a far different message than it would
if a woman's right to choose to have an abortion were more clearly
and broadly protected legally and in practice.3 31 Perhaps the ads
would not exist if the increasing growth of a vocal minority of ex-
treme pro-life advocates 332 were not combined with weakened and
disheartened women's groups3 3 3 and the decreasing protection of
331. Recent years have seen such a clear and publicly noted pattern of vio-
lence and harassment against persons and institutions that provide abortions that
citations are hardly necessary. See, e.g., National Org. of Women v. Scheidler, 968
F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994) (describ-
ing alleged criminal acts by abortion foes); Abortion Clinic Violence: Oversight
Hearings on H.R. Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1985 and 1986); Sandra G.
Boodman, Abortion Foes Strike at Doctors' Home Lives; Illegal Intimidation or Protected
Protest?, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1993, at Al (reporting six-fold increase in acts of vio-
lence and terrorism against abortion clinics, workers and physicians between 1990
and 1992); Mary Pat Flaherty, Antiabortion Activists Tell of Grand Jury Questions on
Violence, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 1995, at B3; Laurie Goodstein & Pierre Thomas,
Clinic Killings Follow Years ofAntiabortion Viwlence, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1995, at Al;
Comments of Planned Parenthood, supra note 8, at 12-13. The anti-abortion tac-
tics have ranged from murder, harassment, vandalism, intimidation of abortion
service providers and their families, fire-bombing and destruction of clinic prop-
erty to campaigns designed to tie up family planning clinic phone lines, and inter-
fering with appointments scheduling by making fictitious appointments. See
Boodman, supra; Comments of Planned Parenthood, supra note 8, at 12; Good-
stein & Thomas, supra. Some anti-abortion activists have defended violence
against abortion workers. See, e.g., Flaherty, supra (describing anti-abortion activists
who see murder of abortion providers as "justifiable homicide."); Rabb, supra note
322 (comments of Ku Klux Klansman John Burt and Paul Hill, leader of Defensive
Action). As discussed above, these ads have even been linked with violence against
abortion providers. See, e.g., Rabb, supra note 322; discussion supra note 321. They
have been characterized as "psychological terrorism." Kunerth, supra note 3 (quot-
ing Jane Johnson of Planned Parenthood).
332. See, e.g., Boodman, supra note 331; Eliza Newlin Carney, Evangelicals in
GOP Ranks, NAT'L J., July 29, 1995, at 1947; Alissa J. Rubin, As Congress Takes Up
Social Issues, Whose Values Will Prevail; After 100 Days of Silence, Antiabortion Back-
Benchers Are Gearing Up for Battle, WASH. POST, May 7, 1995, at C3. See also LAURENCE
TRIBE, ABORTION: A CONFLICT OF ABSOLUTES 139-96 (1990) (discussing develop-
ment of "New Right"). For a thorough account of the rightward turn in this coun-
try in general, see generally KENNETH KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S ExPRESSION:
VISIONS OF POWER IN THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION (1993). On the
growth of social conservative groups opposed to sex on the air, see cites collected
in Levi, supra note 68, at 97-98 & nn.234-38.
333. See, e.g., SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH (1994); Nina Easton, "I'm Not a Feminist
But... "; Can the Women's Movement March Into the Mainstream?, LA. TIMES (Maga-
zine), Feb. 2, 1992, at 12. I am not claiming that the feminist movement is mori-
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abortion rights by the courts,3 3 4 state legislatures,335 and the House
of Representatives. 33 6 That they are, however, suggests to some that
unfettered access to all dayparts for this kind of assaultive speech is
particularly bad social policy.
On the other hand, this is an extraordinarily dangerous argu-
ment, hinging suppression on the fear of the growing political
power of a group with whose views the critic does not agree. And
allowing broadcasters to channel these political ads on the ground
that the candidates' campaigns are not serious is similarly danger-
ous. 33 7 The notion of conditioning political access on whether a
bund; indeed, the conservative Congress' recent attack on reproductive rights has
galvanized women. See, e.g., Debbi Wilgoren, Gingrich, GOP Favorite Targets at NOW
Rally; Tens of Thousands Turn Out to Support Women's Rights, WASH. POST, Apr. 10,
1995, at Bi. Until this political sea-change, however, it is fair to observe that the
increasing size, efficiency, mobilization and organization of the right to life move-
ment was not matched by similar cohesion and efficacy in the women's movement.
334. For examples of the Supreme Court's constriction of the abortion right,
see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173 (1991); Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). While
none of these cases have overturned the right established in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), they have obviously burdened its exercise.
335. See, e.g., RichardJ. Thurman Ballwin, Letters from the People, State Tests Lim-
its with Abortion Bill ST. Louis POsT-DISPATcH, May 1, 1995, at 6B (describing Mis-
souri Senate Bill 279, requiring women to obtain permission from unskilled,
volunteer case managers before seeking abortion); Rogers Worthington, State by
State, Laws Create Confusion, CHI. TRIB., June 30, 1992, at 4C (describing "growing
patchwork of state laws that will further constrict women's access" to abortion). Cf
Neal Devins, The Countermajoritarian Paradox, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1432, 1449-55
(1995) (reviewing DavidJ. Garrow, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (1994)) (although arguing that state govern-
ments have respected Supreme Court decisionmaking authority in area of abor-
tions, observing that "most elected government action has sought to limit abortion
rights.").
336. See, e.g., Editorial, Abortion Under Fire, THE PROGRESSIVE, Aug. 1995, at 9
(discussing Republican fight against abortions); Gray, House Acts, supra note 330;
Jerry Gray, Family Aid Plan Rejected in Hous N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1995, at Al; Jerry
Gray, Issue of Abortion is Pushing its Way to Center, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1995, at Al;
Judith Havemann, Abortion Foes Win Senate Vote; Ban on Coverage in Federal Health
Plan Moves to Conference, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1995, at Al; Janet Hook, Abortion
Funding Limits Clear House; Legislation: Bill Passes on 215-206 Vote and Would Allow
States to Deny Medicaid Money in Cases of Rape and Incest. Issue is Tied to Controversial
Spending Measure, LA. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1995, at Al; Carol Jouzaitis, Senate OKs Bill
Cutting Abortion Funding for Federal Employees, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 6, 1995, at 6C; Rubin,
supra note 332; Late-Abortion Ban Sent to House Floor, LA. TIMES, July 19, 1995, at
All; Warren Vieth, Senate Acts to Limit Abortion Coverage to Rape, Incest Cases, LA.
TIMEs, Aug. 6, 1995, at Al.
337. Note, of course, that the FCC's November Ruling would not permit the
channeling of these ads simply because they were perceived as manipulative. The
only expressly asserted justification for channeling of this material is feared harm
to children. In addition, although I have set out the argument, I take the position
that this basis for regulation is too dangerous and inconsistent with First Amend-
ment values.
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candidate believes that she is likely to win is problematic, and not
only because of the difficulty of establishing the "seriousness" of a
candidacy. Fringe party candidates often know that they will not
win elections, but wish to familiarize the public with their views as
they articulate them. Having an objectively verifiable possibility of
wining an election (or at least a subjective belief in the likelihood of
success) should not be a litmus test for participation in politics. In
addition, creating public debate about the advertisement, and thus
the issue, arguably furthers rational political discourse.
Reliance on the manipulative character of the graphic anti-
abortion imagery, while also question-begging, is more adminis-
trable. It is possible to imagine a deceptiveness type of standard
(akin to an FTC analysis) that could more justifiably be applied to
the anti-abortion ads. Yet, the anti-abortion candidates deny that
the ads are misleading and defend their use of third trimester fe-
tuses on the ground, inter alia, that fully formed babies are less of-
fensive to view than the results of earlier abortions. 338 Even if this
justification is given the low level of credence that it appears to de-
serve, there would still be the question of distinguishing the decep-
tiveness of graphic anti-abortion advertising from the deceptiveness
of other kinds of more traditional political advertising.33 9
338. See, e.g., Booth, supra note 1 (quoting Jimmy Fisher to effect that "it is
better to see the whole baby... than half a baby").
339. Critics of political ads generally have charged some of them with being
intentionally deceptive and misleading. This is particularly true of negative polit-
ical advertising. See, e.g., JAMIESON, supra note 322, at 59-63, 84-101 (describing
ways in which political television ads invite false inferences as result of peripheral
processing of visual cues and use of veiled cues); Lance Conn, Note, Mississippi
Mudslinging: The Search for Truth in Political Advertising, 63 Miss. L.J. 507 (1994);
May, supra note 327. Moreover, it may well be argued that smoother and more
subtle advertising is in fact far more dangerous because it will not provoke reac-
tion, but will have unchecked underground effects.
More generally, it can be said that all advertising is intended to be manipula-
tive in some sense. After all, advertisers wish to convince potential buyers that they
should choose the advertised product. They often do so by subtly playing up as-
sociations with desirable cultural symbols and models of identity. Critics of "con-
sumer culture" or advertising culture complain that these unrealistic images have
deleterious effects both on individuals and on the social fabric as a whole. See, e.g.,
STUART EWEN, ALL CONSUMING IMAGES (1988); Stephen J. Schnably, A Critique of
Radin's Theory of Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REv. 347, 385-89 (1993) and
sources cited therein.
Nevertheless, on the particular effectiveness of visual political cues that foil
argument and persuade without analytic scrutiny of the message, see generallyjAMiE
SON, supra note 322.
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(2). The Pros and Cons of a Model of Deliberative Politics:
In an argument related to the charge of manipulation, we
might find these graphic abortion images offensive and inappropri-
ate to the extent that they can be said to undermine a certain sub-
stantive vision of rational political discourse.3 40 Our political
discourse consistently employs the rhetoric of the well-informed
electorate.3 4 1 The attempt to inject shock - the visceral - into
political discourse is antithetical to the idea of a politics that is sup-
posed to be informed and deliberative. A softer version of this is
the notion that sensible decisions are not made in the heat of the
moment. These graphic ads are designed to sway by the power of
the image, substituting for reflection on the issues as a whole. Just
as criticism of negative advertising rests in part on the argument
that attack ads are designed to elicit simplistic and knee-jerk reac-
tions to complex problems,3 42 criticism of graphic anti-abortion ads
as well can rest on their improperly and incommensurately sensa-
tionalistic effects on public discourse about a complex and contro-
versial social problem.
The bottom line, on this view, is that there are many ways to
express a political viewpoint - and even the horror of abortion -
340. Jackson, supra note 1 (quoting NARAL executive to effect that ads "in-
flame tensions rather than try to responsibly explore the issue of choice"). See, e.g.,
Crossfire, supra note 4 (comments of New York Democrat Rep. Nita Lowey: "I think
that instead of rationally discussing the issue ... we are showing this graphic, ugly,
disgusting, obscene photograph ... I think this is a cheap way to discuss an issue,
and let's get together and discuss this issue rationally."); Nightline, supra note 10
(Prof. Thomas Wolf, Indiana Univ. Southeast: "He has corrupted the system, both
from the standpoint of what we would ordinarily accept as being appropriate for
television, and from a standpoint of what the campaign should do, presenting is-
sues, presenting differences of positions, in a rational, unemotional situation.").
341. This is frequently cast as the aspirational norm against which current
practice is compared and found wanting by observers from all political vantage
points. It is fashionable to bemoan a politically uninformed and apathetic electo-
rate, declines in voter participation, and a news media insufficiently committed to
in-depth coverage of political issues. Journalism critics call for engaged, informed
debate on public issues. See, e.g., JAMIESON, supra note 322. Politicians and aca-
demics question the effectiveness of the 30-second spot in promoting informed
citizenship. See supra note 136, infra 342, 348-49. Civic republican legal theorists
aspire to a system of free expression designed "to ensure a well-functioning delib-
erative process among political equals." CASs R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITU-
TION 84 (1993). See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE
SPEECH 72-73, 82 (1993).
342. For criticism of negative political ads on these grounds, see May, supra
note 327, at 181-83, 189; TimothyJ. Moran, Format Restrictions on Televised Political
Advertising: Elevating Political Debate Without Suppressing Free Speech, 67 IND. L.J. 663,
664-73 (criticizing political spots generally); Victor Kamber, Political Discourse De-
scends into Trivia, ADVERTISING AGE, Feb. 25, 1991, at 20. See generally JAiESON,
supra note 322.
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powerfully and viscerally without having these sorts of video ex-
cerpts of "reality." Channeling these ads might well create an in-
centive for pro-life groups to invent powerful alternative
advertisements making the same point. If we can regulate in the
indecency area by reference not to the subject of sex, but to the
manner of presentation, then this area of graphic anti-abortion ad-
vertisements should be dealt with analogously.
On the other hand, proponents of reasonably strong political
access rules would argue that this substantive argument should fail
both because of broadcaster incentives for ineffective political cov-
erage and, more generally, because of the need for a full, robust
and inclusive vision of politics not limited to rationalist discourse.
There are also obvious weaknesses in paternalistic arguments that
prevent speakers from choosing their preferred form of expression
because of a view that they could accomplish their goals more effec-
tively in different ways.
The anti-abortion candidates could respond that shock is the
first step to opening closed or inattentive minds and leading to
thought on the issue. It could also be argued that the image of
politics as reasoned discourse is bloodless, conventional, and main-
stream. There is no intrinsic reason to prefer such a politics to one
of the heart as well as the mind. From flag burning3 43 to wearing
expletives on one's jacket in a courtroom, 34 the law has taken cog-
nizance of the role of passion, shock, and confrontation in the con-
text of political speech. Shock value may be an important way to
begin a process of informing and mobilizing the public.
Views of speech as a tool of enlightened and rational political
discourse adopt an anti-populist notion of why we protect expres-
sion constitutionally.3 45 Indeed, it may well be that the kind of
shocking discourse exemplified by the anti-abortion ads reflects
what is out there in at least some parts of the heartland. If a visceral
attachment to a viewpoint and a belief in the value of an emotive
politics exist in popular culture, then the attempt to exclude their
343. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
344. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). For a discussion of the constitu-
tional problems of regulating political speech with a view to improving public de-
bate, see, e.g., Moran, supra note 342, at 680-717.
345. Cf. J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104
YALE L.J. 1935 (1995) (reviewing CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF
FREE SPEECH and noting elitist and anti-populist strains in civic republican
discourse).
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expression from the arena of media politics evidences the adoption
of a particular - and exclusionary - vision of politics.346
Finally, perhaps the fundamental difficulty with promoting a
political discourse requiring rational inquiry and serious attention
to the full ramifications of complex problems is that some social
problems - and abortion may be one of these - are incapable of
being resolved or even discussed in a rational and deliberative way
with everyone. The notion of a rational and deliberative politics
that these ads may undermine assumes that all participants in the
discussion speak the same language and can address issues coopera-
tively, with many shared assumptions. But those who wish to air
graphic anti-abortion advertisements fundamentally disagree that
rational discourse about the subject of abortion is either possible or
likely to lead to consensus.347 To them, abortion is simply murder
and not a social policy issue susceptible to cool and calm reason.
Indeed, the imposition of calm reason on the horrifying image is an
effective way to cut off the only vocabulary that some opponents of
abortion believe is properly available to discuss the issue.
The substantive argument for a politics of reason is, moreover,
a bad fit for the kind of channeling rationale adopted by the FCC in
the anti-abortion context at issue here. After all, protecting chil-
dren by channeling these advertisements to late night hours does
not serve to assure us of the kind of adult political sphere that our
rationalist notions of politics might be said to promote. After the
children are in bed, the adults will be bombarded by messages in-
consistent with the deliberative model of politics. It may well be,
then, that the FCC's channeling approach is simply underinclusive
from the point of view of influencing a desired politics of reason.
Yet, complete exclusion of particular types of political speech on
grounds of a homogeneous theory of a good politics would be un-
constitutional if a state actor were to mandate it, and is surely just as
bad as a policy matter if a private party were to effectuate it. Fur-
thermore, the category of speech covered by the November Ruling
is underinclusive relative to the category of irrational, visceral-ap-
peal political advertising.
Moreover, we do not currently have the kind of engaged and
deliberative democracy or reasoned public discourse that a disap-
346. This is not to deny, of course, the exclusionary character of the ads
themselves and of this kind of popular political discourse.
347. See Gary Lawson, Thayer Versus Marshall, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 221, 221
(1993) (on rhetoric and invective as natural substitutes for rational discourse when
political culture contains no consensus about how to resolve normative questions
in a rational way).
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proval of this kind of anti-abortion advertising might suggest.3 48
Although we are not saturated with the "gut level" kind of discourse
that the anti-abortion ads represent, our conventional politics has
all too often been criticized as not much more than image poli-
tics.3 49 As noted above, we have become used to seeing hard-hitting
negative advertising during political campaigns.350 Indeed, one of
the central complaints about television coverage of political cam-
paigns is that it emphasizes the "horse race" character of politics,
fixates on the image of the candidate, and eschews reasoned, in-
formative, issue-oriented discourse that illuminates systemic social
problems.3 51 If the rest of politics is not thoughtful, then why dis-
criminate against a particular form of shocking and dissenting
speech appropriated in this case by a particular interest group? In
any event, in channeling away gut level discourse, we may be pro-
tecting not rational discourse, but merely conventional image
politics.3 52
It could be said, nevertheless, that just because we do not cur-
rently have an engaged public sphere does not mean that we
should exacerbate the situation. Additionally, despite the surface
appeal of the argument that we should decline the invitation to a
bloodless and elitist form of rationalist politics, common sense tells
us that there is a spectrum of political speech between desiccated
rationality on the one hand and gut-wrenching gore on the other.
348. See generally RICHARD SENNETT, THE FALL OF PUBLIC MAN (1978). Cf
Daniel R. Ortiz, The Engaged and the Inert: Theorizing Political Personality Under the
First Amendment, 81 VA. L. REV. 1, 4, 26-29 (1995) (arguing, in context of reviewing
campaign finance legislation, that average citizen is not politically engaged).
349. For analyses of political advertising and news coverage of political con-
tests, including criticisms of image politics and "horse race" news coverage of elec-
tion contests, see, e.g., DANIELJ. BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE: A GUIDE TO PSEUDO-EVENTS
IN AMERICA (1987); DIAMOND, supra note 328; ROBERT J. DINKIN, CAMPAIGNING IN
AMERICA 159-68 (1989); ROBERT M. ENTMAN, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT CTIZENS: ME-
DIA AND THE DECAY OF AMERICAN PoLrcs (1989); KATHLEEN HALLJAMIESON, PACK-
AGING THE PRESIDENCY: A HISTORY AND CRmcIsM OF PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
ADVERTISING (1984); JAMIESON, supra note 322; KERN, supra note 327; LARRY
SABATO, THE RISE OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS: NEW WAYS OF WINNING ELECTIONS
(1981); MARTIN SCHRAM, THE GREAT AMERICAN VIDEO GAME (1987); Rebecca Arbo-
gast, Political Campaign Advertising and the First Amendment: A Structural-Functional
Analysis of Proposed Reform, 23 AKRON L. REV. 209, 215-16 (1989); Cambell, supra
note 42, at 527 & nn.31-33; Shiffrin, supra note 314, at 701-06 & n.69; Leonard C.
Shyles, The Relationships of Images, Issues and Presentational Methods in Televised Polit-
ical Spot Advertisements for 1980's American Presidential Primaries, 28 J. BROADCASTING
405, 406 (1984).
350. See discussion supra notes 328 & 341-42 and accompanying text.
351. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 42, at 527. While it is beyond the scope of
this paper, I should note that this kind of criticism of all television coverage of
political campaigns suffers from the defects of all generalizations.
352. See supra note 349 and accompanying text.
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Despite all this, however, we should be wary of substantive argu-
ments based on a preferred theory of politics. They run counter to
fundamental assumptions underlying First Amendment values, and
would, in my view, entail far too great a danger of tyranny in the
core expressive context of politics.
(3). The Ambiguous Effect of the Political "Market":
Another substantive argument for allowing broadcaster discre-
tion to channel graphic anti-abortion ads is that the ordinary mar-
ket constraints on broadcast content do not operate in the same
way in the political realm. With regard to other contexts, the usual
expectation is that if viewers really find the broadcast material of-
fensive, they will alert advertisers and broadcasters, who will ulti-
mately change the programming in response.3 53 In the political
context, the market syllogism - that there will be complaints from
viewers to candidates about undesirable campaign advertising, that
the candidates will not win, and that they will therefore moderate
their advertising in the next campaign - relies on far more indi-
rect chains of causation than those traditionally assumed in the or-
dinary programming context. For example, we do not know that
these candidates intend to win. We do not know that, if they lose,
they will deem their failure to be caused by the offensiveness of
their advertising. We do not know that they would change their
advertisements to increase their chances of winning, as they are not
traditional candidates who pick issues and create campaign strat-
egy, inter alia, by focus group. Finally, they might win even without
change.
On the one hand, the fate of this kind of advertising may well
be influenced by the voting public. Many pro-life proponents and
Republicans distance themselves from these kinds of tactics and
graphic ads, which they fear will offend people and have a boome-
rang effect. In Indiana, for example, the Republican chairman said
that he was "extremely pleased" with the victory of State Senator
353. I am not proposing that the relationship of viewers, programmers,
broadcasters and advertisers is such that viewers in fact have a consistent and
timely constraining effect on program content. Although the success of a number
of consumer boycotts appears to suggest some truth to the notion of market cor-
rection of broadcast content without regulation, it is not necessary to go so far in
order to make the argument in text. See Patrick M. Fahey, Advocacy Group Boycotting
of Network Television Advertisers and Its Effects on Programming Content, 140 U. PA. L.
REv. 647, 691 (1991). That argument proposes that even if the viewer market is as
disciplining a force as might be thought in the ordinary course, certain peculiari-
ties of the anti-abortion candidacies stretch the analogy.
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Jean Leising over Michael Bailey. 54 Leising even received the en-
dorsement of the Indiana Right to Life Political Action Commit-
tee.3 55 Moreover, of the three Congressional candidates who used
these ads in Georgia, two lost and one was forced into a runoff in
the Republican primary in 1992. This too might suggest that the
ads will backfire politically.5 56 Some commentators have opined
that advertising like this will have the effect of getting "the true be-
lievers, the strong pro-life people to the polls" without changing the
minds of the majority of Americans, who are somewhere in the mid-
dle.357 In addition, the ambivalent reaction of the public to nega-
tive political attacks generally 58 suggests that viewers feel that one-
sided and negative political advertisements are manipulative. 59
On the other hand, Michael Bailey, for example, did win the
Republican nomination in his first try in 1992360 and was character-
ized as one of the best known politicians in southern Indiana who
"commands unusual loyalty in his followers, many of whom feel a
354. Groppe, supra note 308. Democrats attributed Leising's victory in the
primary to the Republican party's "quiet determination to keep Bailey from defeat-
ing a mainstream candidate again." Dieter, supra note 308. See alsoJackson, supra
note 1 (quoting Bill Price, President of Texans United for Life, on his criticism of
Stephen Hopkins' graphic ads on the ground that they might alienate too many
people). See also supra note 327.
355. William J. Booker & John R. O'Neill, Graphic Picture This Time Shows Bai-
ley Far Behind Sen. Leising, INDLANAPOLIS STAR, May 4, 1994, at A10; Lewis, supra note
11.
356. See Crossfire, supra note 4 (remark of Kingsley). See also Booth, supra note
1 (quoting Kathleen Hall Jamieson for proposition that ads may mobilize oppo-
nents and attract funds from groups and individuals sympathetic to abortion
rights). Moreover, the climate of anti-abortion violence, although it may make the
abortion advertisements more menacing and fraught with danger for women view-
ers, may also make the ads appear even more to be artifacts of the fringe, demoniz-
ing all candidates who would align themselves to the radical anti-choice view.
357. Crier & Company, supra note 4 (comment of Ann McDaniel, White House
correspondent for Newsweek).
358. As noted above, negative political attacks may either assist or backfire
against the candidate employing them. See supra note 327. Despite the recent con-
clusion of some social scientists and political consultants that negative political ads
are effective (for example, in enhancing recall), the data suggest that voters report
a distaste for such advertising and, especially, for the "hard sell" attack version. See,
e.g., JOHNSON-CARTEE & COPELAND, supra note 327, at 30-31. This does not mean,
of course, that such a distaste will translate into votes against candidates using
them.
359. See supra notes 322, 327 & 339. Although the social science data I ex-
amined did not fully specify why viewers and research subjects reported a dislike
for some negative political advertising, one possibility is that they felt manipulated
even as they were processing the negative information in a particularly efficient
way. See, e.g., Basil et al., supra note 327, at 258-59 (noting better recall for negative
ads, but increased dislike of candidate in negative campaign).
360. Dieter, supra note 308.
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religious zeal for his candidacy."36 1 Although he ultimately faced a
runoff, Daniel Becker finished first in the Republican congressional
primary in his district in 1992.362 Stephen Hopkins ran for the
House in 1992 and the Senate in 1993, "when he placed seventh in
the 24 candidate field." 363 These candidates were previously com-
plete unknowns. 364 Even if the controversial commercials did not
help their candidacies, they did spotlight the issue of abortion.3 65
Some of the candidates saw shock and offense as a measure of their
success in changing the grounds of the abortion discussion.
b. The Protection of Children:
The FCC did not rely on substantive arguments about the pro-
tection of a particular image of politics in order to justify its Novem-
ber Ruling. Instead, it hinged its decision on the possibility of harm
to children from exposure to certain of these graphic anti-abortion
ads, and accordingly permitted broadcasters to consider the protec-
tion of children in deciding when to air the material.
The notion of harm to children has both an empirical and a
normative component. The empirical component in turn refers
both to the generalized beliefs of lay persons and to expert assess-
ments of harm, grounded in social science data. There is evidence
that the candidates using these graphic anti-abortion images wish to
air them during daytime hours precisely and intentionally to shock
and traumatize children.3 66 At least some of them believe that chil-
dren's shocked reactions can be used to sway their parents' political
beliefs about abortion. The trauma to children, then, would not be
an unintended and unanticipated consequence, but, rather, an in-
tentional program by at least some of the graphic ad candidates.
(Others take the position that any harm to children should simply
be disregarded in favor of advertising "the truth.")
361. Mary Dieter, Choices Plentiful in Usually Active Congressional Races, Cou-
RIER-J. (Louisville), May 1, 1994, at BI.
362. Jay Bookman, Voters Engage in Rebellion, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 23,
1992, at A14.
363. Jim Simmon, Next Rulings Come From Texas Voters, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 27,
1994, Voters Guide, at 1.
364. Crossfire, supra note 4 (comments of Rep. Dornan).
365. See, e.g., Cabell, supra note 10 (concerning free publicity generated for
candidates by controversial ads); supra notes 10, 325.
366. See supra note 11 & 322. Some of the Bailey ads include a disclaimer that
the ad "is not suitable for small children; that is because abortion is so evil it is not
suitable for America." David Goetz, Indiana Candidate to Show Aborted Fetuses in TV
Ads, COURIR-J. (Indiana), Apr. 15, 1992, at Al.
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These candidates' assumptions that children will be shocked
are apparently borne out by social science theories and data. There
was some evidence in the FCC's docket proceeding on graphic anti-
abortion ads that small children experienced physical and psychic
harm as a result of exposure to this kind of graphic imagery. Social
science data support the proposition that young children learn
from images, cannot distinguish images from reality, and have
strong visual memory.3 67 Because of this visual trigger, graphic and
horrifying images have a more traumatic effect on children, partic-
ularly young children, than they do on the average adult.
The traumatic effect of these images may be reinforced by
their transmission over the powerful and intrusive television me-
dium. We have a deep ambivalence about television - denigrating
the medium and fearing its power and effects while simultaneously
spending many hours per day tied to "the tube" and constructing
our popular culture by reference to television benchmarks.3 68 The
escalating debates concerning violence on television prove, at the
very least, that there is a significant public belief in the power and
effectiveness of television.3 69 Indeed, the entire regime of advertis-
367. See, e.g., Joanne Cantor, Confronting Children's Fright Responses to Mass Me-
dia, in MEDIA, CHILDREN, AND THE FAMILY.- SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC, PSYCHODYNAMIC, AND
CLINICAL PERSPECTIVES 139 (Dolf Zillmann et al., eds. 1994) (noting that "studies
published in every decade starting with the 1930s have indicated that transitory
fright responses to mass media stimuli are quite typical, and that enduring, and
sometimes severe, emotional disturbances occur in a substantial proportion of chil-
dren");JuDITH VAN EvRA, TELEVISION AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 6-28, 83-93 (1990)
(summarizing data on children's cognition of television, including importance of
perceptual salience for comprehension by young viewers and youngsters' difficul-
ties in distinguishing between reality and television programming, and discussing
effects of television violence on children); Catherine N. Doubleday & Kristin L.
Droege, Cognitive Developmental Influences on Children's Understanding of Television, in
CHILDREN & TELEVISION: IMAGES IN A CHANGING SOCIOCULTURAL WORLD 23
(Gordon L. Berry & Joy Keiko Asamen, eds. 1993); Marguerite Fitch et al., From
Television Forms to Genre Schemata: Children's Perceptions of Television Reality, in CHIL-
DREN & TELEVISION: IMAGES IN A CHANGING SOCIOCULTURAL WORLD 38 (Gordon L.
Berry &Joy Keiko Asamen, eds. 1993). See generally CHILDREN'S UNDERSTANDING OF
TELEVISION: RESEARCH ON ATTENTION AND COMPREHENSION (Jennings Bryant &
Daniel R. Anderson, eds. 1983); ROBERT M. IEBERT &JOYCE SPRAFEIN, THE EARLY
WINDOW: EFFECTS OF TELEVISION ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH (1988) (reviewing liter-
ature on effects of television violence).
368. There are countless critical assessments, both in the lay and scholarly
communities, of television's impact on popular culture. See, e.g., DOUGLAS KELL-
NER, TELEVISION AND THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY (1990); TELEVISION: THE CRITICAL
VEw (Horace Newcomb, ed. 1987); NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH:
PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN THE AGE OF SHOW BUSINESS (1985); AMERICAN MEDIA AND
MASS CULTURE: LEFT PERSPECTIVES (Donald Lazere, ed. 1987); Elizabeth Kolbert,
Americans Despair Of Popular Culture, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1995, § 2, at 1.
369. For a sampling of the large non-social science literature on television
violence, see, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 341, at 66-67; Terry L. Etter, The Knock-
Down, Drag-Out Battle Over Government Regulation of Television Violence, 3 CoMMLAw
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ing - political or otherwise - is based in large part on the notion
that the publicity will persuade the viewer or listener.3 70 Whatever
the current social science assessment of the power of television, 71 it
is commonly agreed that TV has some effect on social mores and
behavior.3 72
CONSPECrUS 31 (1995); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & LA. Powe, Jr., Televised Vio-
lence: First Amendment Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REv. 1123 (1978);
Kevin W. Saunders, Media Violence and the Obscenity Exception to the First Amendment, 3
WM & MARY BILL RTs.J., 107 (1994); Symposium, Television and Violence, 22 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 773 (1992) [hereinafter Hofstra Symposium]; Laurence S. Winer, The Signal
Cable Sends, Part 1I - Interference from the Indecency Cases?, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 459,
524 & n.330 (1987); Ian Matheson Ballard, Note, See No Evil, Hear No Evil: Televi-
sion Violence and the First Amendment, 81 VA. L. REv. 175 (1995); Stephen J. Kim,
Comment, "Viewer Discretion is Advised": A Structural Approach to the Issue of Television
Violence, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1383 (1994); Sissela Bok, TV Violence, Children, and the
Press: Eight Rationales Inhibiting Public Policy Debates, Discussion Paper D-16 (The
Joan Shorenstein Barone Center for Press, Politics, Public Policy, Apr. 1994). For
newspaper reports of current lay opinion as to the effect of television violence, see
infra note 371.
370. See, e.g., Kevin Robins and Frank Webster, Broadcasting Politics: Communi-
cations and Consumption, 27 Screen nos. 3-4 (1986), reprinted THE MEDIA READER
135 (Manuel Alvarado andJohn 0. Thompson eds. 1990) (exploring development
of television as "the greatest selling medium ever devised"). That is why so much is
spent on advertising yearly. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 328, at 146 (describing
federal candidates' broadcast advertising expenditures).
371. There has been much debate on the effect of television violence among
social scientists tracking the social role of the medium. For overviews of the social
science data regarding the effects of television violence, see, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra
note 341, at 266 nn.46-50; Arbogast, supra note 349, at 216-20; Ballard, supra note
369, at 185-91 and sources cited therein; Bok, supra note 369, at 2-7; Harry T.
Edwards & Mitchell N. Berman, Regulating Violence on Television, 89 Nw. U. L. REv.
1487, 1534-51 (1995); Hofstra Symposium, supra note 369, at 807-54; Kim, supra note
369, at 1383 n.2; Robert S. Koppel, The Applicability of the Equal Time Doctrine and the
Reasonable Access Rule to Elections in the New Media, 20 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 499, 512-13
(1983); Kristine Oswald, Comment, Mass Media and the Transformation of American
Politics, 77 MARQ. L. Rv. 385 (1994).
372. Edwards & Berman, supra note 371. The raging debates on television
violence demonstrate that a significant percentage of the public also believes that
exposure to television violence has at least some harmful effects on children. See,
e.g., Lawrie Mifflin, Spurned by Industry, V-Chip Retains Some Mighty Friends, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 1995, at D7; Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Takes on Violent Television, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 1995, at Al; Robin Schatz, Speaking of... Media; Laws Will Not Totally
Stem Violence, NEWSDAY, July 16, 1995, Money & Careers, at 1; Robin Schatz, Swearing
to Deter TV Violence; Some Tube-Inspired Foulness from their own Kids Spurs Lawmakers,
NEWSDAY, July 13, 1995, at A45; Jube Shiver, Jr., Interest Revived in Technology that
Blocks Profanity on TV, LA. TIMEs, July 11, 1995, at D1; Adam Walinsky, The Crisis of
Public Order, MIAMI HERALD, July 9, 1995, at Cl (excerpted from ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, July, 1995); Robert W. Welkos, The Times Poll; Public Echoes Dole View on
Sex, Violence, LA. TIMES, June 14, 1995, at Al; Pediatricians Urge Entertainment Indus-
try to Tone down Media, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., June 9, 1995, at B5.
Last summer, Bob Dole chose attacks on Hollywood and television as linch-
pins of his presidential platform on the ground of the effect of the media. See, e.g.,
Dan Balz & Thomas B. Edsall, Dole's Blast at Hollywood Resonates; Theme Has Appeal
Far Beyond Social and Religious Conservatives, WASH. POST, June 2, 1995, at Al; John
M. Broder, Dole Indicts Hollywood for Debasing Culture; Politics: He Assails Entertain-
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The empirical argument in the graphic advertising context is
actually a less controversial claim than that. It is not analogous to
the anti-violence argument that watching violence on television will
cause children to act violently. Rather, the claim is simply that chil-
dren, because of the way they process images, will be particularly
frightened and traumatized by these graphic images that they can-
not clearly enough distinguish from reality. The causal nexus is
therefore far more direct than that claimed for other social effects
of television. Therefore, a substantive argument in support of the
FCC's November Ruling could rest - as the FCC's decision itself
did - on the value of protecting children from harmful material
on a powerful and virtually unavoidable medium.
In addition, the average American home has a number of tele-
vision sets and the average American spends many hours per week
watching television. Thus, television is intrusive into the home 373
- an invitee into what many see as the intimate locus of self-realiza-
tion and the zone of private control. In reality, parents argue that
they have very limited capacity to control children's access to harm-
ful television. Permitting broadcasters to channel graphic images
would enable parents to assert some additional control over the
timing and circumstances under which their children would be ex-
posed to this material.3 74
The empirical probability of some harm to children leads to a
normative question: how to balance such harm against the interest
ment Depravity.' Remarks in L.A. Are Strongest By Any Current Presidential Candidate,
LA. TIMES, June 1, 1995, at Al; William Claiborne, Dole Scores Entertainment Indus-
tiy, Time Warner for Debasing' America, WASH. PosT, June 1, 1995, at A6. President
Clinton himself joined the bandwagon. See, e.g., Purdum, supra. One of the best
examples in recent memory of assumptions about the power of television to affect
values is the national discussion prompted by then-Vice President Quayle's criti-
cism of the Murphy Brown television program on the ground that its main character
had become a single mother. See, e.g., Douglas Jehl, Quayle Deplores Eroding Values;
Cites TV Show, LA. TIMES, May 20, 1992, at Al; Barbara Vobejda, Can a Sitcom
Change Society? Debate Rises Over Popular Culture's Effect on American Values, WASH.
POST, May 21, 1992, at Al. While it is questionable whether mere lay beliefs about
the effects of television, without support in social science data, could provide an
adequate legal and policy basis for channeling, there is, in fact, such social science
support.
373. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 727-28 (1978).
374. The argument from parental control of the home requires limitation.
That parents in principle should have the right to oversee the development of
their children is one thing. That certain parents should be able to control the
material available to other households through the mass media simply because
they do not wish their own children exposed to particular views is another thing
altogether. That is not the argument I intend to make in text. Rather, I wish
simply to point out that in the narrow area of material that is demonstrably harm-
ful to smaller children, the desirability of channeling that material to prevent such
harm is reinforced by arguments grounded in parental control.
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in an unfettered sphere of political advertising. Indeed, the ques-
tion with respect at least to some candidates' graphic ads is the ex-
tent to which we will tolerate the intentional exposure of children
to horrifying material as a tool to accomplish ideological ends.
Those who support the FCC's approach in the November Rul-
ing take the position that, since the graphic political advertising will
be available to voters during safe harbor hours (not to mention by
way of reference in the broadcast news and print press), and since
one purpose of airing these ads during the day may be intentionally
to traumatize children for ideological purposes, sound policy would
dictate a regulatory approach designed to protect children from
such strategic and harmful effects.
Admittedly, talismanic references to the protection of children
can serve to mask the intrusive character of regulatory interven-
tions.3 75 Hinging access rights on broadcaster views of harm to chil-
dren runs a risk of authorizing political censorship. Therefore, it is
important as a policy matter to subject child-based justifications to
close scrutiny, to determine whether the mere reference to chil-
dren will undermine other important interests.
First, it could be argued against the child-protection rationale
that the November Ruling does not require broadcasters to channel
these advertisements. The broadcaster autonomy approach
adopted by the FCC predictably leads to localism and potentially
inconsistent scheduling decisions even within local markets. If chil-
dren are really harmed by this kind of material, channeling at the
broadcaster's discretion does not necessarily solve the problem.
Nevertheless, lodging discretion in the private hands of broad-
casters means that the public has an opportunity to convince licen-
sees to channel the material to promote the protection and welfare
of children. Between this public pressure and the economic incen-
tives to avoid controversial programming discussed above, it is
likely that most broadcasters will channel the worst ads to safe har-
bor hours. In any event, the fact that the regulation is underinclu-
sive does not mean that it should not be undertaken as a policy
matter. At least, it can reduce the likelihood and extent of harm to
children. A regulation that would mandate channeling would not
have the benefit to some candidates of having their ads aired in the
daytime, and a regulation mandating full-day access would ensure
more widespread harm to children watching television during the
day.
375. I have previously made this argument in connection with the FCC's regu-
lation of indecency. Levi, supra note 68.
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Second, it could be argued that the harm to children argu-
ment in this case is overdrawn and discriminatory because, while
explicit abortion ads are clearly horrible and unpleasant, violence
on television as a whole may be more harmful to children than the
isolated exposure to the anti-abortion ads.3 76 Candidates like
Michael Bailey and Daniel Becker contend that children are already
exposed to massive doses of graphic violence during prime time
viewing of entertainment and news, and that the argument from
harm is nothing short of "hypocrisy."3 7 7 Why single out this sort of
material, rather than focusing on the whole effect of the medium?
Yet, while there is a useful warning in this claim about over-
arguing from harm, the anti-abortion ads can be distinguished
from ordinary television violence. Virtually nothing on mainstream
over-the-air television today has the same level of graphic and ex-
plicit imagery, paired with terrifying voiceovers, as these anti-abor-
tion ads. Even news photos of corpses do not involve the gruesome
close-up shots of severed, blood-covered limbs as are contained in
these ads. The risk of harm to children - and the corresponding
rationale for channeling - is thus greater here.
Third, and most powerful, is the classic civil libertarian slippery
slope argument against channeling. What is deemed to be too vis-
ceral and too harmful varies between communities and changes
over time.3 78 Harm and offensiveness are defined by shifting per-
sonal and cultural norms and necessarily depend on the perspec-
tive of the viewer. As noted above, the harm-based justification for
regulation of political speech involves not only an empirical but
also a normative component. Why protect against certain harms
and not others? Why protect one group in society against expres-
sive harms and not others? For example, an African-American per-
son may be as offended by an advertisement in which there is the
appearance of rational discourse about racist theories as others
might be about actually seeing an abortion, or a gun control ad that
376. Cf Bailey, supra note 1, at 161.
377. Nightline, supra note 10 (comments of Daniel Becker) (referring to hor-
ror movies such as Nightmare on Elm Street); Perl, supra note 46 ("[1]ive births, actual
murders and dead bodies are shown during prime time, but abortion shows must
be viewed along with pornography and other filth from midnight to 6 a.m." ac-
cording to Becker); Cary Willis, Bailey files Complaint Over Station Limiting Ad, Cou-
RiER-J. (Louisville), Apr. 7, 1994, at BI (Bailey "ask[ing] viewers to examine the
'hypocrisy' of a TV station that is 'showing dead bodies nightly' on newscasts but
won't show aborted fetuses.").
378. The local community standard referenced in obscenity determinations is
an example of judicial recognition of heterogeneity in values.
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shows a child being blown up, or an anti-fur ad showing an animal
in a trap.
The simple, although not complete, answer to this question is
the special interest we have as a society in the protection of chil-
dren and the defense of parental power to guide children's devel-
opment.379 It does not, and is not intended to, answer the broader
questions of how to deal with offensive and hurtful speech more
generally. Whether or not we support a laissez-faire attitude toward
speech because there is no universal, unchangeable, and meta-cul-
tural notion of what is offensive, it seems clear that material which
has a demonstrable empirical effect on children is a sufficiently dis-
tinguishable situation as to be capable of resolution without engag-
ing in a wholesale post-modem critique of libertarian notions of
free speech. Admittedly, notions of what is harmful to children
change over time,just as do notions of offensiveness. Nevertheless,
with children we are paternalistic. Given what is at stake, we act on
our current understandings of harm to children even while recog-
nizing the contingency of our notions of harm.
Genuine broadcaster concerns with the welfare of children are
nevertheless amplified by the advertiser pressure on commercial
broadcasters to avoid offending the audience. And there is a signif-
icant danger of political discrimination, a chilling effect on consti-
tutionally protected dissent, and the proverbial slippery slope.
Accordingly, to the extent possible, the FCC's review of broadcaster
decisions in this area must account both for perverse results arising
from factors beyond the protection of children, and for the likeli-
hood of content-based decisions on channeling.
B. The Better Alternative:
My initial intellectual response to this problem was a civil liber-
tarian argument that it would not be good policy to interfere with
political speech, that the manner of expression is often as impor-
tant as the content, and that there was something a bit shady about
the FCC having its cake and eating it too in the November Ruling's
shift of the predictable channeling decision to private actors. I fo-
379. There is, of course, a high level of irony in the fact that we hew to this
notion as an aspirational norm and employ the rhetoric of child welfare and family
self-determination in the face of a harrowing national problem of child abuse and
poverty. Nevertheless, if the question is between protecting and not protecting the
psychological welfare of children even with respect to a single aspect of their lives,
social policy should counsel protection. (The issue of the relationship between the
social interest in the protection of parental authority over children and the in-
dependent social interest in child welfare is beyond the scope of this paper.)
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cused on the fact that the end result of the November Ruling was
retention of the by-now traditional regulatory approach to inde-
cency - which I think is not a good idea - joined with adoption
of a new sort of liberalism into the interpretation of reasonable ac-
cess for federal candidates under section 312(a) (7) - which I also
thought was not a good idea in the abstract. I concluded - in a
troubled fashion - that if we were to take the reasonable access
rule seriously, we should not allow broadcasters the free discretion
to channel to late night hours all these and other political ads they
consider harmful. The danger of broadcaster censorship of a par-
ticular kind of speech would be simply too great, I feared.
Then I had the opportunity to view a few of the advertisements.
The reality provided a gut-wrenching counterpoint to my abstract
fears of the slippery slope of broadcaster discretion. Simply put, I
changed my mind. I felt manipulated, disgusted and offended by
the derogatory images of pro-choice women and the women's
movement, by the appropriation of images of the Holocaust, by the
clinical neutrality of the "medical" voiceover providing misleading
information about abortions. That did not convince me, however,
to change my view. I am enough of a First Amendment traditional-
ist to believe that offensive political speech deserves protection.
But the personal experience of an afternoon of nausea and subse-
quent flashbacks to the grotesque and mangled images in the ads
sufficed to convince me to accept the argument that some of this
material would be tantamount to a traumatic assault on children.
I then had to think through my traditional liberal responses to
any suggestion of governmental interference with political speech.
Could any standards be developed that would minimize concerns
about enhanced media power over political speech, while at the
same time minimizing the likelihood that small children would be
exposed to the images of abortions that it would be hard to believe
would not scar even the hardiest among us? Assuming that al-
lowing room for broadcaster discretion despite the political adver-
tising rules is the better regulatory approach to the problem of
graphic imagery, the question remains whether there are any useful
ways to direct the broadcasters' deployment of that discretion.
The FCC's November Ruling does not grant broadcasters com-
plete and untrammeled discretion to channel any political advertis-
ing they do not like. There are a number of attempts in the
decision to constrain the exercise of licensee censorial discretion.
Although these constraining standards are ultimately imperfect as
expressed, they contain the seeds of a common-sense approach to
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this kind of political advertising that seems best to balance the con-
flicting interests identified above.
The FCC's attempt to guarantee that its new approach is con-
sistent with its obligations to enforce the political advertising rules
is based on three limiting principles: individualized consideration;
provision of alternative access "to times with as broad an audience
potential as is consistent with the federal candidate's right to rea-
sonable access; 38 0 and a requirement that channeling not be used
as a "pretext" for denying access.38 1
On their face, these standards appear to address the FCC's
quite proper concern that broadcasters not use the discretion pro-
vided them under the November Ruling in bad faith, in order to
promote candidacies or messages they like and bury those of which
they disapprove. Yet they also raise administratability questions.
First, the meaning of the FCC's notion of individualized con-
sideration is unclear in this context. As noted above, the Commis-
sion traditionally has held that the Communications Act required
broadcasters to consider candidates' individualized campaign
needs rather than simply treating all candidates fungibly.38 2 With
the exception of news programming, the practical reality of individ-
ualized consideration in the past required giving candidates the ac-
cess requested unless the licensee could show such significant
disruption of the broadcast schedule that assent to the candidate's
demands would not be practicable. 383
What the FCC seems to mean by individualized consideration
in its November Ruling is a determination on the part of the broad-
caster that any given anti-abortion ad featuring graphic imagery is
too harmful to be shown at a time when large numbers of children
are likely to be in the audience. 384 This adds a different element
into the individualized consideration required of the broadcaster; it
requires the individualized articulation of the candidate's needs to
380. November Ruling, 9 F.C.C.R. 7638, 7647 (1994).
381. Id. (quoting CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 387 (1981)).
382. See Section IIA.l.b. supra.
383. Id.
384. The language of the opinion is quite confusing on this issue. On the
one hand, the Commission emphasizes the need for individualized consideration.
On the other hand, its description of such individualized consideration is puzzling:
"any decision to channel must be based on the reasonable, good faith judgment of
the broadcaster that political advertisements containing graphic abortion imagery
should not be aired when there is a reasonable risk that large numbers of children
may be in the audience." November Ruling, 9 F.C.C.R. at 7647. While that state-
ment in its terms seems to call for a generalized conclusion by broadcasters, the
Commission's subsequent assurance that "[s] uch a decision necessarily requires an
individualized assessment" suggests a different reading.
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be balanced against the potential harm to children of the particular
advertisement. The FCC in its November Ruling states that in mak-
ing the requisite individualized determination, the broadcaster
"must carefully balance federal candidates' specific time requests
against factors relating to the protection of children in the audi-
ence. s3 8 5 However, the FCC provides neither standards nor gui-
dance on how the balance should be struck, nor any suggestions for
the basis of the broadcaster's assessment of "factors relating to the
protection of children in the audience." 386 Won't all candidates be
able to argue from need, focusing on their desire to reach more
adults in prime time? If all graphic anti-abortion advertisements
are not to be channeled on a blanket basis, then what will the "rea-
sonable" broadcaster use to distinguish between one graphic ad
and another? As between the amorphous notion of the protection
of children and the individualized campaign need of a Congres-
sional candidate whose anti-abortion message is designed to air, say,
at the moment of maximum influence for a piece of pending legis-
lation, the November Ruling does not define the basis on which the
FCC's mandated balancing is to take place.3 8 7
The FCC's second limiting element - alternative provision of
access - is arguably also unclear. The November Ruling's lan-
guage providing for alternative access is simply circular. How can
we decide whether a candidate has been provided "access to times
with as broad an audience potential as is consistent with the federal
candidate's right to reasonable access"? On what basis can we de-
cide whether the broadcasters have "air[ed] those advertisements
in time periods in which the audience potential is broad enough to
meet their reasonable access obligations"?38
Third, the FCC's admonition that broadcasters not use their
discretion to channel harmful political advertisements for pretex-
tual political reasons is either simply hortatory - and therefore not
particularly meaningful - or a real enforcement signal - and
therefore deeply troubling to supporters of editorial discretion and
a free press. To be administrable, a subjective good faith standard
for broadcaster decisions to channel harmful political advertise-
ments would likely entail a much more searching review of broad-
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Even though the balance between concern about children's viewing and
the needs of candidates is arguably lacking well-defined standards under the No-
vember Ruling, however, the calculus has been in theory standardless for years
under the FCC's traditional interpretation of § 312(a) (7).
388. November Ruling, 9 F.C.C.R. 7638, 7648 (1994).
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caster decisionmaking than many civil libertarians would think wise.
Therefore, it could be argued, if we are to avoid the morass of un-
due government intrusion into editorial discretion, the November
Ruling's good faith standard cannot really be interpreted to have
teeth. If, on the other hand, it does not have teeth, then candidates
lack any protection against broadcasters' mercantile imperatives or
political misuses of the license. s89
The main effect of the FCC's first limiting principle is to place
the burden on the broadcaster to show that he attempted reason-
ably and in good faith to compare the importance of that articu-
lated campaign need with the degree of harm feared for children
from the imagery of the particular advertisement. It would be ra-
tional for broadcasters faced with that burden to consider, inter alia,
the length of the advertisement and the degree to which its images
are graphic and horrifying. When interpreted along with the sec-
ond limiting principle, this ensures that the FCC faced with a com-
plaint could establish the level of the broadcaster's willingness to
work with individual candidates flexibly, within the parameters of
the degrees of harm to children predicted for different sorts of
graphic images.
With regard to the meaning of the FCC's second limiting fac-
tor, it is a commitment in principle to alternative access which, if
not perfect, is almost as good as the candidate's preferred slot. At a
minimum, this principle would require that broadcasters not de-
velop a pattern of channeling all graphic anti-abortion ads to ex-
tremely late night slots when no voters except night workers and
insomniacs would realistically be able to see them. A consistent pat-
tern of shunting controversial political ads into the dead times of
the broadcast night would indicate that a more searching inquiry
into the basis of the broadcaster's decisions would be advisable.
With respect to the third constraint on broadcaster discretion
articulated in the November Ruling, evidence of discrimination mo-
tivated by distaste for political content would be hard to unearth
without significant intrusion into the state of mind of the broad-
caster. However, both First Amendment values and an expansive
notion of unfettered political discourse might suggest that a verifia-
ble standard of harm and reasonable broadcaster behavior be used
by the FCC in reviewing complaints in order to limit the level of
permissible intrusion.
389. Cf Note, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 H. v. L. Rv. 221, 229 (1981).
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Thus, under this approach, the candidate who chose to use a
particularly jarring and graphic format of advertising would be fore-
warned that his commercial might be moved to a safe harbor pe-
riod. In turn, the broadcaster who chose to move the ad to a safe
harbor would have to justify the reasonableness of its channeling
decision if an abuse were claimed. The broadcaster would have to
show that it was reasonable in deciding that a particular graphic
advertisement would pose sufficient risks of harm to children to
warrant channeling. This is not to say that the FCC or a different
broadcaster could not have come to a different substantive conclu-
sion. Rather, the standard requires the channeling broadcaster to
provide evidence of a rational decisional process with a rational and
non-arbitrary result.
Ordinarily, I would be troubled by increasing administrative
discretion to inquire into the editorial decisions of broadcasters.
The notion that the FCC should return to the business of detailed
review of programming decisions is worrisome: a wide-ranging in-
vestigative approach would put important First Amendment values
in jeopardy. In this instance, however, we can think of the pro-
posed approach as a burden-shifting device which broadcasters ac-
cept when they choose to channel political speech. Their choice to
channel the speech justifies a level of administrative review that
would not be appropriate if there had been no expressed statutory
interest in free political speech. The importance of political speech
and the Communications Act's presumption that federal candidates
should receive access to the air justify the decision to impose the
burden on the broadcaster.
Because harm is an elastic and relative concept and because
candidates will certainly make strategic attempts to entrap broad-
casters in the FCC's legal web, however, the Commission should be
very careful in the way in which it deploys its "reasonable good
faith" standard. One can easily foresee a battle of the experts be-
tween the broadcaster's psychiatrist and those hired by a candidate
whose graphic advertisement has been postponed till late night
viewing on the issue of whether children would be harmed by see-
ing the images at issue. And if the broadcasters' harmfulness deci-
sions were grounded not on the views of experts, but on some
broader notion of general social consensus, then there would be
even more obvious problems of verifiability. That is why deference
to a rational process within supportable boundaries seems the best
option.
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Nevertheless, one can argue that so long as it focuses on the
reasonableness of the broadcaster's decision rather than substitut-
ing its substantive judgment for that of the licensee, the use of an
"objective" standard of possible harm to children will at least re-
quire broadcasters' channeling decisions to be tailored and justi-
fied, rather than mechanically triggered by blanket
preconceptions.390 With regard to the ideological broadcaster, the
rest of its channeling decisions could be analyzed to demonstrate a
discriminatory impact on certain viewpoints. With regard to the
non-ideological broadcaster, the proposed approach would likely
have a practical effect. The time and expense associated with the
burden of proving a reasonable concern about harm to children
may be sufficient to discipline at least some excessive cautiousness
on the part of the ordinary, non-ideological broadcaster. An objec-
tive standard of harm splits the difference between FCC interroga-
tion of station personnel as to their subjective views of the ads'
harmfulness on the one hand, and total FCC capitulation to broad-
caster justifications on the other.
Finally, it might be useful for broadcasters to employ the de-
vice of the disclaimer, in lieu of safe harbors, for some graphic ad-
vertisements. 391 Although disclaimers and warnings are not an
390. By using the term "objective," I mean to refer in a short-hand fashion to
the notion of consensus. Admittedly, consensus can be measured in any number
of ways, including by reference to the judgment of experts and by reference to
popular expressions of will. Neither of those methods of establishing consensus is
value-neutral. Moreover, experts will disagree; our assessment of popular will
often will depend on the loudness of the voices making themselves heard (rather
than some empirically verifiable and undistorted view of what all the citizens "re-
ally think"); and often the expert view will conflict with the sense of popular will.
Thus, different decisionmakers can come up with different versions of consensus.
Moreover, it has been suggested that consensus-based theories are majoritarian,
mainstream, and, by accepting the status quo as a starting point, implicitly
conservative.
I do not rely on consensus out of a naive desire to blind myself to these obser-
vations. Rather, I use the notion of consensus as to harm strategically, as a burden-
shifting device that allows for the exercise of some broadcaster discretion without
unduly involving the government in second-guessing the subjective rationales of
broadcasters who decide to channel any given advertisement.
391. The FCC staff has previously permitted advisories before these commer-
cials. Letter to Pepper and Gastfreund, supra note 22, at 5600. See also Letter from
Roy J. Stewart, Chief, Mass Media Bureau, to Wayne Brewies, KLOL(FM), 5
F.C.C.R. 4643 (1990) (establishing that content-neutral disclaimers acceptable
when not used selectively). Yet disclosure is far from a panacea in this situation.
As the Pacifica Court pointed out, "[b ] ecause the broadcast audience is constantly
tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer
from unexpected program content." FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748
(1978). Many commenters in the Commission's docket proceeding regarding
graphic anti-abortion advertising made this point repeatedly. Admittedly, unlike
the radio broadcasts at issue in Pacifica, television would allow a visual disclaimer to
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appropriate substitute for channeling for very harmful material,
there may be some graphic advertisements that broadcasters may
reasonably conclude can be aired at some point during prime time,
with continuous warnings. Evidence that a broadcaster had experi-
mented with disclaimers as well as channeling would augment the
record of reasonableness and individualized decisionmaking.
The benefit of the kind of approach suggested here is not that
it will "correctly" address any given instance of broadcaster judg-
ment about channeling shocking and harmful political ads. After
all, it would be at this point hopelessly naive to believe that we
could come up with a predictable and mechanically applicable rule
that would assure that only those graphic political ads which are
"truly" harmful to children would be channeled to safe harbor
hours. The real benefit of this approach is that it will give discre-
tion to broadcasters on a day-to-day basis about a controversial
political question, while assuring that broadcaster decisions will be
reviewed and debated in other, open fora. The limelight will surely
discipline the most risk-averse behavior to which mercantile imper-
atives could drive broadcasters - namely, channeling all poten-
tially controversial commercials to late night hours. Even if any
particular actions are not deterred by the possibility of review in
various fora, that review can prompt a broader discussion of the
political questions entailed by the graphic ad issue. The review can
include the FCC, the courts, and even the Congress, and can pro-
vide an opportunity to address the political advertising rules and
the various theories of free speech and democracy that underlie
our beliefs about how broadly we should interpret those rules.3 92
run on the bottom of the television screen throughout the duration of offensive
material. Yet, a safe harbor might be better than running a continuous disclaimer.
First, the viewer sees the images simultaneously with the disclaimer. Second, chil-
dren watching alone would not necessarily understand the disclaimer or switch the
channel, especially if they could not read. There is a real question, then, as to
whether this sort of "warning labels" solution averts the harm, or whether it simply
provides an illusion of a solution. Nevertheless, the possibility of advisories may
allow broadcasters to make more tailored and refined judgments about their re-
sponses to different graphic ads. Advisories, while far from perfect, allow broad-
casters the option of channeling some ads and merely adding warnings to others
considered less harmful to children.
392. 1 do not mean to suggest that Congress can easily amend a statute if it
does not like the judicial or administrative interpretations of the legislation. Many
articles have claimed that congressional constraints on statutory interpretation by
other branches is unrealistic in most instances and does not reflect the compli-
cated calculus of factors that lead to congressional action and inaction. On the
practical difficulties with the notion of legislative correction, see, e.g., William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J.
331, 353-90 (1991); Pierce, supra note 100, at 764 n.108.
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CONCLUSION
The question of whether broadcasters should be allowed to
channel graphic political speech to safe harbor hours despite the
equal opportunities and reasonable access rules of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 is a difficult one. The FCC's decision to permit
such channeling of graphic anti-abortion ads has repercussions far
beyond that specific factual context. Its rationale can extend to the
use of graphic imagery of countless other sorts in political advertis-
ing. The gun control proponent, the animal rights activist, the sup-
porter of stiff criminal penalties for rape - issue candidates of all
political persuasions - may be affected by the FCC's decision and
limited in the kind of visual strategy they can deploy in support of
their candidacies.
As a strictly doctrinal matter, it is likely that the FCC's Novem-
ber Ruling will pass both statutory and constitutional muster on ju-
dicial review. Because both the reasonable access provision of
section 312(a) (7) and the "no censorship" element of section 315
do not specifically speak to the issue of channeling graphic political
ads, the FCC's declaratory decision would most appropriately re-
ceive extremely deferential review under Chevron. Although some
rhetoric in the legislative history of the provisions - particularly
section 315 - and some prior court and FCC interpretations of the
political advertising rules could be used to support the conclusion
that political advertisements should be aired by broadcasters on a
non-discretionary common carrier basis, the FCC's decision in the
November Ruling is a rational interpretation of the statutory
scheme and therefore deserving of judicial assent. With regard to
the constitutional status of the decision, this Article has concluded
that a successful First Amendment challenge is unlikely. It would
be surprising if a reviewing court would find sufficient state action
under current interpretations of the doctrine to trigger constitu-
tional review in light of the FCC's strategy of leaving channeling
entirely to the good faith discretion of broadcast licensees.
This is not the end of the story, however. The FCC's outcome
raises difficult issues of policy. A number of arguments can be
made in support of the FCC's decision, ranging from claims about
our obligation to promote a rational, deliberative and non-decep-
tive political culture to claims about the social benefits of broad-
caster autonomy and the protection of children from harm. Yet
there are strong arguments as well - grounded both in the Consti-
tution and in public policy - for the social benefit of untrammeled
political discourse and the dangers of permitting virtually standar-
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dless private broadcaster interference with expression at the core of
the First Amendment.
This Article concludes that, on the whole, the FCC's decision
to permit broadcaster channeling of anti-abortion political ads so
graphic as to be harmful to children is the better alternative as a
matter of policy. It does so, however, not because of a substantive
desire to improve political discourse or an unquestioning belief in
the benefit of broadcaster autonomy. After all, our commitment to
freedom of expression should not only extend to political discourse
we find pleasant and congenial. And broadcasters are faced with
economic and institutional incentives that might well promote a
censorious culture and prompt virtually automatic decisions to
channel all controversial political imagery. Moreover, there is a cer-
tain discomfort (even if no doctrinal problem under current law) in
rewarding administrative agencies for the kind of strategic decision-
making that permits effects indirectly that the constitution might
have disallowed the government from achieving directly. The Arti-
cle supports the results of the November Ruling primarily because
the imagery used in many of the graphic anti-abortion ads that have
aired since 1992 is simply too shocking and harmful to small chil-
dren to warrant mandated carriage at any hour of the candidate's
choosing.
While the best arguments in support of the FCC's action are
grounded in broadcaster editorial autonomy and the protection of
children, blanket recitations about editorial freedom and protect-
ing the young should not be used to justify incursions on speech
without some safeguards against abuse. Because of the tension be-
tween channeling and untrammeled political speech, and because
of the mercantile pressures on broadcasters to be risk-averse regard-
ing controversy, this Article proposes that upon complaint, the FCC
review broadcaster decisions for signs of excessive zeal in channel-
ing. I suggest that broadcasters bear the burden of showing that
their decisions to channel were reasonable pursuant to a standard
of "objective" reasonableness regarding both the process and the
ulimate conclusion as to the likelihood of harm to children from
the particular advertisement channeled. Such a reasonableness
standard would ordinarily entail deference to broadcaster decisions
taken pursuant to a rational process, so long as the conclusion of
likely harm were rational and non-arbitrary. Although such stan-
dards are themselves subject to criticism on grounds ranging from
undue interference with broadcaster decisions to questions about
the administratability of "objective" tests, they can in fact serve both
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as adequate substantive grounds for review and as hortatory devices
and deterrents to excessive channeling of political speech by
broadcasters.
Today, the most the FCC can offer us is an experiment. Mod-
em politics takes place largely over the television screen with thirty
second political spots and negative attack advertisements. Because
we live in a culture in which most people do not watch thorough,
balanced and dispassionate discussions of political issues, candi-
dates increasingly wish to invoke the most visually immediate spot
format for their campaigns. The FCC should not seek to redesign
media politics simply because it does not like that particular form of
advertising strategy. Yet when the welfare of children is at issue in a
context in which there is no a priori reason to deprive broadcasters
of editorial discretion, the November Ruling's opportunity for
broadcasters to balance candidate autonomy over the most impor-
tant modem political forum with community control to protect
children is a rational approach. Whether that balance is struck rea-
sonably in any given context cannot be assessed in advance and in
the abstract. As in all things, the test of the FCC's decision will (and
should) be experience.
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